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Abstract 
 
The new prominence of authoritarianism ushered in a series of new studies that seek to 
explain the reasons behind the longevity of these regimes. An integral part of these studies is 
that the institutional arrangements contributed to the survival of autocrats and the 
maintenance of authoritarian regimes. In particular, they recently began considering the dark 
side of nominally democratic institutions under authoritarian regimes such as legislatures 
arguing that they predominantly serve as the means of regime survival. Given these facts, the 
overall goal of this study is to produce an understanding of the role of parliaments in the 
survival of authoritarian regimes by focusing on their institutional capacity and related 
performance. Using the Iranian parliament, Majles, as a case study, the major point of 
contention in this study are the conditions under which Majles contributed to the resilience of 
post-revolutionary Iranian regimes. Inspired by the legislative institutionalization approach, 
three main characteristics are identified to explain the authoritarian legislatures: 
subordination as opposed to autonomy, exclusiveness as opposed to representativeness and 
secrecy as opposed to deliberativeness. With respect to these criteria, it is demonstrated that 
Majles is marked as a subordinated institution, caught between powerful and influential 
formal and informal institutions. Majles also fell short of meeting the representativeness and 
deliberativeness identified as decisive criteria in distinguishing authoritarian from democratic 
legislatures. With respect to the Majles performance, it is shown that Majles has been at the 
centre of the regime co-optation strategies since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution to 
encapsulate the loyal oppositions and to exclude those were regarded as outsiders. Majles 
also acted as the main agent of manipulation of political institutions through its law making 
function and by this contributed to the stability of the Islamic Republic. 
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Introduction 
Authoritarian regimes have long been with us and still are ruling over much of the 
world‘s population, however, they have not attracted adequate scholarly attention. Instead, 
there is a plethora of literature currently being written on the democratic regimes which are 
comparatively new and often unconsolidated in most parts of the world. This is partly 
because of ‗democratizing bias‘; a tendency in the post-cold war literatures assuming all 
nondemocratic nations as partial forms of and in transition to democracy. Nonetheless, the 
resilience or backlash of authoritarianism in several countries around the world over the past 
two decades revealed that such optimism towards the prospects for democratization is 
premature. The new prominence of authoritarianism encouraged scholars to draw attention 
back to the limits of democratic change, the sources of democratic breakdown, and the 
survival of autocrats.  Central to the concern of such scholars is whether institutional 
arrangements contribute to the survival of autocrats and the maintenance of authoritarian 
regimes. In particular, they recently began considering the dark side of nominally democratic 
institutions under authoritarian regimes such as legislatures and political parties arguing that 
they predominantly serve as a means of regime survival. They put into question the 
conventional wisdom which views them as mere window-dressing or face-lifting institutions. 
Instead, they argue that these institutions are strategically designed to foster the survival of 
autocrats. They contend if such regimes remain underinstitutionalized, their tenure will be 
curtailed.  
Interestingly, the authoritarian regimes have long established various sorts of legislatures. 
Yet, how exactly they operate within such regimes and more importantly the way they 
contribute to the change or durability of authoritarian regimes remains an elusive question. 
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By revisiting the scant extant literature, three different and contrasting approaches can be 
identified in this regard. These approaches can be placed on a continuum. At one extreme, 
parliaments are viewed as the most important democratic institutions that can and should 
contribute to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes in particular in the early stages of 
democratization and also help the consolidation of democracy in the subsequent stages of this 
process. By moving along the continuum, one comes across the views of those who argue 
that parliaments lack the ample power to have an active instance in the transition process. 
They often termed parliaments as wholly rubber stamps whose main task is to approve the 
decisions already taken somewhere else. At the other extreme, there is the idea of those who 
have examined the complicated nature of authoritarian institutions arguing that the 
legislatures in such regimes serve as a means of regime survival and longevity.  
Although each approach has its limits and caveats, the latter approach has gained more 
popularity and acceptance in the recent years. The existing literature in this regard 
predominately focuses on the functions or the performance through which parliaments can 
help autocrats to remain in power. It is argued that authoritarian regimes used legislatures to 
gain popular legitimacy, manipulate the political institutions through their law making 
functions and co-opt and accommodate the opponents. In contrast to the literature on the role 
of legislatures in democratization, this literature largely overlooks the environmental and 
institutional determinants that shape and influence the parliaments‘ power and capacity to 
exercise such performance. In other words, this literature concentrates on how legislatures 
help the survival of authoritarian regimes while paying scant attention to the conditions under 
which they can make a contribution to the consolidation of such regimes.   
Given these facts, the main contribution of this research is to shed different and more 
lights on the environmental and institutional determinants of authoritarian legislatures. To 
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address these aspects of authoritarian legislatures, this research draws on the 
conceptualizations and operational indicators developed in legislative institutionalization. 
Inspired by the legislative institutionalization approach, three main criteria for the 
conceptualization of authoritarian legislatures are identified:  the degree to which the 
authoritarian legislatures are autonomous or subordinate, representative or exclusive and 
deliberative or secret. In this conceptual framework, the legislatures are posited as a 
continuum, with authoritarian legislatures greatest in subordination, exclusiveness and 
secrecy, and democratic legislatures greatest in autonomy, representativeness, and 
deliberativeness. Having acknowledged the conceptual core of authoritarian legislatures, the 
next step in this research is to identify operational indicators for the measurement of the 
concepts. The identification of these indicators proved to be very complicated and frequently 
conflated. However, a series of commonly used related indicator will be proposed.  
Although the research places its main emphasis on the capacity and institutional factors, 
it does not ignore the merits of a legislature‘s actual performances in this regard. Among 
others, the co-optation role of legislatures by which autocrats make concession with 
opponents by offering rents and policy compromise and also the legislation function through 
which they manipulate the law in their own advantages especially those laws concerning the 
main political institutions will be taken into consideration in this research.  
In order to enrich the understanding on how and under which condition legislatures 
contribute to the survival of authoritarian regimes, the Iranian post-revolutionary parliament 
known as Majles-e Shourai-e Eslami
1
 (Islamic Consultative Assembly) or briefly Majles is an 
ideal case to study. In contrast to the majority of parliaments under non-democratic regimes, 
                                                 
1
 Before Islamic Revolution Majles was called Majles-e Shouray-e Meli (National Consultative Assembly). 
From its inception on 7 October 1906, Majles has a comparatively long history; however, for the purpose of the 
study the post-revolutionary Majles in the periods between 1980 and 2004 was selected for the analysis. 
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Majles has never been dissolved and its elections have been held uninterrupted for eight 
consecutive periods since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Thus, it came to be described by 
many Western pundits as the liveliest parliamentary forum in the Middle East, surpassed only 
by the Israeli Knesset. The Majles history of interaction with non-democratic regime should 
be a good reason for trying to understand better the reasons behind its contribution to regime 
survival. The Majles experience is interesting also in that Iran has moved toward and away 
from democracy intermittently in the last three decades. For instance, the victory of the 
reformers in the sixth Majles came to be considered as testimony to a new wind of 
democratic change in Iran. However, the two subsequent sessions of Majles (seventh and 
eight Majles) signalled the massive backlash of authoritarianism. Dominated by extremely 
conservative MPs, these sessions were the best exemplars of subordinate and undemocratic 
parliaments in the post-revolutionary Iran. 
To study Majles, some important caveats are in order. First and foremost, studying the 
Iranian case is problematic in that it has received neither sufficient nor appropriate attention 
from legislative studies scholars and Iranian political scientists. Majles was neglected by 
Iranian political scientists mainly because political science in Iran has not kept pace with 
recent developments in this field. The extant Iranian political scientists placed significantly 
higher emphasis on political philosophy and history than on political institutions. With such 
reluctant interest from political scientists, it is understandable why the bulk of research on 
Majles has been done by public law experts from a legal point of view. More importantly, the 
secrecy and information constraints as a result of a non-democratic regime created significant 
obstacle for scholars to analyse any aspect of Iranian politics.
2
 The idiosyncratic 
                                                 
2
 Barros, Robert. ―Secrecy and Dictatorship: Some Problems in the Study of Authoritarian Regimes‖ C&M, 
Committee on Concepts and Methods. Working Paper Series, Number: 2. April 2005. On-line at:  
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characteristic of the Iranian political regime has also made it difficult for legislative studies 
scholars with a comparative interest to develop a clear knowledge and understanding of the 
Iranian parliament.
3
 Finally, the fast moving events in Iran make any research shortly out of 
date.  
The chapters of this research are formulated as follows. Chapter 1 offers a brief review 
of the potential role of parliaments in regime change and stability in the context of 
authoritarian regimes by taking a critical look at the extant studies. Revisiting the scant 
literatures in this regard, it identifies different and opposing approaches ranging from 
hindering to helping authoritarian regimes. It also takes a quick look at the presence or 
absence of legislatures in authoritarian regimes in the second half of last century, drawing on 
the quantitative data. Furthermore, it seeks to clarify some pertinent issues including 
authoritarian regimes definition and regimes transitional direction. In particular, it considers 
the institutional determinants influencing the authoritarian survival to make reference to the 
role of legislatures in this regard.  
Chapter 2 predominantly seeks to address the fundamental question of under which 
condition legislatures can contribute to the resilience of authoritarian regimes. To do so, this 
chapter seeks to explore and discuss the conceptual criteria and operational indicators of the 
institutional capacity of authoritarian parliaments. It begins with cursory reviews of the 
importance and origins of institutionalization approach in legislative studies and critically 
analyze its applicability to non-democratic regimes. In particular, it proposes a conceptual 
framework explaining the institutionalization of authoritarian legislatures. The framework is 
based on three criteria distinguishing authoritarian legislatures from democratic legislatures. 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.concepts-methods.org/working_papers/20050421_57_PM%202%20Barros.pdf. Accessed: 29 April 
2007. 
3
 Norton, Philip. ―How Many Bicameral Legislatures Are There?‖ The Journal of Legislative Studies10:4 pp. 1-
9 (2004) 
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It is suggested that the further legislatures go to be characterized as subordinated, exclusive 
and secret the greater the danger of losing its democratic nature. Finally a series of 
operational indicators will be identified to measure the authoritarian legislatures.  
Chapter 3 provides a detailed exposition of the research questions to be addressed, 
followed by the methodology. It will explain why the case study is adopted as the main 
strategy for the research and how the methodology and research problem matches. The main 
data collection techniques including archival and documented-based methods and elite 
interviewing are discussed in detail. It also spells out the conceptual framework of the 
research. 
Chapters 4 through 6 elaborate on the contextual and institutional factors which 
condition and influence Majles by the application of the framework proposed in chapter 2. 
The chapters are designed to give comprehensive and rich accounts of Majles and its 
surrounding environment. Descriptive in character, these chapters are extensively based upon 
archival data including various types of documents (Constitution, parliament roles and 
procedures, Gazette, annual reports), press statements, speeches and interviews printed in 
newspapers. The complementary data are also collected through in-depth interviews.  
Chapter 7 explores the contribution of Majles to the regime survival in practice by 
considering its legislative and co-optation roles. Drawing on the extant literature reviewed in 
chapter 2, it first sketches the co-optation role of Majles by exploring how Majles has been 
used by ruling clerics as the main platform to encapsulate the loyal opposition and eliminate 
the radical ones within seven subsequent sessions of Majles. Then to examine its legislative 
role, three cases of election laws, press laws and political party laws are analyzed. The 
analysis opens by examining the context within which the laws were originated and evolved, 
focusing on the centrality of Majles in different stages of making such laws. 
7 
 
The conclusion details the findings and discusses their implications as well as the 
conclusion that can be drawn from the case study.  
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Chapter 1: Parliaments and 
authoritarian regimes change and 
stability 
 
Introduction  
The overarching aim of this chapter is to review the extant literatures on the potential 
role of parliaments in regime change and stability in the context of authoritarian regimes.
4
 
With a cursory review of the relevant literatures, it becomes evident that the issue is placed in 
the intersection of two different trends of literature: authoritarian regimes analysis and 
legislative studies. Despite the ubiquitous and significance of legislatures in authoritarian 
regimes, these two mainstream literatures have not paid adequate attention to the issue. Nor 
was the linkage between two trends of literature well established. Within authoritarian regime 
analysis, there is almost a consensus that legislatures are nothing but ornamental institutions 
and thus hardly deserve to take into consideration. Huntington who first conceptualized 
political development as institutionalization has never explicitly examined legislatures.
5
 In 
the most recent literature like Brooker‘s comprehensive examination of non-democratic 
regimes the terms like ‗institution,‘ ‗legislature,‘ or ‗law‘ are increasingly absent.6 The very 
popular notion regarding legislatures in authoritarian political systems noted by Levitsky and 
                                                 
4
 For the sake of brevity, the words non-democratic and authoritarian regimes and also parliament and 
legislature would be used interchangeably throughout this research.  
5
 Having clarified the Huntington‘ idea, Gasiorowski notes: ―Huntington‘s argument about the importance of 
institutionalization also applies under authoritarian regimes, but consociationalism, party system structure, 
electoral rules, and the type of executive system are largely irrelevant and therefore presumably have little 
effect...‖ . See Gasiorowski, Mark. ―Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History 
Analysis.‖ American Political Science Review 89:4: 882–897. (1995) p. 883  
6
 Brooker, Paul., Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics, St. Martin‘s Press: New York. 
2000 
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Way
7
 is that they are not a major ―arena of contestation‖. Similarly, legislative scholars 
largely neglected or ignored parliaments in a non-democratic context.  In fact the majority of 
legislative studies literature focused on the U.S. Congress or in the context of consolidated 
democracies. Although there have been a number of researches on legislatures in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa in recent years, these works exclusively focus on democratizing or 
democratized countries in these regions.  
The limited literature on the role of parliaments in regime transition under authoritarian 
regimes posits different and opposing approaches ranging from contribution to the 
democratization to authoritarian regime survival. This is the main theme of this chapter. 
However, before proceeding to the main theme, it is necessary to clarify some pertinent 
issues including authoritarian regimes definition and regimes transitional direction. Of 
importance to this study is to explore the determinants of democratic consolidation and 
authoritarian regime survival. Among different factors contributing to the longevity of a 
political regime, the institutional determinants will be reviewed here because of their 
importance in understanding the role of legislatures in the transitional process. Once these 
introductory issues are reviewed, the chapter turns to the main point: the role of parliaments 
in regime change and durability under authoritarian regimes. Different arguments and 
approaches in this regard will be unfolded in detail throughout this chapter. 
To summarize, the chapter is organized as follows: it begins with offering some insights 
on the authoritarian regimes and authocratization including the definition of authoritarian 
regimes, direction of regime transitions and its institutional determinants. In the light of 
dichotomous and continuous definitiona, the authoritarian regimes are defined. In particular it 
                                                 
7
 Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way, "Linkage and Leverage: How Do International Factors Change Domestic 
Balances of Power?" in Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, .2006. p84 
10 
 
is discussed that political regimes can move both towards and away from democracy. 
Drawing on the quantitative data, this chapter also reviews the presence and absence of 
legislatures in authoritarian regimes in the second half of last century. The large portion of 
the chapter is devoted to the central theme of the research; the role of parliaments in regime 
change and durability under authoritarian regimes.  
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Authoritarian regimes and authocratization  
 
Authoritarian regimes definition 
As with many concepts in social science, the definition of political regimes is neither 
easy nor straightforward. Those scholars who have sought to define political regimes have 
taken into consideration different issues to offer vigorous definitions. Among others, they 
raised the issue of whether political systems should be defined in terms of kind (dichotomous 
concept) or degree (continuous concept) whether democratic and authoritarian regimes can be 
conceptualized as distinct categories or as two ends of a continuum
8
. The definition of 
authoritarian regime will be unfolded in light of this distinction.  
Authoritarian regimes as a distinct concept  
Many of the classical definitions offered of authoritarian regimes are best placed within 
this category. Such definitions are characterized by a distinctive line to classify authority 
structures and identify institutional alterations in such regimes. In earlier definitions of this 
kind a distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes was apparent
9
, the former 
defined as deeply pervading society through ideological leadership, mobilization efforts, and 
intolerance of autonomous organization, while the latter is more pluralistic and predictable in 
nature. Given that relatively few totalitarian regimes exist in the contemporary world, the 
term totalitarian regime grew obsolete. In this classical definition the main criteria for 
definition is the organization and bases of support in authoritarian regimes. Apart from the 
traditional distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, the subsequent studies 
                                                 
8
 Collier, David, and Robert Adcock. ―Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about 
Concepts.‖ Annual Review of Political Science 2, 537-565 (1999)  
9
 For instance see Arendt, Hanna The Origins of Totalitarianism. London: Andre Deutsch. Baumann, ([1951] 
1986) and also Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. 2nd ed. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1965 
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have identified a wide range of nondemocratic regimes. For instance, Linz and Stepan
10
 have 
put forward the authoritarian typology by identifying the types of ―post-totalitarianism‖ and 
―sultanism‖ to portray communist totalitarianism. Chehabi and Linz11  advanced different 
types of personalist rulers termed as sultanism.  Bratton and Van de Walle
12
 added 
neopatrimonialism to this classification. The predominance of military regimes in the 
developing world gave rise to the study of these regimes. O‘Donnell distinguishes the main 
subgroups of military regimes as bureaucratic-authoritarianism.
13
 Although these typological 
strategies offer useful insights to the understanding of authoritarian regimes, they are put into 
question in that they are not applicable to a broad range of cases in different periods. As 
Snyder and Mahoney argued Linz and Stepan‘s insights are ―idiosyncratic‖ and ―apply to just 
one country.‖14 As a result, in new definitions scholars attempted to base the classification on 
a more comprehensive basis. For instance, drawing in part on the work of Samuel Huntington, 
Geddes identifies personalist, military, and single party regimes as three main classifications 
of authoritarian regimes. She also includes ―amalgams‖ or hybrids of these three generic 
types. Her classification is largely on the basis of differences in ―control over access to power 
and influence rather than formal institutions.‖15 Hadenius and Teorell16 , however, focus on 
the different ways in which autocrats hold on to power: monarchies that involve hereditary 
succession, military regimes that use or threaten the use of force, and electoral regimes that 
                                                 
10
 Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 1996.  
11
 Chehabi, H. E., and Juan Linz. (eds.) Sultanistic Regimes. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
1998. 
12
 Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas Van de Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
13
 O‘Donnell, Guillermo. 1979. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American 
Politics. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies. 
14
 Snyder, Richard and James Mahoney ―The Missing Variable: Institutions and the Study of Regime Change,‖ 
Comparative Politics 32:1, 103–22. (1999) 
15
 Geddes, Barbara, ―What do we know about Democratization after Twenty Years?‖, Annual Review of 
Political Science, Vol. 2 (1999).p,123 
16
 Hadenius, A., & Teorell, J. Pathways from authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 18:1, 143–156. (2007) 
13 
 
can be further distinguished by the degree of party competition permitted in national-level 
elections.  Alternatively, Cheibub et al
17
 argue that the way in which governments are 
removed from power set the distinction between democracies and authoritarian regimes. They 
noted ―Monarchs rely on family and kin networks along with consultative councils; military 
rulers confine key potential rivals from the armed forces within juntas; and, civilian dictators 
usually create a smaller body within a regime party—a political bureau—to co-opt potential 
rivals.‖18  
 
Authoritarian regimes as a continuous concept 
Although the continuous or degree approach has gained increasing popularity in 
comparative democratization, its application to the authoritarian regimes has not been free 
from challenges.  For one thing, the dominance of democratic thinking appears as a 
significant barrier to adopt this approach in defining the authoritarian regimes. In fact, in 
most definitional debates the departure point and fundamental concept is democracy. Non-
democratic regimes are seen as residual categories of democracy and often defined in terms 
of what they are not rather than what they are. Yet, to say that these regimes are non-
democracies scarcely captures their complexity. To address this challenge, some scholars 
focus on the fundamental concept of authoritarianism and instead enumerate a variety of 
regimes with adjectives attached to authoritarianism rather than to democracy. For instance 
Linz
19
 argues that many democracies lack the minimum standards of democracy and thus the 
application of democracy title to them is nonsense. Instead, he suggests the terms of ‗electoral 
authoritarianism‘, or ‗centre authoritarianism with subnational democracy‘. Levitsky and 
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Way
20
 focus on the fundamental concept of authoritarian and coin the term of ‗competitive 
authoritarianism‘, as a diminished variant of authoritarianism. Diamond21 puts forth a more 
ambitious and wide-ranging attempt in regime classification. He regards ―hybrid regimes‖ as   
those regimes which are neither fully democratic nor ―politically closed authoritarian.‖ Then 
depending on the degree of competitiveness within them, he classifies hybrid regimes as 
―competitive authoritarian‖ or ―hegemonic electoral authoritarian,‖ leaving a residual 
category of ―ambiguous regimes.‖  
In general, there are several objections to continuous definitions. First of all, as Diamond 
admits, these definitions ―are offered more in an illustrative than a definitive spirit.‖ The 
exact institutional or procedural criteria are not determined explicitly. Nor is any effort made 
to offer a classification of countries in different periods. After all, these definitions place 
groups of countries at different intervals along a single continuous (quantitative) dimension 
rather than drawing on actual categorical regime traits (based on the qualitative differences 
between authoritarian regimes).  
An important conclusion can be drawn from the above definitional challenges is that 
both dichotomous and continuous definition contribute to the knowledge to make sense of 
authoritarian regimes. Dichotomous definition in particular gave rise to the identification of 
diverse authoritarian regime typologies while continuous definitions draw on the fact that 
there exist a range of intermediary types between full democracy and absolute dictatorship. 
However, these definitions and classifications as they stand are nothing but rough sketches. 
In order to understand better a particular authoritarian regime the idiosyncratic character of it 
must be taken into account.  
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Democratization and authocratization  
The global proliferation of democratic rule increasingly became the subject of academic 
interest after the overthrow of the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships in mid-1970s, an 
event which ushered in the so-called ‗third wave‘ of democracy in the world history.22 The 
transition toward democratic regimes that started in Southern European countries spread to 
other non-democratic countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe so that by 
the middle of 1990s, there were more 120 democratic countries comprising roughly 60 per 
cent of the whole independent countries around the world
23
. In an influential book The Third 
Wave, Huntington
24
 defines democratic transition or democratization as a group of transitions 
from non-democratic to democratic regimes that take place within a stipulated period of time 
and that extensively outnumber transitions in the reverse direction to authoritarian regime 
during that period. He refers to three such waves in contemporary history: the first was 1828–
1926; the second 1943–1962; and the third 1974–1989. He also notes that each wave was 
thwarted by a period of democratic ‗reversals‘ in which democratic countries were collapsed 
and authoritarian regimes were re-established.  The inter-war and war years were examples of 
periods when the world witnessed an immense reversal in democratization, whilst the years 
shortly after war saw a dramatic increase in the number of democracies. More significantly, 
however, during the third wave the number of countries moving toward democracy has 
unprecedentedly increased.  
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Democratization 
As democracy flourished in various parts of the world, scholars began to predict the 
demise of many enduring autocrats. Influenced in part by Huntington‘s third wave of 
democratization thesis, the so called school of transitology emerged and became dominant 
from the early 1990s. The theoretical foundation of this school had been developed some ten 
years previously, and had focused on the fascism in Europe and the military dictatorships in 
South America prior to the mid 1980s. The concepts and methods utilized in relation to those 
processes were adopted or modified to explain the new wave of changes. The aim of 
transitology is to explain political change from authoritarian to democratic regimes through 
predictable stages or along a consistent path. As O‘Donnnell and Schmitter25  put it, the 
countries in transition usually follow a ―three-part process of democratization consisting of 
opening, break-through, and consolidation‖. Against this theoretical background, the bulk of 
this writing assumes that there is a definite end towards which countries in transition are 
inevitably moving. In practice, this school has evident normative consequences among 
academics as well as policy makers: a tendency to see more and more states democratize. It 
has also been a basis of confusion between understanding of democratization and making 
policy for democratization promotion programmes. In the late 1980s, at the height of the 
‗third wave‘ of democratization , which coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis 
Fukuyama
26
 went further and announced an ‗end of history‘- by which he meant that the 
breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe gave rise to ‗an unabashed victory of economic 
and political liberalism‘ over its rivals. But with the passage of years it became apparent that 
triumph of democracy is hardly inevitable.  
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Authocratization 
By the mid-1990s, however, democratic consolidation appeared threatened in a number 
of countries and the spread of democracy seemed halted, leading scholars to ask whether 
authoritarian backlash spelled the end of the third wave. Carothers
27
 argued that the three-part 
process of democratization consisting of opening, break-through, and consolidation hardly 
runs so smooth in reality. More importantly, he observed that most transitory countries do not 
fit in this black and white picture and instead they are caught somewhere in the middle.  
By the turn of the twenty-first century the world once again witnessed the resurgence of 
democratization. The new wave started with the downfall of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia 
and reached its height in the wake of ‗colour revolutions‘ of 2003– 2005 in the former Soviet 
Union. Whether this should be regarded as a new wave of democracy (fourth wave) or a 
belated extension of the third wave depends upon how one classified this trend in terms of 
time frame and political dynamics. Some scholars have argued against the notion of waves.
28
 
The subsequent events including the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, 2004–2005 Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine and 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan increasingly raised the 
prospect of further democratic revolts on at least a regional scale, possibly setting an example 
outside of the former Soviet Union which might be culminating to a global ‗rainbow of 
revolutions‘. However, the optimism about the prospects for democratization proved to be 
premature. In a short few years, with the powerful backlash of authoritarianism, the world 
slid into a democratic recession. Democracy was thwarted or increasingly stifled in several 
countries, including Nigeria, Russia, Thailand, Venezuela, and, most recently, Iran and 
                                                 
27
 Carothers, Thomas, ―The end of the transition paradigm.‖ Journal of Democracy 13:1 (2002) 
28
 Kuzio, Taras ―Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Postcommunist Countries: Comparative 
Perspectives on the Fourth Wave‖, Demokratizatsiya, 16:1 (2008)  
18 
 
Afghanistan. To be sure, Freedom House‘s annual survey 29  of political rights and civil 
liberties in 2009, reported that for four subsequent years the most regions experienced 
stagnation while sub-Saharan Africa and the non-Baltic former Soviet Union experiencing 
the most decline.
30
 This has been accounted for a growing sense that this new wave of 
democracy has reached the high-water mark and has begun to recede. The recent reverse 
changes in regime transition especially since the onset of the third wave of democratization 
has spawned new interest in the way political regimes move either towards or away from 
democracy rather than focusing only on the transition toward democracy. This encouraged 
scholars to recognize that the process is susceptible to be reversed and backtrack as well. 
―Autocratization‖ was coined as an opposing terminology for democratization.31   In this 
sense, one should not expect that one of the two typical directions of regime change to be 
teleological or given. This begs other significant questions: Which conditions do determine 
the direction of regime transition? Why have some countries remained stable while other 
undergone dramatic changes? The next section attempts to address partly these questions by 
focusing on the institutional arrangement of regimes. 
 
Institutional arrangements and regime change and durability 
Having acknowledged that regimes are moving toward and away from democracy, the 
second crucial issue is the degree to which these fragile new democratic regimes are durable 
or consolidated. This concern gave rise to the sub-discipline of ―consolidology‖ and the 
popularity of democratic consolidation concepts among academic scholars.
32
 Consolidation 
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was initially identified by O‘Donnell 33  as a resistance to the decline or slow death of 
democracy that ultimately leads to a democradura. These arguments were mainly attempted 
to address the fundamental question of when new democracies can be free from the threats of 
democratic collapse. As Di Palma
34
 put it, ―at what point ... can democrats relax?‖ In Linz‘s35 
classical notion, consolidation is largely described by the ―only game in town‖ metaphor 
which consider attitudes and behaviours. This initial notion of regime stabilization was 
adopted and redefined by subsequent scholars. Among others, Schedler
36
 elucidates five 
different usages of the same term. The crucial factor in consolidology debates is the ability of 
institutional arrangement to make democracy governable and thus more stable.  Przeworski et 
al
37
 for instance note that ―democracies survival does in fact depend on their institutional 
systems‖. The institutional foundations of democratic consolidation spawned a diverse array 
of literature. The dominant approach employed in such literature termed ―Patterns of 
Democracy‖ approach relying on large-scale statistical comparisons over time and space and 
looking at macro-level constitutional factors.
38
 A fundamental theme raised is that these 
trends of literature are to examine which system is more desirable for democracy. To address 
this issue some scholars argue that parliamentarism provides the best institutional prospects 
for democratic stability.
 39
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As with the discussion associated with the consolidation of democratic regimes, a crucial 
issue to the study of authoritarian regimes is the survival of autocrats or the maintenance of 
authoritarian regimes.
40
 To address this challenge a vast body of literature emerged. Some 
studies rely largely on the societal interests and collective actors to understand the change and 
continuity of authoritarian regimes.
41
 Others draw on different strategies consistently used by 
autocrats to ensure their longevity including the use of force to repress the opposition or the 
propagation of public legitimating ideologies to win the hearts and minds of peoples.
42
 An 
emerging body of literature has begun to focus on the institutional arrangements contributing 
to the maintenance of authoritarian regimes. The initial studies mainly take into account 
institutions that are distinctively authoritarian, such as the party state, the military junta, the 
secret police and different sorts of machinery of propaganda while the recent studies have 
shifted their attention to those institutions that tend to associate with democratic regimes, 
such as legislatures, constitutional courts, multiparty elections, non-state media, and 
federalism.
43
 The underlying argument is that because the repression and use of force is 
costly and in some instances ineffective, the autocrats have no choice but to accommodate 
opposition and make concessions to induce cooperation from outsiders. These concessions 
take the form of the distributions of rents or policy compromise. The policy compromise in 
particular should be made through a series of institutional forums. Nominally democratic 
institutions like legislatures and political parties serve as the best institutional arrangement for 
this purpose.
44
 Given these facts, the related scholars argue that these institutions are the 
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result of strategic choices and have an impact on the survival of autocrats. They contend if 
such regimes remain underinstitutionalized, their tenure will be curtailed.
45
 The most 
prominent challenge to this discussion is that although the existing literature maintain that 
nominally democratic institutions in dictatorships help authoritarian survival, they were not 
able to clearly explore how they do so, why the same results could not be accomplished 
without them, and why they are adopted in some cases but not others. Yet the most 
significant conclusion drawn is that institutional arrangements do matter both in the longevity 
of autocrats and consolidation of democracy. In the light of this argument it is plausible to 
raise the question of if and to what extent parliaments do matter in this respect. However 
before getting into this discussion it is important to consider the existence of parliaments in 
these regimes. The next section deals with this concern by drawing on the quantitative data.  
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The presence and absence of parliaments in authoritarian regimes 
 
Parliaments under authoritarian regimes have been largely marginalized and at times 
suspended or completely dissolved by military junta, strong parties and monarchs. It is also 
widely argued that the overwhelming dominance of external institutions and apparatus left 
these parliaments little room to manoeuvre. These facts, however, are not in contradiction to 
the ubiquity of legislatures in such regimes. In fact, the historical evidences suggest that 
legislatures have long existed and do still exist under such regimes throughout the world.  
Figures 1 and 2 represent the number and the percentage of authoritarian regimes with and 
without legislatures throughout the world between 1951 and 1999. Two databases were 
employed to determine the distribution of legislatures in authoritarian regimes: the 
Przeworski et al.‘s 46  Political and Economic Database known as ACLP and Keefer‘s 47 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI). The former database traces the continuity and change 
of authoritarian regimes with and without legislatures between 1951 and 1990. The latter 
construct the same trend between 1975 and 1999. Given that Przeworski et al.'s dataset does 
not include oil-exporting countries, Keefer's dataset offers an alternative list of these 
authoritarian regimes.  
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Figure 1: the percentage of authoritarian regimes with and without parliaments 
between 1950 and 1999
 
Source: Przeworski et al.
 
(2000) for 1955-1974 and Keefer (2002) for  1975-1999. 
 
Figure 2: the number of authoritarian regimes with and without parliaments between 
1950 and 1999
 
Source: Przeworski et al.
 
(2000) for 1955-1974 and Keefer (2002) for 1975-1999. 
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The number of authoritarian regimes increased gradually from around 40 in 1951 to a 
height of 108 in 1978. Then the world witnessed a decline in authoritarian regimes to about 
90 by 1999. Coincided with the process of decolonization in the early 1960s, authoritarian 
regimes without legislature grew abruptly.  The growth of authoritarian regimes without a 
legislature was slow for about fifteen years but once again they increased considerably until 
the mid 1970s as in 1976 there were 47 authoritarian regimes without a legislature. But by the 
early 1980, there were around seventy authoritarian regimes with legislatures.  
Despite the growth in the number of authoritarian regimes, the ratio of authoritarian 
regimes without a legislature to authoritarian regimes with a legislature has been surprisingly 
stable between the years under study. As presented in Figure 1, an average of 70 to 80 
percent of all authoritarian regimes have had elected legislatures. Only during the 1970s did 
this percentage decrease to less than 60 percent, however shortly after that there is a 
considerable growth in the number of authoritarian regimes without a legislature.  
Table 1: transition toward and away from democracy 
 Become authoritarian 
after independent 
Transition to 
authoritarianism 
Authoritarian regime  
With 
legislature 
Without 
legislature 
With 
legislature 
Without 
legislature 
Abolish 
legislature 
Establish 
legislature  
1955-59 3 1 1 2 2 4 
1960-64 20 1 3 6 6 5 
1965-69 7 0 1 7 5 12 
1970-74 2 1 0 4 13 16 
Total 1955-74 32 3 5 19 26 37 
1975-79 1 0 2 0 0 0 
1980-84 0 0 6 0 0 0 
1985-80 0 1 2 0 0 0 
1990-94 2 0 4 0 0 0 
1995-99 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Total 1975-99 3 1 15 0 0 0 
Source: Przeworski et al. 
 
(2000) for 1955-1974 and Keefer (2002) for 1975-1999. 
Table 1 shows in further detail the number of transitions to authoritarian regimes after 
independence or from already sovereign countries which were democratic. The number of 
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transitions between authoritarian regimes with and without legislatures is also presented in 
Table 1. It can be witnessed that the majority of regime transitions happened before 1975. 
After independence, 35 countries moved toward authoritarian regimes from 32 established 
parliaments while another three did not. This average is reversed in the countries that shifted 
from democratic to authoritarian.  19 countries abolished legislatures while only 5 countries 
kept legislatures after shifting from democracy to authoritarian regimes. Within authoritarian 
regimes 26 autocrats established legislatures and 37 lost them. After 1975, however, the 
changes are few and far between. The numbers of legislatures in authoritarian regimes 
remained stable, only a few countries become authoritarian regimes with legislatures after 
independence, and most regime transitions toward authoritarianism resulted in authoritarian 
regime with legislatures (15 cases).  
This quick review of the quantitative data on the presence and absence of parliaments in 
authoritarian regimes reveals several interesting findings. First, at the time of independence, 
authoritarian regimes with legislatures are more likely to emerge than authoritarian regimes 
without legislatures. It is in part because of the fact that most autocrats inherit a variety of 
pre-existing organization and institutions. As Schedler
48
 notes they ―will be selective in 
accepting, modifying, or transforming given structures of rules and power‖. The democratic 
breakdowns represented an opposing result as the numbers of authoritarian regimes without 
legislatures outweigh those with legislatures. Another interesting conclusion to be drawn is 
that democratic breakdowns before 1975 resulted largely in authoritarian regimes without 
legislatures but after 1975, all authoritarian regimes have been shown to keep the inherited 
legislative institutions from former democratic regimes. The numbers of elected legislatures 
have also increased considerably compared to the unelected legislatures.  
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By now it is evident that institutional arrangements like parliaments do matter in regime 
change and stability and that both authoritarian and democratic regimes have long established 
different sort of parliaments. In the following the main point of the study will be made: if and 
how do parliaments contribute to the regime change and stability. Three different approaches 
identified by revisiting the literature will be discussed in detail in the next sections. 
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Parliaments as ornamental institutions 
The conventional wisdom posits legislatures as ornamental or wholly rubber stamp 
organizations with very little, if any, influence in regime change and stability. This approach 
is reflected in the earlier studies taking into consideration the parliaments in non-democratic 
regime particularly those in newly independent nations. These studies often portray 
parliaments as exclusively dependent variables or extremely subordinated institutions. They 
increasingly focus on the dominant role of the cultural and political environments in the 
establishment and survival of viable legislatures. Riggs
49
, for example, starts with the 
contexts under which legislatures originate and obtain "salience" and "durability." He 
discusses the emergence of "constitutive systems" composed of three interdependent 
components: one or more national elected assemblies, an electoral system designed to select 
its members, and a party system. He identifies different ways through which these three 
elements interact with one another and then proposes a classification of ―constitutive systems‖ 
based upon the system's relationship with the bureaucracy. He argues that ―constitutive 
systems‖ with legislatures of varying degrees of salience and durability produce different 
patterns. To demonstrate the different possibilities, Riggs undertook case studies of the 
evolution of constitutive systems in ten Southeast Asian nations. Based on this framework 
and case studies, he arrives at the conclusion that elements such as the nature of the 
indigenous culture, geography, levels of industrialization, urbanization, and social 
mobilization ―do not seem to be as highly correlated with the kind of polity that emerges or 
the roles assumed by elected assemblies as the structural mode of genesis. [In Southeast Asia, 
a] basic factor affecting the genetic mode seems to be the policies followed by imperial rulers 
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in dealing with their dependencies"
50
. Apart from its complicated terminology, the main point 
Riggs's full model made is that the circumstances under which new nations come to 
independence shape and influence increasingly the type of legislative structure and the way it 
operates. By the same token, Sisson and Snowiss
51
 note that viable legislative institutions 
necessitate a supportive ideology including constitutionalism and individual rights. In newly 
independent nations where "parliamentary institutions are either borrowed or inherited from 
colonial regimes, supportive ideologies are not likely to be well-developed". In the absence of 
such conditions or a supportive ideology, Sisson and Snowiss argue, legislatures in these 
states will be viable as long as they can serve the interest of dominant classes.  Weinbaum's
52
 
study on the parliamentary institutions under authoritarian regimes in Iran, Turkey, and 
Afghanistan is distinguished from former studies in that it tends to address the conditions that 
can lead toward or away from legislative viability. He argues that a transformed legislature 
might be conditioned by one of several events: an abrupt expansion or contraction in 
executive powers, a radical modification in the configuration of parliamentary parties, a 
revision in formal constitutional procedures, a change in societal norms regarding the 
legislature, a change in the level of support accorded to the legislature by attentive publics.  
Weinbaum's work has much to do with Riggs's as both emphasize the overwhelming 
dominance of party and executive power over legislatures. As with Sisson, he also highlights 
the significance of societal norms. However, Weinbaum fails to find a link between the 
different factors that he identifies. In general his idea is in conformity with Riggs and Sisson 
as he summarizes the status of legislatures as, "especially modifications in their decisional 
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and integrative capacities, were the results of events elsewhere in the political system and 
largely beyond their control".
53
 This predominant notion considering parliament as 
subordinate institutions is also reflected in those studies classifying parliaments in terms of 
their powers and rank them against one another. The classifications are based largely on the 
policy making power of parliaments in relation to the executive and portrays the parliaments 
on a continuum ranging from very powerful to the most powerless. Blondel
54
 identifies four 
broad categories for the parliaments throughout the world in the 1970s. At the first or lowest 
level of this classification he locates legislatures in non-democratic context and calls them the 
‗nascent‘ or ‗inchoate‘ legislatures whose ostensible activities are ―very small and almost 
non-existent‖. The ideal type of this typology is parliaments in the Soviet Union immediately 
after Stalin. Similarly, Polsby
55
 refers to these parliaments as ―rubber stamps‖ to describe a 
series of parliaments particularly in authoritarian regimes whose main task is to endorse that 
decisions have been already made somewhere else with little or no involvement in this 
process.  
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Parliaments as agents of democratization 
With the rapid democratic changes that swept throughout the world since the third wave of 
democratization, many scholars and practitioners came to express optimism about the potential 
role of parliament in this process. Theoretically, legislatures have long been acknowledged as 
the quintessential institution of democracy which represents the principles of representative 
government. Almost all liberal and consolidated democracies have had and still have some 
sort of viable parliaments. Parliaments are among the first institutions abolished or subverted 
when democratic regimes are overthrown, and they are among the first institutions which are 
established or restored when democracies emerge or consolidate.
 56
 These arguments at best 
stressed the importance of parliaments but how exactly they interact with the democratization 
process still remains unanswered. Furthermore, the role of authoritarian parliaments in 
transition toward democratization in different stages of this process is more problematic. In 
the following, the role of parliament in different stages of transition toward democracy will 
be reviewed. 
 
The role of parliaments in the authoritarian breakdown and liberalization 
In fact, the early stages of democratization, or what is called in the relevant literature as 
the breakdown or liberalization stage, are largely dominated by social movements and 
revolutionary groups. Parliaments historically have rarely been accounted for the abrupt 
regime changes and democratic openings.
57
 The notable exception in which legislatures 
openly challenge an incumbent‘s survival by voting to remove him from leadership is 
Madagascar in 1996. In Russia in 1993 and 1999, it nearly happened. In other cases 
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parliamentary challenges have only resulted in the weakening (Benin, Malawi, Moldova and 
Ukraine) or paralysis (Haiti, Russia 1992-3) of incumbent governments. Ruland et al
58
 
suggest that parliamentary oppositions in the Philippines, South Korea and Indonesia played 
an important role in the liberalization process by forming coalition with oppositions outside 
the parliament. However they contend that they have not been involved in the toppling of 
regimes alone. Way identifies the formal and constitutional powers by which parliaments 
challenge autocrat incumbents as follows: ―they may thwart key presidential appointments 
(including, in some countries, prime ministers), conduct embarrassing investigations into 
executive corruption or abuse, create new mechanisms of oversight over the electoral process, 
provide an institutional home for opposition media, and protect key opposition leaders from 
prosecution (via parliamentary immunity)‖.59 This is the case especially when the opposition 
enjoys a strong position in the parliaments. This begs another question of under what 
condition opposition gains power in the legislature. Ziegenhaiun points out that it happens 
once parliaments constituted an arena for the opposition parties with mass support
60
. 
Alternatively, Levitsky and Way argue that where incumbent parties are fragile, legislative 
factions are more likely to crack into division, or raise rebellion and defection. Such internal 
crises in turn allow the opposition forces to gain control of the legislature and challenge the 
ruling parties.
61
  
Yet, even in instances where opposition is weak in parliament and the executives enjoys 
dominant power, opposition forces may use the parliament as an arena for coming together 
and using it as a public podium from which to make demands. In Peru, anti-Fujimori 
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legislators, in spite of their weak position between 1995 and 2000, used Congress (and media 
coverage of it) as a forum to express publicly their views. In Ukraine in 2000, opposition 
legislator Aleksandr Moroz used parliament to make accusations against the president and to 
promulgate supporting evidence to the public. In general, these and other examples reveal 
that parliaments are very reluctant to get involved directly in the toppling of the authoritarian 
regimes.  
 
The role of parliaments in the democracy consolidation  
Although parliaments are regarded as insignificant forces of change in the early stages of 
democratization, they have intensive potential to contribute to the regime transition during 
the subsequent stages of democratization or what is called in the literature as consolidation of 
democratic regimes. As Barkan
62
 notes ―in the context of a typical emerging democracy ... 
the legislature rarely matters as an institution until after the second or third multiparty 
election, and thus after the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule has been under 
way for an extended period.‖ To address such new role for parliaments in the democratization 
stage an extensive body of literature has emerged on parliament and democratization. 
Longley and Zajc
63
 used ―virtual Niagara Falls‖ as a metaphor for describing this scholarship. 
Some went beyond this cautious optimism and claimed that democratization and 
parliamentarianism are part of an intertwined global process of political transformation and 
consolidation that has made this both the age of democratization and ―the age of 
parliaments.‖64 The potential roles of parliaments in these stages are not however free from 
controversy. Central to the problem is the commonplace observation that parliaments in such 
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regimes are largely weak and consequently incapable of fulfilling their main functions. To 
address this problem many scholars attempted to focus on the element of change in the 
relationship between democratization and legislative power and consider this relationship as 
reciprocal rather than unidirectional. In parallel with such arguments, Longley
65
 reviewed the 
scholarly literature concerning the role and dynamics of parliaments as institutions that 
experience change within themselves and that support and enhance change in the larger 
regime. Starting from the premise that parliaments matter in the democratization process, he 
asked whether parliaments are the subject of democratic reform or the agent of it. He notes 
parliaments, as central political institutions of a regime, could be expected to be conservative 
and resist changes that run counter to the status quo. However, there are a number of 
examples of legislatures, even very mature and well-established legislature such as the United 
States‘ Congress and British Parliament, which underwent dramatic changes and have had an 
intensive impact on the nation. Finally, he concludes: ―parliamentary institutional change and 
regime change, enhanced by parliamentary change, are inexorably linked.‖ Similarly, Olson 
argued that the parliaments of the new democratic or democratizing regimes are 
―simultaneously affected by and a part of the broader transformation of the whole political 
system … They are both the creatures of and major participants in the wider democratic 
transformation of [their] political systems.‖ 66 To put it another way, there is no clear cut 
answer to this question as the causal arrow probably points a transaction relationship rather 
than a simple cause effect one. In that sense, the democratic transformative process between 
the changes in the role of the legislature and the regime change is dialectical, not linear. And 
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consequently, the development of the legislature is both the dependent and independent 
variable in this political equation.  
Similarly, in an attempt to explicate the interconnected relationship between systemic 
democratic change and change in the role of its legislature, Liao Ta-chi‘s67 analysis of the 
Taiwanese parliament reached the same result. She first challenges a stereotyped image of a 
legislature in an authoritarian regime, i.e. a ‗rubber stamp‘, and offers an alternative, a 
‗sleeping lion‘ to conceive of the legislature‘s potential role. She argues this metaphor not 
only conveys a dynamic sense of the legislature‘s role even in a hard authoritarian regime, 
but also aims at its changing ability in correspondence with change in the political 
environment. Then she proposes that the change of the environment should be tied into the 
role change of the legislature, more specifically, a sleeping-lion like a legislature in a hard 
authoritarian regime awakened by the relaxation of the regime‘s rule from a hard one to a soft 
one. As she notes an awakened lion is better able to echo the environmental change more 
than before. Furthermore, an awakened lion-like legislature is more able to transform into a 
roaring lion that not only respond loudly but also leads democratic discussions fiercely, if its 
environment has been subject to the demands of rapid democratization.  
Another pertinent argument is that although in most non-democratic political systems 
legislatures remain weak in relation to the executive in terms of policy making power, they 
can fulfil other functions including legitimation that retain for them potential power and 
autonomy. In fact, the importance and centrality of legislative functions varies with the 
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regime types as well as the stages of regime transition.  Liebert
68
 draws attention to the 
distinctive roles parliament might play in different stages of democratization by relating the 
functions of parliament to stages of democratization. Later Leston-Banderia
69
 developed well 
this framework by its application to the Portuguese parliament. Benefiting from the works of 
Packenham
70
, Mezey
71
 and Norton
72
  on parliamentary roles and functions, she offers a 
framework for analysis based on the legitimation and legislation roles of parliament.  She 
argues that the role of the Portuguese parliament changed from legislation to legitimation as 
democracy developed. Then she develops Packenham‘s concept of legitimation and 
employed it to an empirical analysis of parliaments‘ legislative and scrutiny activity. In 
writing with Norton, Leston-Banderia argues that SE parliaments ―rather than being the 
centre of decisions, they legitimise the process of decision-making. Like most developed 
legislatures they are not so much law-making as law-effecting bodies‖. However, ―the 
legislative and representative functions were fundamental roles of the SE parliaments at the 
time of democratic consolidation‖ bearing in mind that the shifts in role have been in 
accordance with new regime changes to adapt to new realities.
73
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Parliaments as the means of authoritarian survival  
 
Another predominant approach regarding the role of parliaments in regime change and 
stability within authoritarian context holds that parliaments are contributing to authoritarian 
survival.  This idea, reflected in an emerging bulk of literature looks at the dark side of 
parliament in the transition of regimes toward authoritarianism. In particular, this literature 
examines the complicated nature of authoritarian institutions arguing that legislatures in such 
regimes are not ―wholly rubber stamp‖ institutions. Rather they are the result of strategic 
choices and have an impact on the survival of autocrats. They contend that autocrats use 
legislatures to hold on power much longer.
74
 In contrast to the parliaments and 
democratization literature in which the capacity of parliament in the regime change has 
received much attention, this literature concentrated largely on the practical actions of 
parliaments or the functions through which parliaments are making a contribution to the 
survival of authoritarian regimes. Using Mezey
75
 terminology, the role of the parliaments in 
authoritarian regimes survival is broken down into two groups of symbolic system 
maintenance and active system maintenance.  
 
Symbolic system maintenance 
The conventional argument is that, as with other nominally democratic organizations in 
an authoritarian context, parliaments tend to provide a democratic façade and consequently 
enhance the regime‘s legitimacy. These parliaments serve as ‗window dressing‘ or ‗face lift‘ 
organizations to offer reputational benefits which bring about some democratic legitimacy. 
Fukuyama arguably claims that ―while there have historically been many forms of legitimacy, 
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in today‘s world the only serious source of legitimacy is democracy.‖76 If he is correct, 
parliaments as one of the most important institutions of democracy can best preserve this 
purpose. This legitimacy is used by authoritarian regimes both domestically and to the 
outside world. From a domestic perspective, most autocrats enjoy the power and institutional 
capacity to impose their policy preferences in an autonomous manner. Nevertheless, it is 
often preferable to make changes under the cover of formal legislative institutions with ruling 
parties composing a parliamentary majority. In fact, in many authoritarian regimes there is 
surprising attention paid to issues of procedural integrity, even when passing the most 
undemocratic of laws. 
Interestingly, legitimisation has been recognized by legislative scholars as one of the 
most important functions of parliaments especially when policy making role of parliament is 
in decline. Mezey coined the term of ‗system-maintenance‘77 to describe ‗those things that 
the legislature does that contribute to the stability of the political system and enhance its 
capacity to survive.‘ In his later studies, he used this concept interchangeably with 
legitimation
78
.  As indicated before, this dimension is widely believed to have potential to 
contribute to the democratization particularly in the early stages of this process. Given that 
the transition can happen toward as well as away from democracy, it can be argued that 
parliaments in authoritarian regimes provide legitimation benefits for the authoritarian regime 
as well.   
Not only are autocrats with the establishment of nominally democratic parliaments 
largely trying to bamboozle the people that the regime is popular and the voice of 
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constituents are being heard through parliament, but it serves as a signal for the opposition 
that the regime is strong enough to arrange a legislature which is wholly under the control of 
the autocrat. This argument parallels the signalling theories which suggest that by 
constituting supermajorities legislatures under authoritarian regimes, the leaders signal 
strength and dissuade other regime elites from defecting to or investing in the opposition.
79
  
The seemingly democratic legislatures can be used also to deceive international donors. 
The current belief among the international aid donors is that foreign assistance should only be 
channelled to democracies where political accountability is higher than in authoritarian 
regimes.
80
 Given that it is not easy or straightforward to measure the democratic degree of a 
country, the nominally democratic institution has been wrongly regarded as a measurable 
criterion of democratization.  
 
Active system maintenance 
Without denying the importance of the symbolic function of parliaments in the survival 
of the authoritarian regime, it is crucial also to take into consideration those functions 
associated with more concrete parliamentary functions. A growing body of literature in 
authoritarian regimes studies is beginning to address these functions. In particular, this 
literature place emphasis on parliaments as instruments to co-opt potential opposition and to 
manipulate the political institution. These two functions will be discussed in detail in the 
following. 
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Cooptation function 
 
This argues that autocrats have two primary instruments at their disposal to survive in 
office: they can either try to repress their rivals or make concessions. The concessions may 
take the form of rent or policy compromise and often are made through political institutions 
particularly election and the legislature.
81
 This strategy, known as co-optation, is summarized 
by Gandhi and Przeworski as ―Authoritarian rulers may need cooperation and may fear a 
threat from various segments of society. Cooperation can be induced and the threat can be 
reduced by sharing spoils or by making policy compromises.‖ 82 The bottom line of this 
strategy is to divide or reinforce the disunity of oppositions‘ fronts. As Magaloni 83 contends: 
―the nature of the autocratic electoral game is such that some opposition players are 
invariably better off playing the ―loyal opposition‖ while leaving others to rebel on their 
own.‖ By selectively forming coalition within the oppositions, the autocrats divide them into 
loyal friends and radicals and prevent their opponents from forming a unified front to rebel 
against the regime.  Parliaments are ideal institutions to accomplish this goal. By offering 
legislative seats and trivial policy influence to its opponents, the autocrat can co-opt and 
divide oppositions. Gandi later identifies two reasons why parliaments are ideal institutional 
arrangements for cooptation strategies. First of all, encapsulating these groups within a 
legislature allows the autocrats to bargain over diverse policy options without having to 
reconstitute their negotiating partner each time. After all, parliaments serve as a forum for 
debates where the views of oppositions can be made known.
 84
 A prime example of 
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cooptation role of parliaments in authoritarian regimes is the legislature established by 
Brazilian military rulers in 1967-1968 in which autocrats were able to form a majority of 
like-minded oppositions and get almost all of their Bills passed in the legislature.
85
  
Wright
86
 develops cooptation argument further, positing that military and single-party 
regimes whose natural resources are limited are more prone to invoke institutionalized forms 
of co-optation. Therefore, these autocrats tend to establish ―binding‖ legislatures that will 
restrain them and push them to make ‗credible commitments‘ to groups outside the winning 
coalition. Monarchies and personalist regimes, with much more natural resources, will 
constitute ―non-binding‖ legislatures, whose main aim is to divide the opposition. Wright 
contends that the binding legislatures operating under military and single-party regimes 
contribute to the development of economic productivity by providing a ‗credible commitment‘ 
on public economic policies, whilst the non-binding legislatures found in monarchies and 
personalist regimes tend to thwart economic performance.  
Some writers made a distinction between rent based co-optation and policy co-optation. 
They argue that in a number of authoritarian regimes, the main task of parliamentarians is to 
deliver services to their local constituents and families, rather than making policy. In this 
sense, legislatures are used as a conduit for distribution of rents. For instance, in Jordan, 
Lust-Okar
87
 suggests that the underlying reason behind the most competition within 
legislature is the direction of rents to the preferred constituencies.  
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To maintain the cooptation strategies some conditions must be satisfied. First of all, the 
oppositions must be able to get to competition and win seats. The second condition is that the 
legislature must allow those groups to have an impact on policy or at least voice their 
demands publicly. If groups cannot get into the legislature and make their demands within the 
assembly, then the assembly cannot serve as a forum for dissent and opposition groups will 
look for other means to have their voice heard.  
Authoritarian legislation  
Given that legislating is arguably the most important function of parliament by which 
formal measures in the form of law are designed and enacted; it seems very likely that 
authoritarian regimes will use this function for their own purpose. Although authoritarian 
regimes largely use their power of decree, they nonetheless need to establish specialized 
collegial bodies that produce the formal rules in a legitimate fashion. As such, Schedler 
points out that ―Most authoritarian regimes establish some kind of legislative assembly. That 
is, they create some collective body tasked with writing the rules that the central state (backed 
by its coercive capacity) seeks to impose on the people.‖88 The existing literature has not paid 
sufficient attention to law making performance of legislatures in non-democratic regimes. It 
is in part because it is argued that the apparent task of authoritarian legislatures is merely to 
approve or legitimize the decisions which have already been taken somewhere else without 
getting them involved in the law making process. In that sense legislatures are authorized to 
legitimize the decrees rather than to make laws.  This premise can be put into question in 
many ways. For one thing, the records of legislatures under several authoritarian regimes 
reveal that legislative output of these parliaments measured by laws passed or amended has 
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grown considerably.
89
 For instance, the Chinese National Assembly has witnessed in the 
recent years several instances in which legislators attempted to propose new laws and debate 
and amend the Bills proposed by the executive and in some instances they have openly voted 
against the highly sensitive proposals of governments.
90
 In addition, these legislatures are 
becoming more and more complex institutions with specialized skills in formulating and 
drafting laws. In these stances, parliaments are the more appropriate institutions to translate 
the autocrats‘ will into law.  
In particular legislatures may contribute to the survival of the autocrats by manipulation 
of political institutions‘ rules through their law making performance. Lucas91 convincingly 
demonstrates how the Jordanian government in several instances used the standard routine of 
legislating through the parliament as part of the survival strategy. This strategy was used in 
the cases of the Political Parties Law and the Press and Publications Laws of 1993, 1998, and 
1999. In all cases the regime chose to use parliaments to produce the regime‘s desired law 
outcome while constitutionally it has the ability to decree laws. With respect to the 
manipulation of Political Parties Law, he explains that the new Political Parties Law enacted 
by parliament permitted the establishment of parties in the country while the law also limited 
parties from entering into coalition with other political organizations. The Election Law 
amendments also further weakened political parties from obtaining representation in 
parliament. The electoral system worked against parities within parliament. It also 
encouraged the atomization of electoral contests, which has prevented many parties from 
consolidating into broader blocs. Press restrictions also present further difficulties for 
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political parties when communicating their political message. The electoral laws have 
attempted to balance the regime‘s desire to control the political makeup of the parliament 
with the need to keep the electoral process legitimate in the eyes of voters and the 
international community.
92
 Based on Lucas‘ observation it seems sensible to suggest that the 
parliaments with more legislative activity on policies dealing with the main authoritarian 
institutions would make more contribution to the survival of autocrats. As such the 
involvement of parliament in the creation of such laws can be regarded as a proxy for the 
legislative role of parliaments in the authoritarian regimes fostering autocrats‘ survival. 
However, this should entail investigating the centrality of parliament in different stages of the 
legislative process, an element which is absent in Lucas analysis.  
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Conclusion  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that authoritarian regimes can take different types and 
degrees. It also made the case that regime transitions are unpredictable processes which can 
move either towards or away from democratization. In particular, the democratic bias which 
theologically views democratization as ultimate fate of all regimes was put into question. 
The majority part of the chapter was devoted to the literature considering parliament in the 
authoritarian regimes. In general, it was lamented that this literature is in its infancy. As a 
result, in several instances the literature review draws on the quantitative data or the facts 
and figures and examples rather than a critical analysis of the literature. The extant literature 
also entails contrasting approaches toward the potential roles of parliaments in the transition 
to change and stability. The idea that parliaments are merely wholly rubber stamps is 
becoming obsolete as parliaments have gained more and more power and popularity in the 
recent years. Given that parliaments have little if any influence in the toppling of autocrats in 
the early stages of democratization, the focus of the studies has turned on the role of 
parliaments in emerging democracies rather than authoritarian regimes. Central to the 
concern of such studies is the condition under which parliaments may contribute to the 
democratization. This question remains largely unanswered in the studies looking at the role 
of parliaments in the survival of authoritarian regimes. This literature instead predominantly 
focuses on the ways through which parliaments help autocrats to remain in power. In other 
words the former literature places the emphasis on the environmental and institutional 
determinants ending up to parliaments‘ power and institutionalization while the latter focus 
on the performance of parliaments like cooptation, legislation and legitimation. The 
conditions through which authoritarian legislatures contribute to the longevity of 
authoritarian regimes is the central theme in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: the capacity and institution 
of  authoritarian legislatures 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that a growing body of literature draws on the role 
of legislatures in the longevity of authoritarian regimes. It also demonstrated that such 
literature focuses predominantly on the performance or functions of authoritarian legislatures, 
be they symbolic or active, by which they may contribute to the survival of autocrats. 
However, knowledge regarding the conditions that determine the performance of legislatures 
in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes and in particular the role of the external 
environment and the institutional capacity of legislatures in this regard is rudimentary. The 
main aim of this chapter is to address this gap. The legislative studies scholars have long 
drawn special attention to the factors within and outside of parliaments that shape and 
condition the institutional capacity of parliaments which in turn determine their performance. 
The abstract discussions of legislative institutionalization and descriptive scholarship in 
traditional legislative studies have contributed to the advancement of this literature. Against 
this background this chapter seeks to explore and discuss the conceptual criteria and 
operational indicators of the institutional capacity of authoritarian parliaments. Theoretical 
discussion and analytical debate of legislative institutionalization would particularly 
contribute to the development of conceptual criteria while descriptive legislative studies, 
authoritarian regimes studies and experiences of legislative capacity building practitioners lay 
a ground for the operational indicators and measurement of these concepts.  
46 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. It starts with a quick review of the importance and 
origins of the institutionalization approach in legislative studies and discuss its applicability 
to non-democratic regimes. The rest of this chapter is devoted to the proposed conceptual 
framework on the institutionalization of authoritarian legislatures. Finally the findings of 
these theoretical discussions will be summarized and discussed.    
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Theoretical foundations of legislative institutionalization  
The concept of institutionalization has a long and distinguished pedigree in the social 
sciences. Huntington who first introduced the theory of political institutions has never 
explicitly examined legislatures. Polsby
93
 was the first to apply it to a legislative body. 
Benefiting from Samuel Huntington
94
, he utilized the institutionalization approach to 
examine the institutionalization of the U.S. Congress in terms of three structural variables: 
autonomy (the establishment of well-defined boundaries), internal complexity and 
universalism (universalistic criteria in conducting its internal affairs). From a comparative 
perspective, Polsby‘s assumptions can hardly hold in contexts outside the U.S. Congress. 
Polsby admitted this by noting that legislative institutionalization ―are best understood ... as a 
historical description of a particular institution rather than as ... a ‗theory‘ specifying causes 
and effects with broad automatic application to other legislatures or institutions‖.95 But even 
with this concession, the legislative scholars adopted increasingly the concept and operational 
indications of institutionalism and widely incorporated it into their studies in US Congress 
and beyond.  The examples of the application of institutionalization approach to different 
contexts are abundant
96
. Revisiting the theoretical importance of the institutionalism 
approach, in many recent studies there is an apparent attempt to accommodate the findings of 
classical descriptive legislative studies into abstract concepts of legislative institutionalization. 
These efforts have been put into question by some scholars characterizing them as ‗story 
telling‘ in that they fail to explain the relationship between an organisation‘s characteristics 
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and its development, on the one hand, and its external environment, on the other.
 97
However, 
these studies made great contributions to the development of legislative institutionalization 
by offering useful insights in to operational indicators of legislative institutionalization and 
also utilization of this framework in different contexts. 
Some legislative scholars argue that the institutionalism approach has now turned out to 
‗a way of looking at‘ legislatures when it is free from the burden of measurement. 98 This 
argument parallels to some extent the arguments that consider institutionalism as methods 
rather than a substantive body of literature.
99
 From this perspective the institutionalization 
seems to have potential applicability to the study of legislatures in different contexts.  The 
literature utilizing this framework for non-democratic regimes, however, is very few and far 
between. As indicated in the previous chapter, the early literature on the legislatures in the 
newly independent countries increasingly focuses on the dominant role of their cultural and 
political environments in what is called in this literature as ‗the establishment and survival of 
viable legislatures‘. These arguments overlap the legislative institutionalization albeit the 
terminology is different. In this literature, legislatures have been seen as exclusively 
dependent variables or extremely subordinated institutions.
100
 A prime example of recent 
application of this approach to the non-democratic context is Norton and Ahmed‘s101 work on 
a series of cases including seven countries in Asia - a wide range from non-democratic East 
and South Asia to democratic Indian Sub continental. They conclude that all parliaments are 
autonomous in that they are free-standing institutions, but the extent to which they can 
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exercise power is limited by the control exercised by party groups. An important conclusion 
can be drawn from these studies is that such legislatures do not meet in large extent the 
conceptual and operational indications of institutionalized legislatures while they are not 
necessarily uninstitutionalized organizations. As such the conceptualization and operational 
indicators of authoritarian legislatures should particularly satisfy the idiosyncratic conditions 
of such regimes.  
Apart from the handful of studies mentioned above, no literature has systematically 
applied the institutionalism approach in a non-democratic context. As such, this chapter seeks 
to propose a conceptual framework based on legislative institutionalization explaining the 
non-democratic regimes.  To do so, three general conceptual criteria appropriate to the 
authoritarian regimes will be identified: subordination as opposed to autonomy, exclusiveness 
as opposed to representativeness and secrecy as opposed to deliberativeness. It is assumed 
that each concept compromises a continuum: at one extreme is pure type of democratic 
legislature and at the opposite extreme is the ideal type of authoritarian legislatures (Figure3).  
Figure 3: Proposed conceptual criteria of authoritarian legislative 
institutionalization 
 
                                                                       
Autonomy                                                                                                              Subordination 
Representativeness                                                                                                 Exclusiveness 
Deliberativeness                                                                                                    Secrecy 
Source: author 
Democratic legislatures Authoritarian Legislatures 
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Once the conceptual criteria for authoritarian legislative institutionalization are 
acknowledged, the next step is to discuss the operational indicators under the heading of each 
conceptual criterion. The extant studies on the authoritarian regimes and legislative studies 
will contribute to the formulation of the relevant indicators. In the following these concepts 
and operational indicators will be reviewed in detail. 
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Autonomy vs. subordination  
Autonomy has come to be regarded as the core conceptual element of institutionalization, 
102
 by many scholars but there is no consensus on the very nature of this concept. Judge
103
 in 
a comprehensive review of the theoretical approaches proposed by key scholars in this field 
including Polsby
104
, Cooper and Brady
105
, Sisson
106
, Patterson and Copeland
107
, Kopecky
108
, 
Norton
109
 and others demonstrates the depth of disagreement among scholars.  Central to 
these disagreements is conceptualization and measurement of this concept in terms of the 
units of analysis in that the boundaries among individual members, legislature organization 
and external environment are not clearly defined. In the following pages three different 
notions of the autonomy reflected in the literature will be reviewed and their application to 
the non-democratic regimes will be unfolded.  
 
Professionalization 
To explain the autonomy, Polsby focuses mainly on the professionalization or 
membership aspect of institutionalization suggesting that the institutionalized legislature has 
stable membership in which turnover is infrequent, entry relatively difficult and its leaders 
are recruited from within the organization and have substantial tenure in office. This 
parsimonious notion of institutionalized legislatures was put into question by other scholars. 
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The critics often address this problem as a trade-off between institutionalization and 
professionalization. Squire 110  elucidates the differences between professionalization and 
institutionalization by noting that ―these two concepts are distinct but linked and that each is 
driven by the main career goals of the membership. Thus, it is likely that professionalization 
will lead to institutionalization, at least along some dimensions.‖111 He then describes the 
professionalized legislatures as institutions which have:  
―…higher member remuneration levels, staff support and facilities, and 
service time demands. Legislatures deemed professional are those which 
meet in unlimited sessions, pay their members well and provide superior 
staff resources and facilities. Essentially, such a body offers potential and 
current members incentives sufficient to consider service as a career.‖112  
 
Price 113 also delves into the concept of ―professionalization‖ by dividing it into 
professionalization in terms of individual legislators and the institutions themselves. The 
individual factors include membership turnover and stability, members‘ time commitment 
(part-versus full-time) and legislative service becoming a ―career‖ while institutional factors 
are autonomy in adopting internal regulation, enhanced capability vis-à-vis the executive, 
greater autonomy from outside influence, and strengthened legislative committees. The 
application of the professionalism concept to the legislative studies has predominantly 
focused on the changes in the formal institutional attributes of membership. Alternatively 
some scholars use the term of legislative professionalization to describe the transformation in 
the personal characteristics and attitudes of the individual members of parliaments. This 
perception of professionalization overlaps with the discussion of the role of norms and 
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informal institutions within a legislature which shape and influence their actual conduct.
114
 
Sisson
115
 offers a theoretical foundation for this concept by focusing on the cultural factors as 
complementary elements of structural indications of legislative institutionalization. In this 
sense, the cultural factors are associated with the elites‘ attitudes regarding institutional rules 
and procedures. The Sisson's theory was enriched by Kopecky in an innovative formulation 
of legislative culture he called ‗the degree of parliamentary institutionalization‘. Kopecky 
notes:  
In addition to structural attributes and formal rules, we will be 
interested in the development of informal authority structures which 
guide parliamentary processes and the evolution of norms and 
institutional identities which constitute parliamentary culture.
116
 
This perception of informal institutions inside parliaments seems to have potential 
applicability in the study of non-democratic regimes where informal relations are of special 
significance. Yet, there is no single study delving into informal institutions and norms 
guiding legislators‘ behaviour within legislatures in a non-democratic context. Instead, other 
concepts and measurement indicators of professionalism including MPs turnover, 
parliamentary staff  and facilities and more importantly MPs‘ immunity have been used in a 
non-democratic context to understand the degree of autonomy and subordination.  
The extant observations suggest that the majority of MPs under authoritarian regimes are 
inexperienced and the percentage of turnover in these regimes is high. In the study of the 
Nigerian legislature, Yinka Fashagba
117
 argues that along with other shortcomings like 
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executive interference and rampant internal conflict, the Nigerian legislature has been unable 
to perform its oversight role efficiently largely because MPs lack the required experience due 
to high rate of MPs turnover. He also notes that ―The incident of high turnover of legislators 
is partly traceable to the influence and action of the executive which often works in 
collaboration with the parties, both at the state and the centre, to prevent legislators who 
refuse to toe the line or appear to be too independent from returning to the assembly in 
subsequent elections.‖118  Similarly Wright119 argues that the legislative high turnover in non-
democratic regimes is largely associated with the co-optation policies of the executive to 
provide rents and policy concessions within legislatures. This, he contends, is very likely to 
weaken parliamentary accountability. Another argument that can be made is that the frequent 
purges of MPs help dictators to prevent the opposition from taking roots and strengthening 
their power. In contrast, Barkan argues bringing new blood to African parliaments resulted in 
a younger and more professional generation of politicians who are intent on transforming 
their institution from a weak rubber stamp into a more powerful  and autonomous 
legislature.
120
  
Another legislative institutional arrangement that increasingly ensures membership 
autonomy is parliamentary immunity or the right that protect MPs from persecution when 
they make statements in relation to their parliamentary duties. Ironically this right has been 
widely used for nefarious purpose in authoritarian legislatures. There are several examples 
demonstrating that under the protection of parliamentary immunity, MPs were able to get 
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involved in the corruption. Considering the Egyptian context, Blaydes
 121
 suggest that ―the 
abuses of immunity undertaken by parliamentarians include everything from relatively minor 
infractions to large-scale fraud and embezzlement rings.‖ Similarly, Satrr notes in Kyrgyzstan 
and Armenia many businessmen involved in organized crime found a secured place in 
parliament enjoying the immunity, and influence of parliamentary status.
122
 Despite potential 
for abuse, in many non-democratic countries that lack enduring protection for basic 
citizenship rights, immunity from prosecution may be a valuable protection that strengthens 
legislative autonomy. In the regimes where the immunity is not effective, defamation 
practices are used frequently against MPs. As Schneier suggest ―the freedom to debate is so 
fundamental to parliamentary autonomy that its occasional use for corrupt purposes is probably 
a price that has to be paid, with other means being found to curb its abuse.‖123  
The availability of human and monetary resources to the parliament and its members 
also contribute to the autonomy of membership. Some scholars associated the weakness of 
parliament in authoritarian regimes to the poor institutional facilities and staff and lack of 
adequate funds particularly to remunerate the MPs. Barkan
124
 argues that the poor MPs are 
more dependent on the executive and those who have the power of the purse. He reported that 
most MPs in African countries are unhappy with their salary as they are not remunerated 
sufficiently. The notable exception in his study is Kenya where the annual salary of MPs 
                                                 
121
 Blaydes, Lisa. ―Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt‖ mimeo, 
Stanford University. (2008) p, 12 
122
 Starr, S. Frederrik: ―Clans, Authoritarian Rulers and Parliaments in Central Asia‖, Washington: Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program 2006. On-line at:  
 http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0605Starr_Clans.pdf Last accessed: 12/10/2009  
123
 Schneier, Edward V. Crafting constitutional democracies : the politics of institutional design. Lanham,. Md. : 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006 p,149 
124
 Barkan, Joel D et al. Emerging Legislatures: Institutions of Horizontal Accountability. The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 2004 
56 
 
reached 65 thousand US$ now; a very high income within the continent‘s standards.125 Yet 
the considerable increase in salary has its own drawbacks. It makes legislatures a prey for 
opportunists who put first their personal interests like a raise in salary and other perks. Apart 
from the monetary aspect, in general, little is known about how parliamentary members of 
staff in nondemocratic parliaments are organized or coordinated and the extent to which they 
have a continuing professional responsibility to parliament as a whole. Fish
126
 in his 
comprehensive review of parliaments around the world investigated parliamentary staff 
whose main task was to give assistance to MPs with policy matters.  Yet his findings cast 
doubt on whether such assistance tends to boost legislators‘ effectiveness and bolster the 
legislature‘s capacity.  
In the light of the above discussion on the professionalism or autonomy at membership 
level, three indicators including turnover percentage of MPs, immunity and human and 
financial recourses were reviewed. These factors, arguably to different extents, can contribute 
to the autonomy and subordination of legislatures.  
 
External environment and informal institutions 
The overemphasis on the professionalism or the membership elements of parliamentary 
institutions in the Polsby theory was specially faulted in that it overlooks the importance of 
the external environments of legislatures. Among others, Cooper and Brady state that 
Polsby's approach fall short in addressing the analysis of external impacts ―by deferring 
environmental analysis to a later stage of inquiry in which "causes" will be treated.‖127 
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Patterson and Copeland
128
 paid a special attention to these determining factors and defined 
the autonomous legislatures as those which can ―stand on their own, independent of other 
structures or organizations.‖ They in particular argue that ―such a legislature is not 
dominated by an external political party apparatus or by some other institution such as the 
bureaucracy, the church, a military- industrial complex, or pressure groups‖ 129 . In the 
authoritarian regime studies it is argued that depending on the type of authoritarian regimes, 
the dominance and the influence of external factors differ. For instance in military regimes 
the military apparatus exert undisputable influences on the legislatures while in personalistic 
authoritarian regimes, legislatures are under the control of monarch.  The constitutional 
structures particularly the nature of the executive-parliament relationship, the structure of the 
legislature whether unicameral or bicameral are of importance. Yet in authoritarian regimes 
the influences of these formal institutions are largely contingent on informal institutions. 
Studies on less or non-democratic legislatures of Latin American and African countries 
brought about these new important factors in the forefront of legislative scholars.  
Desposato‘s analysis of legislative behaviour in five Brazilian states with varying degrees of 
clientelism allowed him to consider how clientelism affects the functioning of legislatures 
with similar formal structures.
130
Morgenstern found that party control of nominations 
increases discipline— but only when party labels were meaningful. Barkan et al‘s study of 
African countries shows that the typical "left-right" and "liberal-conservative" distinctions do 
not apply. Rather political mobilization normally occurs on a community-by-community and 
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region-by-region basis through networks of clientelist relationships that determine hierarchies 
of leaders and followers and, thus, the state to society.
131
  
In general there have been many instances in which informal institutions constrain 
parliamentary autonomy and power. For example, the supremacy of the legislature over the 
executive was noticeably stipulated in Mexico‘s 1917 constitution. In practice, however, 
presidents were authorized with overwhelming ―metaconstitutional‖ powers which turned the 
Congress into a ―rubber stamp for presidential decrees‖132. In fact in non-democratic regimes 
where formal political institutions are predominantly weak, the rules of the game are 
frequently determined by de facto power relations, rather than formal rules. For instance in 
Slovakia, Prime Minister Meciar—who was supported by a strong party and other informal 
means of control—had an absolute domination over the legislature while the Prime Minister 
was constitutionally ―weak‖ 133 . Similarly in Moldova, because the real power was 
concentrated in the Communist Party, the post-2000 transition from semi-presidentialism to 
parliamentarism ended up with strong authoritarianism rather than democracy
134
. In contrast, 
in Russia, Yeltsin‘s weak position in the party led to serious challenges from the legislature 
despite a super-presidentialist constitution, however Putin, with the same constitutional 
structure, made parliament ineffective.  
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Representation vs. exclusion 
Several scholars underline the significance of representation in the enrichment of the 
institutionalization concept. For instance, Cooper and Brady particularly argue that ―the 
House is not an army, a business, or a hospital. Rather, it is a legislative unit in a democratic 
political system, which is itself organized in terms of a separation of powers, geographic 
constituencies, and plurality elections.‖135  Yet some other scholars highlight the inherent 
paradox of representation and the legislature‘s autonomy. They argue that the more the 
legislature goes in obtaining such autonomy, the more likely to fail to fulfil its representation 
function. As Hibbing indicates ―isolating itself from its environment ... legislatures are simply 
unable to go very far down the road of institutionalization.‖ Particularly, "where party 
leadership roles are conjoined with executive hierarchies, as in Westminster systems, then the 
constitutional design of those systems militates against ... the autonomy of legislatures as 
defined by Polsby."
136
 Studies of newly established parliaments in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhastan have also found that the legislators are investing the most of their time to 
lawmaking on the altar of engagement with voters.
137
  O‘Brien and Luehrmann 138 
demonstrated that Chinese local people's congresses often give priority to autonomy at the 
expense of strengthening capacity and improving oversight. They ultimately conclude that 
―institutionalization can involve pursuing certain ends at the expense of others‖. 139   
Apart from the above inherent paradox, representation has come to be considered as an 
integral part of a parliament‘s functions. The representation role has also gained popularity in 
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the study of non-democratic countries. Mezey notes ―When those studying Third World 
legislatures began to seek alternative, non-decisional functions for these institutions, 
representation seemed an obvious place to begin.‖140 This, however, has been used differently 
by different scholars. Two significant concepts of representation will be discussed in the 
following: representation as reflection of population diversity and representation as response 
to the constituencies‘ policy expectations.  
 
Representation as reflection of population diversity 
The most common perception of representation focuses predominantly on the diversity 
of the population and how these characteristics are reflected in a state body.
141
 Among state 
bodies, legislatures are particularly an ideal arena representing accurately the range of 
diversity and making closer link between MPs and population because of their plural nature 
and larger membership. The fundamental question here is what sort of diversity ought to be 
privileged in parliamentary representation. Various elements manifesting this diversity can be 
identified. For instance, Loewenberg and Patterson point to ―occupational patterns in the 
country into occupational patterns among legislators; ethnic, racial, religious, sex and age 
distributions among the constituents into similar distributions among the elected 
legislators.‖142 Another pertinent issue here is that the diversity represented in legislatures 
may be defined by collective bodies like political parties that represent some set of interests 
or alternatively, legislatures may include representatives who simply draw strong individual 
support from a particular group of voters. This gave rise to a fundamental trade-off between 
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collective and individualistic representation. Electoral rules by setting electoral formulation 
determine the dimensions along which diversity can be translated into representation.
143
 Two 
key electoral formulae reflecting collective-individualism distinction is winner-take-all in 
single-member districts (SMD) and proportional (PR) system. The characteristics and relative 
merits of SMD vs. PR has long been the main focus of literature on legislative elections. The 
relevant scholars normatively argue that PR is superior to SMD elections.
144
 This view is 
based on some key assumptions that political parties are main units of legislative 
representation, and that a left–right spectrum significantly reflect the ideological arena of 
party rivalry.  
In a non-democratic regime context where party systems are more volatile or absent 
these assumptions, however, are subject to greater scepticism. Having said that, the 
fundamental issue in the elections of non-democratic regimes is the exclusion of opponents 
by engaging in fraud and other forms of electoral abuse, either screening the selection of MPs 
(through direct selection or the vetting of candidacies to elective legislatures) or by 
constituting tempting incentives that push legislators towards collaboration with the executive, 
be it through pressure and threat or cooptation. 
145
Manipulation of the electoral system is of 
course a more complicated method that has frequently been used or misused in 
accomplishing authoritarian aims in excluding, subverting, or fragmenting the oppositions 
groups or other opponents.
146
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Representation as responsiveness to the willing of constituents 
Eulau and Karps conceptualized representation as responsiveness to the will and 
expectations of constituents. In this sense, they have identified four elements of 
responsiveness, including policy responsiveness, allocation responsiveness, services 
responsiveness and symbolic responsiveness.
147
 Policy responsiveness includes the links 
between the policy preferences of citizens and the actions of MPs. The further the activities 
of the elected representatives are ending up with the achievement of policy preferences of the 
constituents, the greater the policy responsiveness, and thus the higher the level of 
representativeness achieved.
148
 Service responsiveness compromises the non legislative 
services that MPs usually offer to their constituents. This includes a vast range of activities 
but the most crucial one is to intervene with bureaucrats to solve the problem of 
constituents.
149
 Allocation responsiveness instead refers to attracting public goods and 
services to the given district that MPs represents. The recipient of the good or services may 
be the whole district, some parts of it, or some groups or individuals in the district.
150
 The 
difference between service responsiveness and allocation responsiveness is that in the former 
the particular service is requested by constituents but in the latter MPs try to fulfil the general 
expectations of the district. In contrast, symbolic responsiveness is concerned more with the 
attitudes of constituents and refers to meeting the psychological needs of citizens, such as 
having confidence in government.
151
 Turan applied this framework of analysis to the Turkish 
National Assembly and concludes that service responsiveness is the most significant 
representative feature of the Turkish legislature. He also notes policy responsiveness and 
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allocation responsiveness are important, but as he argues ―both the role of the legislature as 
an institution and the role of the individual deputy as a representative are seriously con-
strained by the government, which has the upper hand in setting priorities and proposing 
legislation.‖ 152 Similarly Barkan et al 153 highlighted the centrality of constituency service as 
the most significant function of the legislature in five African countries. They argue MPs are 
under massive pressure to devote time and resources to constituency service, due to the local 
―pork barrel‖ characteristics of African politics. This expectation of constituents is in fact a 
normal reflection of African society and electoral systems which encourage parochialism. As 
a result, they believe that legislative elections in these countries turned out to be referendums 
on the ability to deliver goods and services. In this context, the role of MPs is analogous to 
"an entrepreneur" whose main tasks are to mobilize the resources to their constituencies. 
Lust-Okar
154
, similarly, reports that Jordanian parliamentarians (and the public more 
generally) see the job of MPs as finding jobs and offering services to their constituencies, 
rather than making policy. In the studies of authoritarian regimes in Africa, authoritarianism 
and parochialism are regarded as two facets of the same coin.
155
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Deliberativeness vs. Secrecy 
Given that the perception of deliberation that draws on core democratic values like 
transparency and accountability is an integral part of a democratic legislature, it merits being 
discussed as a constituent component of this framework. In essence, legislatures are public 
forums for debate and legitimate consideration of the varied viewpoints they entail. 
Advocates of deliberative democracy maintain that by putting debates into an open setting, 
legislatures may limit permissible arguments on behalf of interests of those who can be 
defended in public and ultimately contribute to the public good.
156
 As Miller
157
 (1993) puts it, 
‗‗To be seen to be engaged in political debate we must argue in terms that any other 
participant could potentially accept, and ‗It‘s good for me‘ is not such an argument.‘‘ In this 
sense, by placing decisions over public policy in a public forum, legislatures contribute to the 
public good quality of the policies and ultimately improving policy outcomes. To put it 
simply, the public nature of parliamentary decision-making would contribute to the public 
good. The central implication of this argument is that the norms of public debate have made 
the internal workings of legislatures subject to scrutiny from outside actors. By means of this 
transparency, legislatures held representatives accountable to those they represent. In 
practice, however, the extent to which legislative deliberation and decision-making is 
transparent to those outside the institutions differs significantly, which in turn influences the 
extent to which legislatures can serve as means for transparency and accountability. Carey
158
 
suggests that floor votes are the best indication that make legislative decisions visible to 
outside observers as the bulk of legislative floor voting is public. Yet, in many legislatures 
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the votes of individual representatives are not public because only aggregate outcomes-
showing the number of yes and no - are published.  
The application of normative democratic values, such as transparency and accountability 
to the analysis of legislatures, however, raise a number of controversies. Among others, the 
historical records reveal that democratic norms are not properly and perfectly accomplished 
in different contexts, even in established democracies. Furthermore, the boundary between 
obeying and transgressing democratic norms is imprecise. In legislative politics, particularly, 
circumventing the regulation is considered in several instances as ―part of the game.‖159 
Despite these perceived shortcomings, there has been an overwhelming interest in recent 
years from legislative practitioners including parliamentary organizations and democracy 
assistance communities to set out benchmarks or normative frameworks to evaluate 
parliaments and distinguish the democratic parliaments from non-democratic ones. 
Surprisingly, there has been little interaction between these groups and academics. As 
Carothers argued ―little systematic learning has been added to the field from outside the circle 
of practitioners. Academic specialists … have not devoted much attention to democracy 
assistance‖.160 In contrast to academics who want to understand the past, and emphasize 
conflicting theories rather than seeking a minimal consensus on what might work best, the 
practitioners look for concrete results, and preferably within a short period of time to satisfy 
their donors. Inspired by current trends in public management, they contend that only what is 
measurable is worth doing. Thus, the priority may be given to activities such as encouraging 
a legislature to initiate more bills than to a non-measurable activity such as building a 
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consensus across political divides. 
161
 A prime example of these efforts is IPU‘s ‗good 
parliamentary practice project‘, which was augmented with the publication of a handbook, 
Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century.
162 
This project was carried out in 
partnership with a wide range of member countries and some renowned international 
organizations. The handbook discusses in detail different practices of parliaments in the wide 
range of their responsibilities, highlighting examples of good practice and also discussing the 
democratic core values upon which democratic parliaments are supposed to operate. The IPU 
framework is of special importance as it set forth helpful indicators for the measurement of 
transparency and accessibility. The transparency and accessibility factors and their 
operational indicators identified in the IPU framework help to describe the deliberative 
criteria of this research‘s conceptual framework. In particular the following factors will be 
adopted:  proceedings of parliaments to be open to the public, the parliament should have its 
own public relations officers and facilities, standards and enforceable code of conduct, 
register of outside interests and income. (Table: 2) 
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Table 2: IPU Framework on the Parliamentary Contribution to Democracy 
Basic objectives 
or values.  
Requirements 
 
Possible procedural and institutional means for the realization of 
these objectives or values 
 Representative 
 
An elected parliament that 
is socially and politically 
representative, and 
committed to equal 
opportunities for its 
members so that they can 
carry out their mandates. 
 
Free and fair electoral system and process; means of ensuring 
representation of/by all sectors of society with a view to reflecting 
national and gender diversity, for example by using special 
procedures to ensure representation of marginalized or excluded 
groups. Open, democratic and independent party procedures, 
organizations and systems. Mechanisms to ensure the rights of the 
political opposition and other political groups, and to allow all 
members to exercise their mandates freely and without being 
subjected to undue influence and pressure. Freedom of speech and 
association; guarantees of parliamentary rights and immunities, 
including the integrity of the presiding officers and other office 
holders.  
Transparent 
 
A parliament that is open 
to the nation and 
transparent in the conduct 
of its business. 
 
Proceedings open to the public; prior information to the public on 
the business before parliament; documentation available in 
relevant languages; availability of user-friendly tools, for example 
using various media such as the World Wide Web; the parliament 
should have its own public relations officers and facilities; 
Legislation on freedom of/access to Information. 
 Accessible 
 
Involvement of the public, 
including civil society and 
other people‘s movements, 
in the work of the 
parliament. 
 
Effective electoral sanction and monitoring processes; reporting 
procedures to inform constituents; standards and enforceable code 
of conduct. Adequate salary for members; register of outside 
interests and income; enforceable limits on and transparency in 
election fundraising and expenditure. 
 
 
Effective 
 
 
 
Mechanisms and resources to ensure the independence and 
autonomy of parliament, including parliament‘s control of its own 
budget. Availability of non- partisan professional staff separate 
from the main civil service. Adequate unbiased research and 
information facilities for members; opinion surveys among 
relevant groups on perceptions of performance. 
 
At all levels 
 
Effective organization of 
business in accordance 
with these democratic 
norms and values. 
 
At the national 
level 
 
Effective performance of 
legislative and scrutiny 
functions, and as a national 
forum for issues of 
common concern. 
 
Systematic procedures for executive accountability; adequate 
powers and resources for committees; accountability to 
parliament of non-governmental public bodies and commissions. 
Mechanisms to ensure effective parliamentary engagement in the 
national budget process in all its stages, including the subsequent 
auditing of accounts. For parliaments that approve senior 
appointments and/or perform judicial functions: mechanisms to 
ensure a fair, equitable and non-partisan process. 
 In relation to the 
international 
level 
 
Active involvement of 
parliament in international 
affairs. 
 
Procedures for parliamentary monitoring of and input into 
international negotiations as well as overseeing the positions 
adopted by the government; mechanisms that allow for 
parliamentary scrutiny of activities of international organizations 
and input into their deliberations;; inter- parliamentary 
cooperation and parliamentary diplomacy. 
 (c) In relation to 
the local level 
 
Cooperative relationship 
with state, provincial and 
local legislatures. 
 
Mechanisms for regular consultations between the presiding 
officers of the national and sub-national parliaments or 
legislatures on national policy issues, in order to ensure that 
decisions are informed by local needs. 
 
Source: Inter-Parliament Union (IPU), Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-first Century: 
A Guide to Good Practice IPU Secretariat, Geneva. 2006 
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Summary and conclusion 
As demonstrated throughout the chapter, inspired by institutionalization terminology, the 
concepts of subordination, exclusiveness and secrecy were set as the main conceptual criteria 
of authoritarian legislatures. They posited in the opposite extreme of autonomy, 
representation and deliberation. Under the headline of subordination two different units of 
analysis were identified: the membership and the organizational subordination. With respect 
to the membership subordination, the tenure of MPs, the immunity, autonomy in adopting 
internal regulation and the resources are the operational indicators that reveal the extent to 
which a legislature is subordinated or autonomous. Regarding the organizational 
subordination the focus is predominantly placed on the trade-off between parliaments and 
external powerful groups and organizations that exert influence on them. The operational 
indicators are mainly the constitutional framework, and external powerful actors including 
the military, political parties and monarchs. Due to the importance of informal institutions 
any analysis of authoritarian legislatures would be incomplete without taking into account 
these factors. As a result the role of informal institutions should be taken into account in this 
analysis. Exclusiveness is placed at the opposite extreme of representation. Two different 
view of representativeness were discussed: representative as the fair reflection of population 
diversity and representative as meeting the expectation of constituencies.  The operational 
indicators of the former are populations‘ characteristics (like ethnic, racial, religious, sex and 
age distributions), electoral systems and the election integrity, while the latter is 
operationalized by factors associated to the extent to which legislators devote their time to 
parochial services rather than national policy making. Finally the deliberation deals with the 
democratic values of transparency and accountability, the floor voting along with extensive 
lists proposed by the IPU for transparency are its most evident indicators.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a detailed exposition of the research problem and questions to be 
explored in the study, followed by the methodology. A brief outline of the arguments of key 
scholars will be reviewed once again to clarify the place of the questions of research within 
the literature. A conceptual framework is developed to spell out the main concepts and 
operational indicators of research. It will also be explained why a case study is adopted as the 
main strategy for the research and how this strategy and research problem matches one 
another. The discussion of the data collection methods also follows the same path. The focus 
is placed on the application of such methods to legislative studies while it explains the 
utilization of them for this research. Finally, the interview questions will be proposed and 
their link with the main research questions will be spelled out. 
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The aim and objectives of the study 
 
The overall goal of this study is to produce an understanding of the role of parliaments in 
the survival of authoritarian regimes by focusing on their institutional capacity and their 
related performance. Using the Iranian parliament, Majles, as a case study, the research in 
particular seeks to explain firstly which environmental and institutional factors within and 
outside Majles influence such a role and secondly how Majles contributes to the longevity 
and consolidation of authoritarianism in Iran through its co-optation and legislation 
performances.  
The significance of research 
 
This study potentially provides three original contributions to the knowledge. First, it 
contributes to the literature on the role of parliaments in authoritarian regimes by critically 
analysing the mainstream literature dealing with parliaments‘ performance.  Second, it seeks 
to generate a new research agenda by proposing a framework based on the institutionalization 
approach by which one can assess the institutional capacity of authoritarian parliaments. As 
such, the framework can be utilized in different cases and contexts. Third, it attempts to offer 
better knowledge and understanding of the Iranian parliament, Majles.  
The results of the study particularly may help parliamentarians and outsiders to 
understand better the significance of authoritarian parliaments and ultimately modify their 
expectation regarding the potential capability of such parliaments in sustaining or subverting 
authoritarian regimes. 
Research questions  
The main question the research seeks to address is: ―How and under what conditions do 
parliaments contribute to the longevity of authoritarian regimes?‖ The first part of the 
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question is dealing with how and has to do with parliaments‘ performances through which 
they foster the survival of authoritarian regimes. The second part of the question which 
enquires about the conditions is associated with the institutional capacity of parliaments and 
their external environment. In the previous chapters, the studies which attempted to address 
these questions were reviewed to some extent. In order to place the questions within the 
literature, a brief review of the literature is given in the following to highlight the link 
between the main questions and sub-questions and the relevant literature. For the sake of 
brevity, each question is drawn only from the most important works that raised the question.  
Patterson and Copeland
163
 defined autonomous legislatures as those which can stand on 
their own, independent of external organizations and actors. In contrast many scholars see 
legislatures in non-democratic contexts as exclusively dependent or extremely subordinated 
institutions to autocrats.
164
 The associated questions to this argument are:  
Q1: Which institutional factors constrain MP autonomy in authoritarian regimes? 
Q2: If and to what extent are parliaments subordinated to or independent from 
autocrats? 
Loewenberg and Patterson
165
 contend that the membership of democratic legislatures is 
fairly reflecting the population‘s diversity. Farrell 166  demonstrates how electoral rules 
contribute to the accomplishment of this goal. Avarez et al
167
 in contrast argue that in non-
democratic regimes the autocrats attempt to exclude the opponents by engaging in fraud and 
other forms of electoral abuse including the manipulation of electoral rules. Drawing on this 
discussion the next research question set forth is as follows:  
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Q3: If and to what extent do authoritarian parliaments reflect the population’s diversity? 
What are the main barriers of aspirant applicants to enter into parliaments and people to 
cast votes?  
Turan
168
 contends that constituency services overshadow other representative functions 
in authoritarian regimes under his study. Other scholars point out that parochialism prevents 
MPs from carrying out other main legislative functions and an indication of authoritarian 
regimes.  Based on this literature the next question can be formulated as follows: 
Q4: How important are local interests to the MPs compared to the other key 
representative functions?  
Drawing on the deliberative democracy discussion, Carey
169
 focuses on the democratic 
values like transparency and accountability as the main feature of democratic legislature. In 
contrast secrecy is identified by many legislative practitioners as the characteristics of the 
authoritarian regimes. Having said that the following question can be formulated: 
Q5:  To what extent is the organization of parliament transparent and accountable? 
Gandhi and Przeworski
170
 argue that parliament has been used to split and thus weaken 
the opposition by offering to a given group parliamentary seats and marginalizing other ones. 
This role is called cooptation. The question that can be derived from this argument is:  
Q6: How do parliaments contribute to the survival of regimes by co-opting the 
oppositions?  
Lucas
171
 maintains that autocrats can use the standard routines of legislation through 
parliaments to manipulate the core political institutions to their own advantage. Based on this 
observation the final question of the study can be proposed as:  
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Q7: How do parliaments help the longevity of authoritarian regimes by formulating new 
laws or manipulating the existing laws regarding core political institution in favour of the 
autocrats?  
 
Conceptual framework 
 
The extensive literature review in previous chapters discussed in detail the concepts and 
operational indicators of the conceptual framework of the study. This section draws together 
these findings under a unified conceptual framework followed throughout the research. 
Before proceeding to the framework it is worth elucidation of the extant comprehensive 
conceptual frameworks proposed by legislative scholars to explore the parliamentary activity. 
These conceptual frameworks predominantly, albeit not explicitly, follow the systematic 
approaches. In this sense, they include different units of analysis which trace their 
relationships to one another and also take into consideration the out-put of this interaction and 
its influences on the whole system. The units of analysis are legislatures‘ internal 
organization and the external environment surrounding the parliaments which determine the 
institutional capacity of parliaments. The out-put is the parliamentary performance and 
mainly policy making role of parliaments. Alternatively, the frameworks put forward by 
legislative institutionalization scholars are often based on a comparatively complicated 
concept in which the boundaries of levels of analysis are blurred.  The conceptual framework 
of this study follow the latter approach in that it does not distinguish different level of 
analysis clearly but is analogous to the former ones as it differentiated between legislative 
capacity and performances. This framework in particular seeks to spell out a series of 
appropriate operational indicators for the measurement of the concepts. Given these 
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explanations, the conceptual framework consists of two main constituents: the authoritarian 
legislature institutional capacity and authoritarian legislature performance. With respect to 
institutional capacity, three main criteria for the conceptualization were proposed:  the degree 
to which the authoritarian institutions are autonomous or subordinate, representative or 
exclusive and deliberative or secret. The subordination-autonomy criteria consist of two 
levels of membership and institutional. The operational indicators of the membership include 
the tenure of MPs, their authority in adopting parliament internal regulation, the immunity 
and the funds and resources available to members. The institutional element can be 
operationalized by taking into account formal macro structures including the formal 
constitutional framework that determines the place of parliaments within diverse external 
institutions in the political regimes. It was also indicated that there are other informal norms 
and procedures that shape the actual distribution of power within the closed circles of 
incumbents. The representativeness-exclusiveness element has to do with two different 
conceptualizations. The first deals with populations‘ characteristics (like ethnic, racial, 
religious, sex and age distributions), electoral systems and the election integrity while the 
second is operationalizing by legislators‘ inclinations toward the parochial interests rather 
than the national ones. Finally the deliberation-secrecy dimension deals with the democratic 
values of transparency and accountability and floor voting are its most evident indication.  
The performance of authoritarian legislatures is also identified by two main functions of 
co-optation and legislation which were discussed in detail in the first chapter. The co-optation 
strategies are carried out by reinforcing the disunity among the oppositions, co-opting some 
opposition and excluding the other ones. Operational indicators for cooptation are the high 
turnover in parliaments and the frequent exclusions of different oppositions from re-election 
or entering to parliaments. The legislation function can be understood by looking at the 
number of laws initiated or amended by MPs in favour of authoritarian political institutions. 
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The manipulation of laws regarding the main political institutions like press, election and 
political parties can be used as a proxy for such efforts. Both performances however require 
extensive qualitative analysis and detailed descriptive observations. Table 3 summarizes and 
represents the research‘s conceptual framework. The case study produces some insights to 
this framework; however generalization is tentative. What is of interest is to develop a 
framework within which the case study can be understood and analyzed. Obviously, further 
testing and development and application of the approach to different cases are required.   
 
 
Table 3: Criteria and operational indicators of authoritarian legislature institutions 
and performance 
 Conceptual criteria Operational indicators 
In
stitu
tio
n
a
l ca
p
a
city
 
 
 
Autonomy-
Subordination               
 
 
Membership  
 
 
Turnover, immunity, resource, authority of 
MPs in adopting and amending their 
governing regulations 
 
Institutional  
Constitutional framework, informal 
institutions, external powerful actor including 
military, political parties and monarchs.  
 
Representativeness-
Exclusiveness 
 
Reflection of 
population 
diversity  
 
Population characteristics, Electoral system 
and election integrity 
Responsiveness Parochial orientations and overemphasis on 
constituency services 
Deliberativeness- Secrecy  Floor voting, organizational transparency and 
accessibility including proceedings of 
parliaments to be open to the public, 
standards and enforceable code of conduct.  
     p
erfo
rm
a
n
c
e
 
   
 
Co-optation 
The rate of oppositions excluded from 
parliaments over the time 
 
Legislation  
The number of laws initiated or amended by 
MPs enhancing authoritarian political 
institutions 
Source: author 
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Research strategy  
 
The main research strategy is a case study. This method has considerable relevance to 
the research. As indicated before, the main aim of this research is twofold: to examine in 
detail the role of Majles in authoritarian survival as well as to develop a framework that may 
be generalizable to other legislatures in other contexts. Since theory building and theory 
testing, are central to the case study method, these aims are being well met by employing a 
case study. 
172The case study method is defined as ―an in-depth study of a single-unit (a 
relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar‘s aim is to elucidate features of a larger 
class of similar phenomenon.‖173 This method which has long been applied and utilized by 
political scientists and has the ability to contribute to the development of theories that can 
accommodate various forms of complex causality. As Evans explains:  
It [the case-study method] is work that draws on general theories whenever 
it can but also cares deeply about the particular historical outcomes. It sees 
particular cases as the building blocks for general theories and theories as lenses 
to identify what is interesting and significant about particular cases. Neither 
theories nor cases are sacrosanct. Cases are always too complicated to vindicate 
a single theory…At the same time, a compelling interpretation of a particular 
case is only interesting if it points to ways of understanding other cases as well 
locate and trace the processes that generate the outcome of interest.‖174 
 
In addition, a certain kind of case study is employed which is termed the ―process tracing‖ 
approach. Process tracing studies seeks to find causal relationships among diverse features of 
individual cases. This is often accomplished through a close examination of the intervening 
                                                 
172
 Eckstein, Harry. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science."  Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of 
Inquiry. Eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Vol. 7. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1975. 
173
 Gerring, John. "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For." American Political Science Review 98:.2 
(May 2004). p 341 
174
 Atul Kohli, Peter Evans, et. al., "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium," World Politics 
48:1( 1996) . p 4 
77 
 
processes that link the variables outlined in a conceptual framework. Checkel explains the 
―process-tracing‖ technique by writing:   
Process tracing means to trace the operation of the causal mechanism(s) at 
work in a given situation. One carefully maps the process, exploring the extent 
to which it coincides with prior, theoretically derived expectations about the 
workings of the mechanism. 
175
 
 
Labelled as process-oriented studies, this approach is employed to some extent by those 
legislative scholars who have explained the policymaking aspects of legislation since the 
1960s. Such studies were not initially the work of legislative scholars and saw parliament 
only as part of the policy puzzle, although usually an important part. Later, a new generation 
of legislative studies scholars begun focusing on policy rather than the legislature and 
establishing the relative importance of the legislature compared to other policy-making cores 
in the structuring of the policy.  These studies look at policy as the dependent variable and 
give less attention to it than to independent variables. These studies differed from product-
oriented ones in that ―policy or policy types as an independent variable shapes process and in 
turn shapes legislative outputs.‖176 Economic policy among other issues has received more 
attention and is used in cross-regional comparisons. Legislation in response to EU directives 
is a rich source of comparative case studies as well. Most policy-oriented studies in newly 
democratic legislatures utilize the ―process tracking approach‖. As discussed already, this 
approach has been applied widely in Latin American legislatures to trace the policy-making 
process in special areas. However, it is ironic that this method has been left largely 
underdeveloped within the legislative studies tradition. 
                                                 
175
 Checkel, Jeffrey. "It‘s the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of  European and International 
Politics." Arena Working Paper. Number 26 Oslo: University of Oslo, 2005. 
176
 Oppenheimer, Bruce I. ―How Legislatures Shape Policy and Budgets.‖ Legislative Studies Quarterly. 8: 
4(1983). P 3. 
78 
 
Data collection methods  
Multiple methods were adopted in collecting data rather than focusing on a particular 
one in an attempt to deal with the limitations of each single methodological approach by 
complementing them with other approaches and ultimately to increase the validity of the 
claims. The major conceptual innovations of research grew out of observations through 
working with MPs as a parliamentary researcher. Without close participation in the law 
making process, it would have been nearly impossible to learn how the system is working. 
However, the main data collection method of the research is qualitative, including archival 
and documented-based methods and elite interviewing. Details about each of these techniques 
will be described briefly below.  
 
 
Archival and documented-based methods 
 
Political historians have long valued archival methods as more than data mining.
177
 
Although documentary and archival techniques persist, textbooks describe them as traditional 
in political science,
178
 implying they are a backward or static set of research practices. 
However, the vast range of documentary sources from newspapers to research reports, 
government records to personal diaries, documentary material constitutes a unique accessible 
resource which can leave the political researcher feeling very much the second rate historian. 
In particular, this method offers much for this research. As mentioned before, the main 
strategy of the research is a case study. Such a method has been equated with the historian‘s 
method in that it increasingly employs archival and document-based research.  
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The first step to make the best use of documentary material is to employ a system of 
classification to decide which sources are of most use for specific research purposes. The 
most common distinction made by historians is that between ‗primary‘, ‗secondary‘ and 
‗tertiary‘ sources179. This often involves the use of a simple timescale categorization in which 
‗primary sources‘ consist only of evidence that was actually part of or produced by the event 
in question; ‗secondary sources‘ consist of other evidence relating to and produced soon after 
the event; and ‗tertiary sources‘ of material written afterward to reconstruct the event.180 
Most parliamentary institutions of democratic countries produce a variety of such 
documentation because their activity is becoming increasingly detailed and complex. 
Depending on their powers and functions, these institutions are gradually generating ever 
larger volumes of information and documentation in numerous documentary formats, as is to 
be expected. In these circumstances, such a wide range of primary documents that is not often 
subject to extended closure rules offers great primary resources for parliamentary research. In 
addition, archives that have long ceased to be the preserve of an elite pursuing academic 
research, perceived to have a much wider cultural value, increasing demand for information 
about records and the services that provide them. In this area, efficient and effective use of 
internet technology provides an unprecedented opportunity to reach, serve and obtain 
feedback from a mass audience. A recent policy document in the UK Parliament concluded 
that ‗Outreach has been a developing preoccupation for archives in recent years, but the 
arrival of the Internet Age provides the opportunities to take archives, as never before, to the 
doorstep of the community at large‘. The International Council on Archives, Section for 
Archives of Parliaments and Political Parties suggested a seven-category classification for 
archiving parliamentary documents (Table, 4). However, such resources offer little to the 
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researcher looking to generate an original contribution to the discipline. Although new 
researchers may feel that Hansard is a potentially rich source of information, the debates, by 
and large, record political talk and do not reveal the mechanics of administrative action. ―The 
lengthy mock battles in the Chambers are often dominated by individuals far removed from 
the policy-making process.‖ For this reason, the Debates are well characterized by Mowat  as 
―low-grade ore for the historian . . . better to read the main arguments, and the votes, in a 
newspaper.‖ 181 The tertiary ones such as books, academic journal articles, published diaries, 
memoirs, biographies and autobiographies, unpublished MA, and PhD theses, make much 
contribution, however, the similar shortcoming are true of them. For instance, the analysis of 
newspapers themselves is problematic. As Wilkinson outlines, newspapers offer a unique 
approach to the study of the past ―inasmuch as they are time-specific and do not have an eye 
on posterity.‖ 182 More importantly, the reliability and accuracy of newspaper material cannot 
be presumed and a full analysis of this source requires study of the role of editors and 
journalists, patterns of ownership and processes of production. The review of the most 
commonly used secondary and tertiary sources in political science has tended to confirm that 
they are most effectively employed when they combine with elite interviewing and/or with 
the analysis of primary documents employing content and discourse analysis.  
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Table 4: ICA classification for the archiving of parliamentary documents 
A.-ORGANISATIONS 
WITHIN THE CHAMBER 
- Vote of lack of confidence 
- Green paper/Parliamentary motion  
- Parliamentary - Interpellation 
- Parliamentary Groups - Motion subsequent to an interpellation 
- Chairman - Control of resolutions 
- Chamber Committee - Hearings 
- Spokespersons‘ Committee - Parliamentary questions 
- Plenary Session  - oral questions in plenary sessions 
- Standing Delegation - oral questions in commissions 
- Legislative Standing Committees - written questions 
-Non-Legislative Standing 
Committees 
- Requests for information from the 
Government 
- Non-Standing Committees 
  - Research 
  - Study 
  - Joint 
- Government communications 
- Programmes 
- Plans 
- In compliance with regulations 
- Sub-committees - Agreements  
- Boards - Parliamentary questions 
B.-LEGISLATIVE POWERS E.–RELATIONS WITH BODIES 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
PARLIAMENT 
- Constitution: approval and reform 
- Draft basic laws 
- Bills of law - Constitutional Tribunal 
- White papers - Court of Auditors 
- Congress  - Autonomous Communities 
- Senate - Town Councils 
- Public initiative F. – ELECTIVE POWERS 
- International agreements - Constitutional Tribunal 
-Legislative Delegation in the 
government 
- Court of Auditors 
- General Council of the Judiciary 
C.-INTERNAL 
REGULATORY POWERS 
- Ombudsman 
- Boards of Public Entities 
- Regulations - Other Boards 
- Personnel Statute G.PETITION RIGHTS 
D.- POWERS FOR CONTROL 
AND INFORMATION AND 
POLITICAL MANAGEMENT 
OR PROMOTION 
- Petitions 
 
 
 
- Investiture of the Prime Minister 
- Vote of confidence 
Source: Taken from SPP‘s web site, International Council on Archives, Section of Archives and 
Archivists of Parliaments and Political Parties. On-line at: http://www.ica.org/en/node/51. Accessed: 
18 May 2006 
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The Majles‘ archives do not cover all required documents; however, at least two classes 
of documentation of parliamentary documentation and administrative documentation were 
available. These documents are in the form of revised statutes, Hansard, votes and 
proceedings, Bills (first draft and final draft), and rules/standing orders most of them 
available on-line. The overall records of Majles‘ debates and proceedings or ‗Majles Minutes 
of Proceeding‘183 along with legal texts are published regularly in the Official Journal or legal 
gazette by the Ministry of Justice. The Minutes of Proceeding of all Majles since its inception 
in 1908 are currently available on-line at Majles library website. A selection of such records 
are also published in Majles news web site, Khaneye Mellat,
184
 however, they are the report 
of legislative business, and do not go into as much detail as the Minutes of Proceeding do. 
Furthermore, an annual brochure collecting yearly key facts and figures is released by Majles 
Public Affairs Office. Majles Research Centre (Iranian Parliamentary Information and 
Research Service) also publishes documents which provide background information and 
analysis of current political topics in response to requests from parliamentarians. 
A series of documents identical to or containing the same information as those kept by 
Majles are held in some other national institutions. This is the case, for example, of some of 
the types of documents kept by the government, which holds documents that can also be 
found duplicated in the various ministries depending on the type of political initiative or 
specific issue. A prime example is bills, which are stored in both the government and the 
parliamentary archives. The same is also true of other types of documents, such as pleas, 
questions and documents used in information sessions and general debates. In addition to the 
government, there are other institutions, such as the Audit Office (Divane Mohasebat) and 
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Majels Legal Office (Edareye Hoghooghie Majles) which, as part of their functions, also 
keep documentation identical to that held in parliamentary archives.  
 
Elite interview 
The interviewing and especially elite interviewing, is a potent source of complementary 
data for the documentary approach and can contribute to process tracing approaches to case 
study research in important ways. One of the strongest advantages of elite interviews is that 
they provide researchers with real participants in the processes under investigation, allowing 
for researchers to obtain accounts from direct witnesses to the events in question. While 
documents and other sources may provide detailed accounts, there is often no substitute for 
talking directly with those involved and gaining insights from key participants. As Fenno has 
observed: "We need political scientists to go take a first-hand look at our politicians and 
report back to us … For only we can persist in attaching observation to theory".185 The nature 
of interviewing also allows interviewers to probe their subjects, and thus move beyond 
written accounts that may often represent an official version of events, and gather information 
about the underlying context and build up to the actions that took place. 
186
 Tansy identified 
four uses for this particular form of data collection: (1) it corroborates what has been 
established from other sources such as documents and archives, (2) it establishes what a set of 
people values attitudes and beliefs are, (3) it makes inferences possible about a larger 
population‘s characteristics/decisions who are not interviewed, and finally, (4) it helps 
reconstruct an event or set of events by probing the decisions and actions that lay behind an 
event or series of events. 
187
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In the field of legislative studies elite interviewing has frequently been employed as an 
additional tool for collecting data. The MPs, official clerks and staff-members often prove to 
be accessible samples for research purposes particularly compared to those in other political 
groups, such as civil servants, citizens, and lower-level politicians whose details are rarely 
registered and publicized. Many of the early important empirical works on how the US 
Congress really operates come from pioneers in elite interviewing. Most legislative scholars 
have successfully carried out interviews of legislators asking a series of questions about their 
attitudes on particular issues or institutional practices through standardized questionnaires. 
However, some confident and skilled interviewers combined different interview approaches - 
structured or semi structured questions- in the same questionnaire in their work. 
188
 
With respect to the interview technique adopted in the research, the main emphasis is 
placed on the semi-structured interview technique because it is proven to be appropriate for 
process tracing related interviews. Set questions can ensure the interview is focused on the 
theoretical concerns of the research project, and the ability to ask follow-on questions will be 
necessary to ensure as much relevant information as possible is gained from the respondent. 
Given that, a standardized questionnaire and a mass sample were not employed; the 
conventional sampling techniques would appear to have little to do with this research. The 
researcher‘s experience as a parliamentary staff member allowed the researcher to make a 
preliminary list of key individuals, mainly sitting and former MPs, who were relevant to the 
study. Then the respondents were invited to recommend other persons who might be relevant 
to the study. This technique which is termed ‗snowball‘ or ‗referral‘ helped to expand the list 
of a network of individuals in the arena of the research.
189
 One of the potential drawbacks of 
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such sampling is that respondents often suggest others who share similar characteristics, or 
the same outlook, those with diverse background, party affiliation, and ideological inclination 
were picked up among them. The majority of the interviewees were sitting or former MPs 
who served more than three terms in Majles. Complementary interviews were also conducted 
with parliamentary official clerks and staff-members, government officials, scholars and 
journalist in Tehran and other sites. For the first version of this study which predominantly 
drew on the role of Majles in democratization, 31 interviews were conducted. At the time, 
getting access to interviewees and arranging the interview was not very difficult for the 
researcher because of his previous career as a parliamentary researcher attending most 
committee session and private meetings, knowing well key respondents. This shared 
experience and background, between researcher and the target sample not only made it 
possible to get the interviews, it also was helpful in building rapport with them, encouraging 
them to be more open. However, the danger of ‗overrapport‘ and being captured by former 
colleagues and like minded fellows was not taken for granted. Taking Moser‘s advice, a 
‗pleasantness and a business-like nature‘ over the interview was adopted. 190 The researcher 
used to take notes in order to get frank answers. The experience of interviewing Iranian elites 
suggests that they are rarely comfortable with a tape recorder. 
Keeping a semi-structured format, the interviews did not follow a rigid framework. A list 
of pre-ordained questions, which relied on the research‘s main concerns and conceptual 
framework, were prepared; however, the questions asked varied depending on the particular 
respondents. Whilst the control of interaction by a respondent was not allowed, the ―rambling‖ 
or going off at tangents was often encouraged to ―give insight into what the interviewee sees 
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as relevant and important.‖191 For the second draft of this research, after taking into account 
the recommendations of examiners, a complementary interview was conducted with six 
informants, two telephone and four face to face interviews. In addition because of substantial 
changes in the second draft of research a large portion of previous interview findings became 
irrelevant. The recent turmoil in the country under study and sensitivity of the issue was 
another barrier the researcher faced to carry out further investigation. Most respondents 
wanted the researcher not to reveal their identities. The names of some fifteen respondents 
are listed in the appendix 2. The final questions after the second revision were formulated as 
follows:  
1-In your opinion, to what extent do MPs possess the required skills and experiences to fulfil 
their legislative duties?  
2-To what extent do you feel parliamentary immunity protect you to accomplish your 
representative tasks?  
3-Do you think the required fund and facilities are available to you to fulfil their 
representative roles?   
4-In your opinion, is Majles independent and powerful in fulfilling its duties? If not, why?  
5-How important are Iran‘s constitutional structures external environments to the success of 
Majles activities?  
6-Thinking about the strong informal institutions and powerful interest groups that exist in 
the Iranian context, do you think they exert influence over Majles?  
7-Do you think Majles adequately reflects the diversity of the population? What are the main 
electoral barriers to achieving this goal?  
8-Which parts of representative duties take more energy and time of MPs? (law-making, 
monitoring or constituency services) 
9-Generally speaking, how transparent is Majles‘ internal organization? Please explain in 
detail how internal rules and procedure contribute to the transparency of Majles. 
10-How successful has been Majles in making laws in general and making the laws 
concerning elections, press and political parties in particular? Do you think these efforts 
helped the stability of regime?  
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Table 5: The link between interview questions and research main concepts and 
questions 
 
 Conceptual criteria Main research 
questions 
Interview questions 
In
stitu
tio
n
al cap
acity
 
 
 
Autonomy-
Subordination               
 
 
Membership  
Q1: Which 
institutional factors 
do constrain the MPs 
autonomy in 
authoritarian 
regimes? 
 
1-In your opinion, to what extent do MPs 
possess the skills and experiences to fulfil 
their legislative duties?  
2-To what extent do you feel 
parliamentary immunity protect you to 
accomplish your representative tasks?  
3-Do you think the required fund and 
facilities are available to you?   
 
Institutional  
Q2: If and to what 
extent are parliaments 
subordinated to or 
independent from 
autocrats? 
4-In your opinion, is Majles independent 
and powerful in fulfilling its duties? If not, 
why?  
5-How important are Iran‘s constitutional 
structures external environments to the 
success of Majles activities?  
6-Thinking about the strong informal 
institutions and powerful interest groups 
that exist in the Iranian context, do you 
think they exert influence over Majles?  
 
Representative
ness-
Exclusiveness 
 
Reflection of 
population 
diversity  
 
Q3: If and to what 
extent do 
authoritarian 
parliaments reflect 
the population‘s 
diversity?  
7-Do you think Majles adequately reflects 
the diversity of the populations? What are 
the main electoral barriers to achieving this 
goal?  
Services 
responsiveness 
Q4: How important is 
the local interest to 
the MPs compared to 
the other key 
representative 
functions?  
8-Which parts of representative duties do 
take more energy and time of MPs? (law-
making, monitoring or constituency 
services) 
 
Deliberativeness- Secrecy  Q5:  To what extent 
is the organization of 
parliament is 
transparent and 
accountable? 
9-Generally speaking, how transparent is 
Majles‘ internal organization? Please 
explain in detail how internal rules and 
procedure contribute to the transparency of 
Majles. 
 
p
erfo
rm
an
ce 
   
 
Cooptation 
Q6: How do 
parliaments 
contribute to the 
survival of regimes 
by co-opting the 
oppositions? 
Because of the sensitivity of the issue no 
question was asked in this regards. 
 
Legislation  
Q7: How do 
parliaments help the 
longevity of 
authoritarian regimes 
by manipulating the 
laws in favour of the 
autocrats? 
10-How successful has been Majles in 
making laws in general and making the 
laws concerning elections, press and 
political parties in particular? Do you think 
these efforts helped the stability of regime? 
Source: author 
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Research Ethics 
 
Research on a fairly institutionalized parliament operating within a non-democratic context 
is not an easy task. The most prevalent problem faced was the absence of ample primary 
materials. It is no wonder that in a parliament not adequately institutionalized and with a high 
level of turnover, archive and documentation is often taken for granted. Another pertinent 
problem was the prevailing tendency to classify most documents with no legitimate reason. What 
made the condition most complicated was the intention of the ruling government to veil the 
realities behind curtains of secrecy and instead to present a public face that does not accurately 
reflect the concealed actions. The only available information was that which the authorities 
allowed to circulate. This information was mainly in the form of self-presentation speeches and 
published interviews in the tolerated press. They were however, unreliable in many ways. For one 
thing, due to a widespread climate of self-censorship amongst the authorities, they have the 
incentive to misrepresent themselves and to speak what they think the rulers want to hear.  
Despite these obstacles the researcher had a number of advantages in the first phase of 
the study, however. A five year work experience as a parliamentary researcher allowed the 
researcher to have access to far more extensive information than external observers normally 
have. Using restricted access materials which were accessible only to parliamentary staff, 
enables the researcher to overcome the challenges every researcher confronts when 
conducting elite interviews. Over the time working in the Iranian parliament, the researcher 
picked up valuable information by attending committees, sub-committees and public sessions 
as well as various formal and informal meetings.  This helped the researcher to some extent 
fill the contradiction between ―what MPs do‖ and ―what MPs say they do‖.  What is more, 
although the Iranian political system is not a democratic one, it is characterised by multi-
centred power. This diversity in power centres has been at times accountable for the leak of 
89 
 
some closed accessed information into the public domain, which in turn will provide a 
satisfactory ground for the research community.  
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Chapter 4: Authoritarianism and 
democracy in Iran 
 
Introduction  
 
The underlying purpose of this chapter is twofold: to take a close look at the nature of 
the Iranian regime and discuss the structural, cultural and informal institution determining the 
current Iranian regime. It is crucial to make sense of the Iranian regime because the capacity 
and functions of parliaments under democratic and non-democratic regimes fundamentally 
differs. As a result, before proceeding to the role of parliaments it is imperative to address 
this fundamental question, the degree to which Iranian regime is democratic or authoritarian. 
In particular, this chapter focuses on the underlying cultural and structural factors as well as 
informal institutions accounting for the resilience of authoritarianism in Iran. By reviewing 
these determinants, this chapter also seeks to address the first main question of research in 
which the environmental contexts and informal institutions were identified as determining 
factors influencing the subordination or autonomy of parliaments. Other key determinants 
including the institutional factors will be unfolded in the next chapters.  
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Brief review of Iranian geopolitics and history 
 
Iran is unique in many ways, including geography, history, and culture. It has a shoreline 
extending along the eastern side of the oil-rich Persian Gulf and about 480 km (300 miles) of 
the Arabian Sea. It is a neighbour of the six Arab monarchies. It has land borders with 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey and Iraq; and it shares its 
Caspian Sea littoral with Kazakhstan and Russia. It is the only country in the region with 
shorelines along the Caspian Sea and the Indian Ocean. As such, Iran, for times the size of 
the UK, is probably the most strategic country on this planet.  
Iran is at once one of the oldest countries in the world and the youngest. Its roots date 
back through a 2,500-year line of kings to Cyrus the Great, who unified the country in the 6th 
century BC, and many Iranians today proudly acknowledge their descent from the first 
Persians. Zoroastrianism, a religion originating in Iran, impacted on Christianity and Islam. In 
the sixteenth and subsequent centuries the Persian Empire competed with both the Ottoman 
and the Tsarist Empires. It was his rivalry with Sunni Ottoman Turks that drove the Safavid 
ruler of Iran in 1501 to adopt Shia Islam as the state religion, thus carving out a distinctive 
place for his country in the Muslim world. Later, finding itself on the periphery of the 
expanding Tsarist Russia and the recently established British Empire in the Indian 
subcontinent in the nineteenth century, Iran became a buffer between two competing empires.  
Iran‘s recent history also makes it uniquely distinctive, characterized by a quest for 
democracy and state building. Iran was the first country in the Middle East to experience a 
constitutional revolution (1905—11), which led to the first parliament in the region, meeting 
in 1907. That constitution was notably a liberal and democratic document, one that provided 
lasting standards for debates on state and democracy in Iran. A constitutional monarchy with 
a multiparty system ruled between 1941 and 1953, when a coup masterminded by the U.S. 
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reimposed royal dictatorship and ultimately ended in a 
genuine revolution, in which millions of ordinary citizens participated, but which was 
inspired primarily by religion, an unprecedented phenomenon which is regarded as the last 
great revolution of the Modern Era
192
. The eight years war with Iraq which has come to be 
the second longest inter-state war of the twentieth century 
193
 also happened shortly after the 
Revolution.  
 The Islamic Revolution in 1979 is a turning point for Iranian history.  The direction and 
shifts of events, and the concurrence with the ebb and flow of democratization process since 
the revolution, allowed scholars to divide the post revolutionary Iran into distinct phases. The 
most famous classification of these periods which is to some extent in accordance with Crane 
Briton‘s model of the phases of revolution194 is the so called ―three republics‖: The first one 
was inaugurated with the Islamic revolution and characterized by revolutionary and 
charismatic leadership by the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini (1979–
1989).
195
 The ―Second Republic‖ lasted roughly from after Khomeini‘s death in 1989 and the 
termination of war with Iraq up until Khatami‘s election in 1997. After Ayatollah Khomeini‘s 
death no one could take the place of his unique personality as he was a spiritual as well as 
political leader of millions of people. During these years Iran was under the duumvirate of 
Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Rafsanjani with no serious challenge. This period 
was a transitory phase in post revolutionary Iran. It moved state and society away from 
revolutionary activism, but it did not produce a stable framework for managing state-society 
relations. The ―Third Republic‖ refers to Khatami‘s two term presidency (1997-2005). This 
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period was marked by an intense struggle between two divergent trends. One centred in the 
president who promised democratization and the other led by the Leader who sought to 
consolidate authoritarianism. The latter ended in the triumph of authoritarianism with the 
election of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad as the sixth Iranian president.  
 
Structures 
 
Economics 
 
Iran is a country richly endowed with oil and natural gas. Iran has the world's second 
biggest proven crude oil reserves after Saudi Arabia and the second biggest natural gas 
reserves after Russia. Ironically, despite abundant oil resources, the Islamic Republic is not a 
wealthy country. According to CIA World Factbook, in 2002 about 40% of all Iranians were 
living below the poverty line.
196
 The estimated jobless rate among the 15-29 age group is 
around 52%.
197
 In a recent poll, 74.6 percent of Iranians identified economic problems as the 
most important challenge facing their society.
198
 Meanwhile, to restore the country‘s oil-
dependent industry, the lifeblood of its economy, Iran needs approximately $17 billion in 
foreign investments.
199
 The natural resource bounties proved to be more a curse than a 
blessing. As argued in the literature on rentier states, easy access to allocated oil revenue 
―releases[s] the state from the accountability ordinarily exacted by domestic appropriation of 
surplus…. [T]he state may be virtually completely autonomous from its society, winning 
popular acquiescence through distribution rather than support through taxation and 
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representation.‖200 In addition, rentierism, it is argued, increases the capacity of the state to 
both buy off, and to repress, opposition. Finally, oil revenues change the class structure of 
society. This can also hurt democracy by preventing changes in the class structure that 
usually lead to democracy.
 201
 Iran is a prime example of a rentier state with dependence on 
natural resource exports as the taxes are closer to 20 per cent of national revenues. Oil makes 
up 60—70 per cent of the state income, most of which is under the control of the ruling 
groups. During the Khatami presidency the surplus income of oil was deposited in the Oil 
Stabilisation Fund, an account opened by the state in 2000 to balance the fluctuation of oil 
prices. But in the time of seemingly everlastingly high oil prices, there was no reason for 
saving. The Fund was used for all kinds of purposes, such as expansion of the IRGC, new 
equipment for the police, grants to disabled war veterans. This share constitutes between 30 
and 50 per cent of yearly withdrawals.
202 
Coupled with problems emanating from the rentier 
state, a series of dramatic political events such as the seizure of the American Embassy in 
Tehran within nine months of the revolution, which led to economic sanctions by the West, 
followed by an invasion by Iraq in September 1980, the rampant corruption after Khomeini‘s 
death and finally more severe sanctions because of pursuing nuclear activities have accounted 
for widespread poverty. Such dreadful circumstances have facilitated the rise of authoritarian 
populism addressing the economic demands at the expense of democracy. 
 
Demography   
 
After the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the war with Iraq, the Iranian regime 
campaigned intensively to increase the country‘s population. Against the background of a 
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rapidly increasing and extremely young population—more than 50% of the people entitled to 
vote are under 30 years old— the government has been faced with major problems. Iran‘s 
population has almost doubled from 1979 (36 million inhabitants) to 2003 (approx. 72 
million).
203
 The demographic factor is one of the chief driving forces in the reform process in 
Iran, because the people who vote for and support reformist candidates are to be found 
mainly among the youth and the female population of Iran. The generation of Iranians born in 
the 1970s and 1980s, who do not harbour any deep resentment of the previous regime, which 
was barely, or not at all, experienced by them, and who did not participate actively in the 
revolution, is disappointed by the Islamic regime. The principal reason for this is that the 
revolution has not fulfilled the promises of social justice and material prosperity that were 
made in 1979. The young people are pressing for political and economic liberalization. They 
are calling for reforms that will create jobs, slow down inflation, and improve the standard of 
living.
204
 In addition, they want an easing of the strict social and cultural bans that determine 
the lives of most Iranians, especially in areas such as the Islamic dress code for women, the 
relationships between the two sexes, and the possibilities of accessing western culture and 
western media. Furthermore, a majority of Iranians wants to see an end to Iran‘s isolation in 
terms of foreign policy, which is mainly rooted in the hostility of the regime towards the 
USA. It has so far not proved possible to overcome this hostility, which is based partly on the 
negative historical experiences of Iran with the imperialist policies of the USA during the 
former regime, and partly on the ideological dogmas of the 1979 revolution.
205
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Political Culture  
 
A growing body of literature generally acknowledged to be making important 
contributions to the understanding of political change in Iran focuses on Iranian political 
culture. Since the mid-1980s, scholars writing on post–Revolutionary Iran have produced a 
number of books mainly on the peculiarities of Iranian political culture and its impact on the 
political process
206
. This new interest represents a departure from earlier works on the Islamic 
Revolution, which mostly embraced Islamic theology or political-economy approaches. 
Central to the concern of such scholars is to identify the characteristics of Iranian political 
culture. For instance, Fuller argues that the characteristics of the political culture are 
understood in such aspects as the extravagance of the Shia Muslim spirit reflected in 
hyperbole, the sense of pride in one of the most ancient cultures of the world, the deep feeling 
of their superiority towards their neighbours and the distinctiveness of the Persian race and 
culture. These insights into the Iranian psyche are important in understanding their political 
culture. He also explains the different skills needed in a culture where conspiracy prevails, 
where personal relationships are vital in power relationships, and where learning how to live 
with absolute power is required for daily existence. 
207
 
Similarly Rezagholi argues that Iran's culture is patriarchal, deeply traditional, and tribal, 
and that it would follow that only a charismatic strongman can rule Iran. He brings a handful 
of historical examples to support the proposition. He believes that more than 2,500 years of 
absolute and often authoritarian rule in Iran have resulted in a traditional, anti-authoritarian, 
and sometimes cynical political culture. With kings, princes, ministers, and clerics either 
ignorant to or unable to meet the concerns of the average citizen, the man on the street would 
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naturally turn to tribe or family for support. With governments to be feared, the Iranian would 
inevitably view politics as a dangerous game played by elites. He also put emphasis on an 
important aspect of Iranian political culture: hero worship. He notes the Iranian is quick to 
mobilize, to provoke the charismatic leader with a bag of promises. The people invest all 
their hopes and dreams in this leader, this saviour, this hero figure, who has come to save the 
day. When he fails to meet those unrealistic expectations, the old Iranian cynicism 
surfaces.
208
  
Other scholars considered devolution in Iranian political culture to be influenced by ever 
changing political contexts. For instance, Alamdari noted that the Iranian political culture 
after the revolution is best understood in three stages. As he put it in the Ayatollah Khomeini 
era (1979–1989) the dominant Iranian political culture was populism. He was a spiritual as 
well as political leader of millions of people ruling on slogans based on religious and 
egalitarian values. The eight years war with Iraq also facilitated a populist political culture. 
After Ayatollah Khomeini‘s death no one could take the place of his unique personality. Thus, 
the political culture shifted from populism to a sort of clientelism
209
. The Iranian clientelism, 
however, differs from other clientelism in that the link between patron and client is both 
traditional and religious.
210
 The reformist government of Mohammad Khatami (elected in 
1997) failed to end clientelism. Instead Iranian society seems to be moving towards 
pragmatism and utilitarianism, while the political power structure leans towards militarism.
211
 
                                                 
208
 Rezagholi, Ali. Jame-E Shenasi-E Nokhbe Koshi Dar Iran. Tehran: Nay, 1999.  
209
 Definitions of clientelism vary, but all have three common characteristics that link patron and client: 1) 
inequality of power, status and wealth; 2) reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services; and 3) the 
proximity of personal and face-to-face relationships, which create a sense of trust between two parties.  
JD Powell, ‗Peasant society and clientelist politics‘, American Political Science Review, 64 (2), 1970, pp 411 – 
425; R Lemarchand,; and Steffen W Schmidt et al (eds), Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political 
Clientelism, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977.  
210
 Alamdari, Kazem. "The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from Populism to 
Clientelism, and Militarization of the Government." Third World Quarterly 26.8 (2005).  
211
 Alamdari, Kazem. ibid.  
98 
 
Motivated by such assumptions most Iranian reformists came to the conviction that long 
standing political cultures conditioned by historical events appear to be the major obstacle 
against reformists' attempts. For example, Mohammad Khatami the former president in a 
lengthy letter addressed to the Iranian nation noted that: 
212
 
No peoples are capable of choosing their future without taking into account their 
past history…Our past history is filled with numerous and continuous instances of 
oppressions. It is the history of chronic pangs of sufferings and throes of 
suppressions in our society…The feelings of abhorrence and yearnings take charge 
while freedom of thoughts and expressions vanish into the limbo in such a 
repressive atmosphere. For centuries, we have been victims of such oppressive rules. 
 
Following the same path, Rezagoli argues that reformist and innovative thought are 
quickly killed or overthrown by a patriarchal, tribal, traditional culture that fails to appreciate 
their efforts. "Generally speaking, Iranian society produces corrupt rulers," he noted. He goes 
on to state that in those rare instances when "great" (in Rezagoli's view) leaders emerge, "the 
culture quickly corrects itself and kills these great ones within a year or two." 
213
The 
widespread idea led to the stance of blaming reform failure on the people lacking required 
democratic political culture. As such, most academics and politician alike went further to 
state that Iranian political culture is in sharp contrast to democratic practices.  
However, empirical evidence from recent polls runs counter to that widely held notion. 
According to the findings of such surveys, majorities in Iran strongly value democracy. For 
instance, a World Public Opinion (WPO) face-to-face poll of the Iranian public confirms 
strong support for democracy. Respondents were asked, ―How important is it for you to live 
in a country that is governed by representatives elected by the people?‖ and told to answer on 
a 0-10 scale, where 10 signified the greatest importance and 0 the least. A large majority 
(68%) of Iranians chose the highest possible score of 10; on average the Iranian response was 
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a 9.1. 
214
 Other polls are consistent with WPO‘s findings that a majority of Iranians both 
support democracy and feel that their government is at least somewhat democratic. A survey 
by the Iranian Student Polling Agency found that 65 percent of respondents said it was 
―absolutely important‖ to live in a democratically governed country and 90 percent believed 
that democracy was better than any other form of government. Smaller numbers—but still a 
majority—said that they believed Iran was ―fairly democratic‖ (59%).215 The World Values 
Survey in 2000 got similar results. Asked how they felt about ―the way democracy is 
developing‖ in their country, 50 percent of Iranians said they were very or rather satisfied. 
Only 25 percent were not very satisfied or not at all satisfied. Though hardly an 
overwhelming endorsement, this does show that more Iranians approved than disapproved of 
their system of government by a 2:1 margin.
216
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Informal institutions  
 
The fate of regime change in Iran is overshadowed by the fact that Iran is ruled through 
an increasingly interwoven power structure that operate through the informal channel of 
authorities.
217
 Of these diverse informal institutions, five are of more importance than others. 
They include thousand families, political factions, the ―Representatives of the Leader‖ 
(Namayandegan-e Rahbar) to the different organs of the state, charity foundations (Bonyads) 
and Iran‘s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) which in recent years gained massive 
powers. In the following, each will be reviewed.  
 
 
Thousand families 
Iranians always speak sarcastically of the "thousand families" to describe the ruling class 
- an expression once used for the pre-1979 aristocracy.
218
 The Islamic Revolution reversed 
the country's class structure as well as its political system. Millions of Iranians fled after the 
revolution, some were executed and many dismissed from the key public positions by the 
new government. Yet, with the passage of time a new elite family has emerged, more 
powerful and notorious than the previous one.
219
 They are coming from different 
backgrounds, but at top are the clerics, whose most fundamental credentials are their 
revolutionary pedigrees, most of them trained in the seminaries in Najaf and Qom where 
Khomeini and his stalwart students taught during the 1960s and 1970s. The most important 
seminary that produced them was the Fayziyeh Seminary in Qom. Over time, the Haqqani 
Seminary in Qom has grown in importance, largely because many of its alumni have 
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dominated the powerful institutions of the Judiciary, the Council of Guardians, and the 
security services. Others include traditional merchants, directors of religious foundations that 
took over royal property, and technocrats, some of them Western educated.
220
 Add to them 
thousands of government bureaucrats, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and the 
militia movement, the Basij, whose power reached its peak in the last few years. Among the 
new "thousand families" are many with clerical connections, including the Larijanis, the sons 
of a famous ayatollah, Hashem Amoli. At the time of writing this research Ali Larijani with a 
military background is Majels speaker; his youngest brother a cleric is appointed to the head 
of the judiciary, and the other brother a prominent physicist holds the post of human rights 
deputy of the judiciary. Other notable examples are the former president Khatami‘s brother, 
Mohammad Reza Khatami who was a member of the Sixth Parliament and the secretary 
general of the reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF)—and who is married to Zahra 
Eshraqi, a granddaughter of Khomeini. Similarly, the daughter of the former president of the 
Parliament, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, is married to the son of Ali Khamenei, the current 
Leader. Rahim Mashaee Ahmadnejad‘s vice president who was sacked by Khamenei and 
again appointed to the higher position in presidential office is the father in law of 
Ahmadinejad‘s son. Perhaps the most famous and infamous of the new elite families are the 
Rafsanjanis, although their power has been in decline in recent years. Rafsanjani himself 
served as Majles president for two sessions, two terms of Presidency and at the time of 
writing this the head of Expediency Council and the Expert Assembly simultaneously. His 
younger daughter, Faezeh, was a member of parliament, a newspaper publisher, and head of a 
sports association for women. His son Mohsen heads the office constructing the Tehran 
underground; another, Yasser, is on the Expediency Council. The third, Mehdi, served in the 
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oil industry and runs an organization promoting fuel efficiency. More recently, many of the 
new elite have come from the ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij. 
The current president, Ahmadinejad, the mayor of Tehran, Mohammad- Baler Qalibaf, and 
many of the ministers all were military figures from these corps or worked for the research 
institutes connected to the IRGC. This growing militarization of politics is a new 
phenomenon in modern Iranian history.
221
  
 
Factionalism 
 
Ironically, the literature on Iranian politics extensively cites political parties while they 
are banned, or do not exist. In the absence of political parties the main political formations 
have continued to be organizations acting in a ―pseudo-party‖ or what is known as faction. 
These institutions are not homogenous and at best include loose coalitions of groups and 
individuals with similar views. They also lack a consistent organizational structure and 
official platform. However, they play an important role in arranging the list of Majles 
candidates shortly after parliamentary elections.
222
 The factions were also able to mobilize 
thousands of volunteers through their vast networks of mosques and foundations. A striking 
feature of political factions in Iran is that they are undergoing persistent changes over time. 
This unstable characteristic of Iranian factions was described by Clawson and Rubin as:   
―Each time it appeared that one faction had emerged on top, that group 
promptly fractured into hostile camps. The political scene was like a 
kaleidoscope: as soon as one pattern formed, it was quickly shaken apart, 
only to reform in a quite different pattern. It is easy to get lost in the 
factional details, but the main recurring theme is the increasing power of the 
revolutionaries and the constant undercutting of those who would 
reestablish more modern, normal government and institutions.‖ 223 
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The Islamic Republic Party (IRP), the first clerical party established in 1979 was forced 
to dissolve by Khomeini because of the bitter factional disputes between them. During the 
1980s and 1990s, the faction has been mainly cleric oriented. The conservative Association 
of Combatant Clergy (ACC) was formed prior to the revolution. The more open-minded 
members of this organization set up the Society of Combatant Clerics (SCC) in 1988. In 1996 
the Servants of Construction (SOC) was created to support then-President Ayatollah Ali-
Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. This was a significant development because not only were the 
group‘s founders not clerics or ostentatiously Islamic in character, but it was technocratic-
oriented and pragmatic ideologically. Supporters of President Mohammad Khatami 
established the Islamic Iran Solidarity Party (IISP) in 1998 which was assumed to be the first 
full-fledged political party since the 1979 revolution. Despite numerous variants, they can be 
categorized into two broad groupings: right/conservative/hard-line and 
left/reformist/moderate. As the protector of the whole system, the Leader plays a decisive 
role in factional equilibrium among the governing elites.
224
 However, Khamenei‘s public 
positions in recent years clearly show that his temperament and ideological orientation are 
more harmonious with a particular faction. He said, ―The two factions, the progressive and 
the faithful, are as necessary as the two wings of a bird.‖225 These words were never put into 
action.  
As such, factionalism has dominated politics in Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 
Seen in a positive light, this can be described as another sign of the dynamic of Iranian 
politics. However, Kazem Jalali, Majles deputy, believes the lack of robust political parties 
curtails the democratization process. He argued ―in our country, it is mainly individuals who 
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get elected. It is natural that these individuals do not have a long record of service, hence the 
difficulty to judge their work. Yet, naturally, we want to act democratically despite the 
vacuum of political parties of such description.‖ He added: ―we are trying to nominate 
personalities whom we deem suitable. We may even be able to form a coalition with some 
groups. The country's political makeup is in the process of recovery. The wise personalities 
of political factions are weary of extremism.‖226  Measured by the number of Majles deputies, 
their fortunes have varied over recent years. The factional alignment of forces within the 
Majles has also mirrored the way wider factional disputes in other centres of power in the 
country have taken place. 
227
  
 
Bonyads 
 
The numerous Bonyads that exist in Iran can be divided into three categories: public, 
private, and charitable—Islamic. Foundations, especially private and charitable—Islamic 
ones, have enjoyed a long tradition in Iran and are not a new phenomenon. It was only after 
the revolution in 1979, however, that they began to gain the enormous social and economic 
significance attributed to them today. In essence nongovernmental bodies, all foundations 
claim to be nonprofit organizations—a claim that in most cases is highly questionable. Most 
foundations either own charity and endowment incomes or officially receive allocated 
budgets from the government, or both. However they are tax exempt. Often times, they 
operate in parallel to the formal institutions of the government, but very infrequently do they 
coordinate their activities with the executive.
228
 Their activities extend from trade and 
commerce to manufacturing and industrial production, and also include the promotion of 
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religious—political propaganda, social services, and art. The ―giants‖ among the public 
foundations enable patronage, mass mobilization, ideological indoctrination, and repression. 
The degree of autonomy enjoyed by the foundations in relation to the state varies and is often 
impossible to determine precisely. How much the foundations receive in financial 
contributions from the official coffers of the leader is also unknown. It is known that the 
foundations enjoy unlimited access to state funds, foreign currency at a low exchange rate, 
and the manufacturers of consumer goods, and that they do business in a completely 
uncontrolled manner, largely outside the country.
 
Although the foundations are allocated 58 
percent of the state budget,
 
the executive branch does not have precise information regarding 
their economic activities or the number of businesses they operate. Almost without exception, 
the foundations are headed by influential clerics or other key figures among the power elite in 
Iran, referred to as moluk-e tavayef (little kings) in the Iranian vernacular.
229
 Despite mutual 
rivalries over social and economic spheres of influence and state contributions, these little 
kings are united by a common desire to promote the revolutionary Islamic system and its 
values by any and all means possible, including repression. The absence of state control 
appears to have resulted in the emergence of widespread corruption, nepotism, and abuse of 
power in many of the foundations. Nevertheless, the Iranian public hears of this only in a few 
exceptional cases—such as when, in the wake of funding battles between various 
beneficiaries of the system, damaging documents are leaked to the press, thereby spurring 
parliamentary investigations.
230
 
Included among the largest and most important foundations, whose total number remains 
unknown, are the Bonyad Mostazafin, ―The Foundation of the Oppressed‖ and The Imam 
Reza Foundation. The former was established to appropriate all assets of the Pahlavi court — 
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from cinemas to factories, even to real estate in New York — and to administer them in 
accordance with the commands of the leader. It is exempt from taxes and audits, endowed 
with preferential access to foreign exchange from the banks, stretching across most economic 
branches in vertically and horizontally integrated divisions — it reads like the fantasy of a 
Rockefeller monopolist. Two-thirds of all bricks, tyres, chemicals and foodstuffs in Iran are 
produced by the Bonyad. It maintains a strong presence in textiles, tourism, transport and 
heavy industry; it dominates shipping, hotel chains, domestic aviation, and road and rail 
construction, and keeps slightly odd assets such as a Disney-style theme park outside Tehran 
and the Shah‘s treasure trove of old jewels and carpets.231 
The Imam Reza Foundation, located in Mashhad, now operates its own bank and several 
transportation firms, including its own airline. In addition, it has acquired a monopoly in the 
exploitation of most gold and semiprecious-metal mines in the province, along with a 
monopoly on exploitation rights in the Sarakhs natural gas fields along the border with 
Turkmenistan. Next to the National Iranian Oil Company and the Foundation of the 
Oppressed, the Imam Reza Foundation is now believed to be the third largest economic 
organization in the country. Bolstered by its economic power, Va‘ez-Tabasi is able to 
approach the central government in Tehran virtually as a self-assured leader of an 
independent province, and at times he is even able to ignore the directives of the 
governmental leadership.
232
 
Almost all of them are ruled by conservatives and report directly to the Leader and are 
technically under his direct control and supervision. While the executive continues to 
underwrite the sizeable budget of these foundations and semi-official organizations, these 
states-within-the-state have managed to develop their own clientele and answer only to the 
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Leader. President Khatami and reformists in the sixth Majles have tried to eliminate 
institutional duplications, but their efforts have been in vain.  
 
Leader’s representatives  
 
The formal office through which the Leader wields his power is the Daftar-e maqam-e 
mo’azzam-e rahbari (literally ―High Leadership Office,‖ but generally referred to as the 
Office of the Supreme Leader). The Office of the Leader arranges the Leader's meetings, 
appearances, and visits, and keeps him up to date on political developments in Iran. It 
consists of four permanent members, all of whom are clerics, two of whom previously served 
in key positions in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, while the other two are Arab 
Shi‘is in exile from Iraq. The Office of the Supreme Leader also employs ten special advisers 
upon whom the Leader can call in fields such as culture, economics, military affairs, and the 
media. In total, approximately six hundred people work directly within the Leader's private 
office or in the branches that feed into it. 
233
 
Yet the most controversial practice in Leader power is his powerful representatives, 
whom the Leader personally appoints or approves. These ―clerical commissars‖ are 
positioned in every important state ministry and institution, as well as in most revolutionary 
and religious organizations. Almost all the representatives are clerics. One resource estimates 
the total number of these commissars working inside and outside Iran at 2000. All together, 
these representatives form a diverse, countrywide control network dedicated to enforcing the 
authority of the Leader, ensuring the greatest possible vigilance against ideological deviation. 
They are more powerful than ministers and other government functionaries, and they have the 
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authority to intervene in any matter of state.
 
Through this system, the supreme leader is able 
to wield his power in five different spheres: 
• ministries in the executive branch; 
• the armed forces and security services; 
• provincial representatives (Friday imams); 
• revolutionary and religious organizations; and 
• Iranian cultural centers in foreign countries. 
 
There are currently no data available on the magnitude of the Leader‘s financial 
resources, or their allocation within his ―shadow empire.‖ One resource estimates that much 
of Iran‘s oil-derived foreign exchange income flows into the supreme leader‘s office. The 
revolutionary foundations provide another source of income for the supreme leader, as they 
transfer to him considerable portions of the profits they earn through their economic and 
commercial transactions.
234
 
At local level, the Leader representatives are those clerics who deliver the sermon after 
each Friday prayer ceremony and called Friday Prayer Imams. Again, while the executive 
branch furnishes the budget that each Friday Prayer Imam has at his disposal, it has no 
control over the contents of the all-important sermons that they deliver every week. 
Provincial Friday Prayer Imams serve two important functions. To begin with, they are the 
personal representatives of the Leader to each of the country‘s cities, towns, and villages. In 
their capacity as the Leader‘s representatives, these clerics are, in effect, more powerful than 
the provincial governors, who are appointed by the Tehran-based executive branch. 
Moreover, the provincial Friday Prayer Imams deliver the all-important sermon during the 
communal Friday prayer, which are usually held in the city‘s largest mosque or another 
central location. 
                                                 
234
 Butcha, Wilfried. ibid.  
109 
 
The Friday prayer ceremonies are ideal propaganda forums exclusively in the hand of 
conservatives, especially over national elections. In 1997 and to some extent in 2001 
presidential elections, conservative clerics frequently used the Friday Prayer sermons to 
endorse their own candidates, although with no success. Yet, through appealing directly with 
a core of ardent supporters and indirectly with the nation through radio and television 
broadcasts, the sermons remain powerful mechanisms for advancing conservative agendas 
and/or undermining opponents in the Majles or in the executive branch. Moreover, the Friday 
prayer sermons in many ways influence the tone and tenor of debate on important national 
issues.
235
 
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  
 
Iran‘s political regime was overwhelmingly civilian over the last century. However, the 
growing presence of military veterans in the regime has led some to suggest that Iran is 
experiencing a creeping coup.
236
 Two distinguished military forces are coexisting in Iran: the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular armed forces.  However, this 
dualism has narrowed in recent years as a result of an increasing integration of the Guards 
and the regular parts of Iran's general purpose forces. 
237
  
Established by an order from Ayatollah Khomeini shortly after the Islamic Revolution in 
1979, the initial mission of the IRGC was as an ideological guard for the Islamic regime. 
Ayatollah Khomeini was undoubtedly opposed to the politicization of the armed forces. He 
went so far as to rebuke IRGC against siding with any political factions: ―I insist that the 
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armed forces obey the laws regarding the prevention of the military forces from entering into 
politics, and stay away from political parties, groups and [political] fronts. The armed forces 
[consisting of] the military, the police force, the guards, and the Basij should not enter into 
any [political] party or groups, and steer clear from political games.‖238 Despite Khomeini‘s 
remarks and ambitions one can argue that the constitutional role of the IRGC is political in its 
essence. The IRGC is defined as the ―guardian of the Revolution and of its achievements‖ 
(Article 150)—a political as well as military mission. Section 5 of the charter provided by the 
Revolutionary Council also stipulated training of the IRGC in ―politico-military‖ and 
―ideological‖ matters. The IRGC has grown considerably in recent years in terms of its 
importance and its influence in the public sphere of Iran.
239
 As noted by Iranian dissident 
Sazegara, also one of the IRGC‘s founders, by allowing so many Guards members to run in 
Majles election, Ayatollah Khamenei "let the genie out of the bottle, because he wanted to 
oppose the reform movement, he invited them [the military] into politics. When people enter 
politics backed by guns, you have no tools to push them back. They have money as well, and 
organization." Yet, it seems the relationship between clerics and military is more complex 
than what Sazgara noted. Clerics such as Khamenei, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and 
Hassan Lahooti were among the first cadres put in charge of military personnel and 
commissioned by Ayatollah Khomeini to create the IRGC. As the commander in chief, 
Khamenei probably knows more about military and security issues than about traditional Figh 
and Shi‘ite narratives. As Nafisi (2009) notes the government of Iran today is ―militaristic 
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state, vested in a clerical robe, and aided and abetted by uncountable Basij militia, extends its 
tentacles to all corners of society.‖ 240 
Now with about 150,000 active members plus thousands of influential veterans, the 
IRGC functions as an expansive socio-political-economic conglomerate whose influence 
extends into virtually every corner of Iranian political life and society. As Slavin  noted ―the 
Guards combines the vanguard military mission of the U.S. Marines, the internal and external 
security and intelligence activities of the old Soviet KGB, the economic muscle of a Japanese 
trading consortium, and the black market expertise of the Cosa Nostra.‖ 241  The Guards 
protect Iran's top leaders and is in charge of its nuclear programme and missile development. 
Its members and veterans rival Shiite Muslim clerics as the most influential figures in Iran 
today. Ahmadinejad is a former Guards officer, as are about more than half the members of 
his cabinet, the majority of Iran's governors, and a half of the members of seventh Majles. 
IRGC has been a cornerstone of the conservatives‘ survival and comeback strategy since 
1997, and has been substantially rewarded by Khamenei. In particular, after Khatami‘s 
presidency, Khamenei increased funding for IRGC‘s training, new weapons systems, salaries, 
benefits, housing, and various services for its rank and file, strengthening IRGC against the 
democratic aspiration of Khatami. As an important pillar of the regime, the IRGC grew in 
power and influence steadily during the Khatami period as it built its capabilities to defend 
the regime against both domestic challenges and external threats. In that capacity, it also 
became prominent in politics. By the end of the Khatami period, the commanders of IRGC 
had assumed additional government and security positions in decision-making circles.  
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In general, these informal institutions accounted for a massive network whose tentacles 
stretched out and reached in every aspect of Iranian public life. The impact of informal 
institutions on the Majles is explained by a conservative MP as:  
Majles neither govern by its RoP nor by the constitutional law. 
Even the MPs‘ consensus and voting have nothing to do with the 
functioning of Majles. I witnessed several times a bill approved by a 
consensus vote of Majles but after few months Majles approved a bill 
very opposite to it…it is a secret network that governs Majles. As long 
as the network has not given permission, nothing will happen. The 
activities of network are not limited to seventh Majles, existing in all 
former periods. Its agents within and outside Majles put mental 
pressure on MPs and force them to act toward their interest. 
242
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Conclusion 
 
The chapter has considered diverse but convergent issues related to the contextual 
determinants of authoritarianism in Iran. It was necessary to review such pertinent studies 
before turning to the main discussion on the role of Majles. It was discussed that in class 
terms, the revolution empowered the previously powerless classes including clerics, and an 
eight years war left a large number of war veterans claiming for power. It was also put that 
the rent wealth coming from oil failed to result in the same democracy-promoting effects as 
wealth generated in a productive economy. Arguably it has had a negative impact on 
democracy in Iran by creating a gap between citizen and government, accounted for rampant 
corruption. The demographic factor is considered as a chief driving force in the reform 
process in Iran, because the people who vote for and support reformist candidates are to be 
found mainly among the youth and the female population of Iran. This chapter has put into 
question the widely accepted idea that Iranian political culture is the main reason for 
democracy failure in Iran by offering empirical evidence from recent polls. Instead it 
discussed relatively overlooked factors such as informal institutions, which have been an 
outstanding consequence for the fate of democracy and resilience of authoritarianism in Iran.  
Throughout this chapter references were made on some occasions to the impact of 
informal institutions on the Majles. For instance it was mentioned that the influential 
members of Majles have always selected from among ‗thousand families‘ the informal ruling 
class in Iran. The political factions were the key actors in compiling the list of Majles 
candidates. The powerful bonyads (foundations) provide secret funds for some candidates 
and Friday Prayer tribune has turned out to be the propaganda forum for conservative 
candidates. More importantly IRGC members in recent years increasingly have shown 
interest in and enthusiasm for running in Majles election. 
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Chapter 5: Majles autonomy 
Introduction 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to address this issue by focusing on the institutional 
arrangements shaping and influencing Majles autonomy. As indicated before, to explain the 
subordination-autonomy criteria, two levels of analysis should be considered: membership 
and organizational units. Due to its importance, the majority part of this chapter is devoted to 
the organizational element of autonomy which deals with the place of Majles within the 
broader political system. The extant literature on Iranian politics considers the Iranian 
political system from an institutional angle; however the role of Majles within the system has 
received scant attention. This chapter largely seeks to fill this gap. A brief review of Iran 
political system reveals that it is unique and extremely complicated. It is marked by the 
coexistence of multiple centres of powers nested in numerous unelected and elected 
institutions. The unelected institutions share overlapping responsibilities with the elected 
ones. Such duality derives from the very nature of the Islamic Republic Constitution in which 
there has been a tendency to bring rapprochement between Islamic and republican concepts 
of sovereignty. To understand the place of Majles in such a perplex system, the study of the 
Iranian constitution is a reasonable departure point. The next step is to analyze the autonomy 
or subordination of Majles with respect to other constitutional institutions which compete 
with Majles in several senses.  These competing institutions in the Iran political system 
includes, the Great Leader, executive, the Expediency Council (EC) and the Council of 
Guardians (CG). In particular it will be discussed which functions these institutions share 
with parliaments. The second element of the autonomy-subordination criteria was 
membership subordination. The operational indicators of these elements as put before are 
115 
 
members‘ immunity, turnover and funds and facilities and the authority of MPs in adopting 
and amending Majles rules of procedures.  
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The Constitution 
 
The genesis and evolution 
 
The first Iranian constitution, framed in 1906, was the first of its kind in the Islamic 
world, earlier than the revolution of Turkey. 
243
 While following the Belgian model, with its 
separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial organs of the 
government, the constitution took into consideration the implications of its Islamic context.  
Its inadequacy as a national constitution prompted the formation, in mid-February 1907, of a 
new committee to draft a supplement to the Constitution. The result was a production of 
Supplementary Fundamental Laws, which outlined the citizens‘ bill of rights, and a 
parliamentary form of government, with power concentrated in the legislature—composed of 
a 136-member Majles with a two-year term and a sixty-member Senate also with a two-year 
tenure—at the expense of the executive, with the cabinet being responsible to the Majles.244 
 The constitution remained unchanged prior to the advent of the Islamic Revolution in 
1979. After the fall of monarchy and proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Iran on April 1, 
1979, in the wake of a 98 percent ―yes‖ vote in a referendum under universal suffrage on the 
subject, Ayatollah Khomeini decreed that the Assembly of Experts should lay a foundation 
for the future regime. The preliminary draft document presented to it did not contain the 
vilayet-e faqih (Rule of Religious Jurisprudent) doctrine, nor did it create any special posts 
for Islamic jurists except limited power for CG.
245
 It was mainly because of the fact that the 
group of clerics and non-clerics, informally appointed by Khomeini to produce a draft, felt 
that this concept was more of an ideal to be achieved in the future rather than something to be 
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implemented straight away.
246
 However, once the election to the Assembly of Experts 
resulted in producing a large majority of clerical members, and the majority of them either 
belonged to or were sympathetic to the governing Islamic Republican Party
247
 (IRP), 
Khomeini broke the silence and came to perceive this doctrine as essential to laying a sound 
foundation of theocracy based on the powers of a small minority of the clerical caste.
248
 
The Assembly of Experts consisted of seventy three members, forty-five of them clerics. 
Starting August 19, the Assembly finished the job of producing a 175-Article constitution 
within two months. On 2-3 December 1979 the document was ratified—as would be 
expected—by more than 99 percent of the population. Surveying the various opinions 
expressed by the Assembly of Experts,
249
 one can distinguish two lines of thought: theocratic 
and democratic. Advocates of the first position objected to the very notion of 
constitutionalism and popular sovereignty which they claimed were Western imports. Rather 
they stressed vilayet-e faqih (Rule of Religious Jurisprudent) doctrine. This doctrine, 
developed by Khomeini in his book,
250
 stated that an Islamic regime required an Islamic ruler 
or faqih who is thoroughly conversant with the Sharia (Islam laws) and is just in its 
application.  According to such a doctrine, at the apex of power is the Leader of the Islamic 
Republic who wields extraordinary power.  
As laid down in Article 110, faqih is the Commander in Chief of all armed forces, and 
has the authority to declare war or peace. He has the power to approve presidential candidates, 
and appoint the President on his election by popular vote, or dismiss him after the Supreme 
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Court has found him politically incompetent and in violation of his duties, as determined by 
the Majles. He is empowered to appoint the highest judicial authorities and the Islamic jurists 
to the CG, charged with vetting all legislation in the light of Islamic precepts and the 
constitution.  
In the Constitution itself, the word democracy is never mentioned. However, it preserves 
the idea of combining some form of popular sovereignty with clerical rule: in its hundred-
plus Articles, the document specifies a variety of competing political institutions and 
authorities— but without indicating how each one was to coexist with the other. For example, 
Articles 2 and 56 echo the theocratic principles proclaimed in Articles 5 and 107 by stating 
that sovereignty belongs to God, while the duty of ―continuous leadership‖ fells on the faqihs. 
But Articles 6, 71, and 113 undermine these provisions, the first by stating that the ―affairs of 
the country shall be administered. . . in accordance with public opinion, expressed through 
elections‖; the second by providing for a popularly elected ―consultative assembly,‖ or 
Majles, that was empowered to ―establish laws on all matters, within the limit of its 
competence as laid down in the Constitution‖; and the third by providing for a popularly 
elected ―president‖ who, ―after the leadership. . . is the highest official position the country.‖ 
Similarly, Article 57 holds that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches were 
―independent of each other,‖ but then undermines this provision by placing these branches 
under the ―jurisdiction . . . of the faqih.‖ Finally, Article 96 affirms the continued centrality of 
traditional Islamic authority by providing for a clerically dominated CG that was empowered 
to veto all laws deemed un-Islamic. Article 99 further circumscribes the legal-rational 
authority of the Majles by giving the council the nebulous right to ―supervise‖ the election of 
the president and Majles. Yet, the Constitution makes no clear provision for settling disputes 
between the Majles and the council, or between the president and the prime minister. 
Paradoxically, the chaotic divisions of powers delineated in the document favour the leader‘s 
119 
 
authority by inviting conflicts between the Majles and the CG that can only be settled by the 
leader himself. 
251
 
The constitution was drafted in 1989. The new Constitution partly reinforced the 
president‘s authority; it did so by abolishing the position of prime minister, diminishing the 
independent authority of CG, and, most of all, enhancing the faqih’s powers in many ways. 
For example, it transferred one of the president‘s key tasks, coordinating the three branches 
of government, to the office of the faqih. The attempt to create a presidential system is 
enshrined in Article 60, which abolishes the post of prime minister. This measure was 
designed to prevent the bifurcation of executive and legislative power that had paralyzed 
previous governments, and did not make the president more powerful than the Leader. Article 
113 stipulates that the presidency was the ―next highest official position . . . after [that] . . . of 
Leader.‖ However, the Leader‘s position was weakened by changes in Articles 5, 107, and 
109 that stripped him of his charismatic-popular base.
85
 The original version of Article 5, it 
will be recalled, stipulated that the ―leadership‖ was to ―devolve upon the just and pious 
faqih,” who was ―recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people.‖ The latter 
provision celebrated Khomeini‘s charismatic link to the people. However, the new version of 
Article 5 dropped all references to any popular acclamation of the Leader. Indeed, because 
the 1989 Constitution stipulates that the Leader is to be selected by indirect election, the 
president emerged as the sole elected representative of the entire nation. 
The other crucial change in the Constitution concerned the CG. While the Council‘s veto 
power was retained, Article 112 turns the Expediency Council into a permanent body. 
Empowered to ―discern the interest in matters arising between Parliament and CG,‖ its 
membership was stacked. By requiring the council to include two ―temporary members‖—the 
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cabinet minister most relevant to the issue in question and the chair of the relevant 
parliamentary committee—Article 112 all but ensures that the six clerics sitting on the 
council would be in a minority. At the urging of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Constitution was 
revised in 1988. 
 
The Assembly of Experts and the Leader accountability 
 
Ranking above all branches the Leader appears to lack any meaningful constitutional 
accountability. Theoretically, the Leader is an elected position while in practice is hardly true. 
The constitution authorizes the Assembly of Experts to select the Leader for a seven-year 
term. However, the members of the Assembly must pass muster with CG, whose members 
were appointed by the Leader. This vicious cycle explains why no member of the Assembly 
has ever said anything critical of the Leader in public session. 
252
 The Constitution appeared 
to make the Leader accountable by stipulating that ―the Leader is equal with the rest of the 
people of the country in the eyes of the law‖ and empowering the Assembly to dismiss the 
Leader whenever he ―should become incapable [of] fulfilling his constitutional duties ... or if 
any time it should be known that he did not meet some of the qualifications mentioned.‖ The 
Assembly appointed a committee to judge on the constitutionality of the Leader‘s 
performance and whether or not it is generally ―satisfactory.‖ This body was reorganized as 
the "Constitutional Article 111 Investigation (tahqiq) Committee" in 2004 to judge on the 
constitutionality of the Leader‘s performance and whether or not it is generally ―satisfactory.‖ 
The Committee consists of seven members chosen by the assembly, meeting every two weeks 
without the press or the public being present. However the practices of the Committee 
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indicate that this power never has been exercised and this check has seemed only theoretical.  
Neither the names of the committee members nor the contents of their reports are published. 
It is vaguely assumed by the insiders that only if the committee was to find the Leader‘s 
performance unsatisfactory would it be expected to issue a statement to that effect. 
253
It is this 
total lacks of transparency that growing body of politically-aware Iranians find unacceptable.
 
254
 But the ban on criticism of the Leader and the constitution imposed in April 2000 inhibits 
public debate. Even in political science classes, students and teachers are barred from 
challenging the doctrine of vilayat-e faqih. 
255
 In December 2006 Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi 
Mesbah-Yazdi, a hard-line member of the Assembly of Experts, told his followers that while 
accountability is a requirement of democracy and is therefore suitable for a president, it is not 
to be expected from the supreme leader, who is above the constitution because he is 
appointed by God.
256
 However in an unprecedented statement Khamenei declared that: "We 
should be wary of the day when our young people in universities do not have the motivation 
to raise questions, issues and demands," He added: "If sometimes we have said there should 
be no opposition to the country's officials, this does not mean there should be no criticism," 
Khamenei said. "This applies to the leadership too."
257
  
The former chairman of the Assembly of Experts, aged and often ill Meshkini, came to 
be ultra-conservative. After the controversial election of the seventh Majles, in his opening 
remarks at the eleventh session of the Assembly of Experts, he said: ―I believe the glorious 
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seventh Majlis election was the result of a divine miracle. This system will last until the 
coming of Imam Mahdi [Shi'i 12th Imam] - God hasten his advent.‖258  
With the election of Rafsanjani as the chairman of the Assembly in succession of 
Meshkini, this position is very likely to change. In a lengthy interview published in the 
Assembly official journal, he put into question the taboo by implicitly criticizing Khamenei: 
"It is not obvious that the most appropriate person is always elected [as Leader]. It is possible 
that in the election a mistake could be made." 
259 
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The Great Leader and Majles 
The Leader, at the helm of power in Iran, has frequently exercised powers in the matters 
normally taken to be the province of Majles. The Leader‘s intervention in Majles is either 
through the constitutional tentacles of the faqih’s power including the judiciary, the Council 
of Guardians, the armed forces, the security forces, and the national radio and television 
networks (the last two powers were added in 1988) or through extra constitutional pre-
rogatives such as major private foundations and his powerful representatives or other 
informal channel. Furthermore in many instances, he has intruded directly without consulting 
the constitutional organs of government, or those bodies he himself has set up. For the 
purpose of this research only to a few representative cases of the latter within the Khomeini 
and Khamenei era will be reviewed.  
 
Khomeini era 
 
Khomeini as the founder of Islamic Revolution had occasionally described parliament in 
high-sounding phrases. The following are a few examples: ‗The Islamic parliament is the sole 
centre which all must obey.‘260 ‗Parliament is the starting point for whatever happens in the 
state.‘ 261  ‗Submission to the parliament means submission to Islam.‘ 262  ‗The parliament 
stands above all other institutions.‘263 ‗Parliament is the embodiment of the people and the 
very crystallisation of the people in one particular place.‘ 264 In his book, on the other hand, 
the only function Khomeini attributes to parliament is planning. In other words, parliament is 
a consultative assembly in so far as its actual function is to participate in the formulation and 
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framing of laws. This function is generally described as one of applying ‗know-how‘ (kar-
shenasi). The actions of Khomeini confirmed what he put in his book rather than the above 
mentioned words.   
As indicated before, the constitution defined the Islamic Republic as a state ruled Islamic 
faqih. It also reserved the right for faqih who is the ‗sources of imitation‘ (marja-e taqlid) to 
deliver religious decrees (fatvas) on any matter.
 265
 This laid the ground for the contradiction 
between Majles and faqih legislative jurisdiction, culminating in faqih supremacy.
 266
 
Khomeini frequently exercised powers of this kind. For instance, in connection with the 
judicial system the then president of the judiciary, Ayatollah Yazdi said the examples of 
supremacy of fatva over the legislation were so common that he could not attempt to 
enumerate them all, although he did mention the following specific cases:  
1. The standardization of sentences involving discretionary punishments, a problem that 
parliament, CG and the judiciary could not agree upon.  
2. Allowing insufficiently educated judges to practice in the courts; according to Art. 
166 of the constitution only faqihs were qualified to hold such posts.  
3. Determining those cases in which discretionary punishments involving whipping or 
flogging were appropriate.  
4. Deciding whether justice should be dispensed by single judges or by several judges, 
and whether this should be after separate consultation or jointly.   
5. Determining under which circumstances appeals could be allowed after a legal 
judgement has been delivered.
267
  
When it came to regulating issues of private ownership of land, which played a decisive 
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role in bringing about changes in the powers of the legislative institutions and the creation of 
the Expediency Council, Khomeini not only played the principal role in that he determined 
the actual contents of the relevant legislation, he also had the final word on the 
implementation of such laws. In November 1980, he issued a decree blocking the 
implementation of a law concerning the amount of arable land a person was allowed to own, 
which had been passed by the Revolutionary Council in April of that year. Likewise, each 
year he re-issued permission for the farmers who had illegally occupied estates during the 
first years after the revolution to retain and work those lands until such time as the legislature 
should enact a final resolution on this question. 
268
It should be noted, however, that they were 
recognized as laws, and even after his death were enforced as such — a point affirmed by a 
member of the Parliamentary Committee for Legal Affairs, Hojjat al-Eslam Asadollah Bayat 
in November 1990.
269
  
Khomeini‘s indirect influence on legislation was also felt through his books, in particular 
the Tabrir al- Vasila,
270
 which provided the two legislative bodies, as well as the courts, with 
a basis for taking decisions on many questions of law.
 
Thus CG, in its legal ruling, declared 
that any law that contradicted Khomeini‘s Tabrir al- Vasila would not be permissible.271 In 
1982, the Supreme Court ruled that until the pre-revolutionary laws had been replaced by 
Islamic laws, judges should base their decisions on fatvas that would be issued by such 
sources as the relevant bureau in Khomeini‘s house.  
As long as Khomeini was alive, he was the highest authority in government and 
therefore the highest legislative authority. Even so no one ever wanted, or was able, to contest 
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the supremacy of the Leader as represented by Khomeini.
272
 However, the fatvas issued by 
Khomeini cannot be counted a direct intervention in Majles. His decisions, communicated in 
the form of fatvas, decrees or recommendations had a great influence on the process of 
legislation whilst he always choose to stay above the fray, reluctant to lay his own prestige on 
the line to intervene in the work of the Majles. In accordance with his tactics of maintaining a 
balance of power or other such considerations, Khomeini hardly put the Majles lawmaking 
and scrutiny legitimacy into question.  
A notable exception is his intervention in the Iran-Contra affair which blocked the 
scrutiny function of Majles. In this case it is said that the US government had secretly sold 
weapons to Iran in 1985 and traded them for hostages held in Lebanon by pro-Iranian militias. 
It was initially exposed in a Syrian-backed Lebanese newspaper and then confirmed by then 
Majels speaker, Rafsanjani publicly.
273
 Eight Majles deputies drafted a letter questioning the 
foreign minister regarding the issue.
274
 Before submitting their letter, the eight deputies made 
sure that they had the support of a majority of Majles deputies. They were almost convinced 
that if they could have succeeded in putting the issue to the floor, Rafsanjani would be placed 
in a difficult situation as he was engaging apparently in this contact. It was precisely to 
prevent this from happening that Khomeini broke his silence on the issue. He expressed total 
satisfaction with the Majles speaker and, at the same time, threatened those who criticized 
Rafsanjani, going so far as to state that they were trying to divide the nation, to plot against 
the Islamic Republic, and to take action against Islam. Immediately after Khomeini‘s speech, 
Rafsanjani said: ―In the present circumstances, the Imam‘s statement served as a healthy 
medicine drying out the roots of sedition … We should not spend our time dealing with the 
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issues which are of no interest to anyone instead of thinking about the war.‖ 275  The 
intervention of Khomeini changed the Majles‘ atmosphere entirely. Almost all deputies who 
could speak condemned the authors of the letter. One accused them as ―causing rifts in the 
Islamic Republic … We know that the loyal people will determine the fate of this movement, 
which will be isolated.‖ In a new letter, drafted and signed by 145 of their membership, 
deputies stated that they ―greatly regret that this movement [referring to inquiries on the Iran-
Contra affair] was launched by people who have been trying to weaken the Islamic 
government for some time … They have taken a negative stance in the Majles, they have 
backed the rich, the land-grabbers, and the hoarders against the interests of the deprived.‖ 276 
 
Khamenei era 
 
Lacking the popular and religious standing of Khomeini as a marjae-e taqlid, Khamenei, 
however, during the period that he has held the office of Leader, has attempted many times in 
vain to obtain the position of marja-e taqlid, to issue fatvas.
277
 Yet, unsuccessful in gaining 
the upper hand in issuing fatva, Khmaneie resorted to employing power reserved by the 
constitution to intervene in the Majles. The prime example for legislative intervention of 
Khamenei is the one on Press Laws in the sixth Majles. The Majles dominated by reformers 
had the intention of producing a more liberal press code. Once the Majles gathered to debate 
and vote on amendments to the Press Law, passed just a few months before by former 
conservative Majles, Khamenei took the exceptional action of circumventing the normal 
institutional checks on legislative power. He delivered a letter the night before to the 
President of parliament stating that ―Should the enemies of Islam, the revolution, and the 
Islamic system take over or infiltrate the press, a great danger would threaten the security, 
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unity and faith of the people. Therefore, I cannot allow myself and other officials to keep 
quiet in respect of this crucial issue,‖ He stressed. ―The current Press Law, to a decree has 
been able to prevent the manifestation of this great calamity and thus its amendment and 
similar actions . . . are not [religiously] legitimate and not in the interest of the country or the 
system.‖ 278 Once the letter was read, the assembly went into chaos. In the centre of the 
moment, one reformer, Mohammad Rashidian, ignored religious and political etiquette by 
referring to the supreme leader simply as ''Khamenei''. He was immediately condemned by 
conservative members.
279
 But in the end, all recognized they had to submit. ―Our constitution 
has the elements of the absolute rule of the supreme clerical leader, and you all know this and 
approve of this,‖ Majles President Mehdi Karroubi told the deputies, before turning off the 
microphones to close up the debate. ―We are all duty bound to abide by it.‖280  
Reformist leaders, including Mohammad Reza Khatami, stated later that they fully 
expected CG to veto any attempt to remove press restrictions. But they never imagined the 
leader would lay his own prestige on the line to block the popular new law when he could 
easily have left it to his clerical allies. 
281
That Khamenei did so reveals much about the 
importance all sides placed on the issue of free expression under the Islamic political system. 
Khamenei had served a powerful reminder that it was, after all, the senior clerics who 
reserved the right to determine the red lines and to protect the faith as they saw fit. The 
Leader‘s intervention also revealed the fundamental weakness of the Iranian press and its 
inability to serve as the keystone of a new, civil society within the Islamic political system.  
Examples of such an intervention coined as ‗Governmental Decree‘ (Hokme Hokoomati) 
abounded in the seventh Majles. For instance, he ordered Majles to stop interpellations of 
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President Mohammad Khatami's cabinet, in an apparent effort to curb further confrontations 
between the two bodies. Political and economic differences between the reformist 
government and religious radicals in the Majles had been intensified. Khamenei's open 
intervention in parliamentary affairs came in a short letter, warning the MPs that further 
impeachments would bear "no fruits". He added that "the possible losses would be extensive 
and its dangers would be alarming".
282
 As soon as the letter was announced parliamentarians 
wrote a reply to Khamenei thanking him for the order and nobody dare to talk about 
impeachment.  
Yet Khamenei appeared to be slightly more reliant on the scrutiny function of Majles. As 
discussed earlier, prior to the sixth Majles, the Expediency Council declared that the Majles 
had no authority to investigate any institution or foundation under the purview of the Leader. 
The sixth Majles taken by reformists had been seeking to call to account the television and 
radio networks and exercise control over its budget, which some of the deputies had accused 
of biased operations. In response to a letter by the Majles speaker, Khamenei gave the green 
light to Majles to overhaul the performance of the state media to ―ensure the safe operations 
of the networks"
283
 and asked the Expediency Council to revise the law entrusting the right to 
probe because the Expediency Council arbitrates disputes between the parliament and CG. 
"CG has blocked the Expediency Council from making any amendment to the law," 
Rafsanjani said in a letter to Khamenei, asking for Khamenei to give the go-ahead to the 
Expediency Council if he deemed it necessary for the law to be amended. 
284
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The executive and Majles 
 
Scrutiny Power 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic confers on parliament a series of scrutiny 
powers. As laid down in Article 76 ―The Majles shall be empowered to investigate and 
scrutinize all matters related to the country.‖ The most significant of these powers range from 
the political responsibilities like the government‘s dependence on a vote of confidence from 
parliament (Articles 87, 133, 135 and 136), to routine scrutiny such as the accountability of 
government officials to parliament, both as individuals and collectively, in a way that 
parliament can question them, warn them of their duty and ultimately, interpellate them or 
formally withdraw its confidence from them (Articles 70, 88, 89, 135). Majles has repeatedly 
made use of these powers.  
With respect to political responsibilities, in each parliament there have been ministers 
proposed by the prime minister and the president who did not succeed in winning a vote of 
confidence. The first Majles refused to declare its confidence in two prime ministers 
proposed by the president
 
while six ministers fell because parliament did not give them a vote 
of confidence. In the second Majles eight ministers fell from office and three fell in the third 
Majies. In the fourth Majies, the president, after being re-elected to his office, had to fill 
seven ministerial posts with new candidates in order to obtain parliament‘s vote of 
confidence. All of Khatami‘s ministerial nominees were approved by the conservative Fifth 
Majles in 1997, including close friends and controversial choices. By contrast, some 20 per 
cent of Ahmadi-Nejad‘s ministerial nominees were immediately rejected. 285 
With respect to routine scrutiny, Majles can use a variety of means including warnings, 
questions, inquiries and interpellations. The warnings have only whistle blowing functions in 
that members may raise awareness on important issues through Majles. With questions and 
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enquiries Majles pursues the same purpose but the executives are obliged to answer and 
convince Majles. Enquiry is more or less an extensive investigation of Majles by collecting 
the related documents and evidence while questions are only those issues of concerns asked 
orally by MPs in the assembly. In recent years there has been a substantial increase in the 
number using these legal authorities.
286
 As indicated in Table 6, the number of warnings 
increased tenfold after it dropped to 16 in 3
rd
 Majles. The same pattern can be traced in the 
number of enquiries. The overuse of this power made the executive feel ignorant and 
unimportant. Due to a lack of enforcement, the executive frequently tends to turn a blind eye 
to the seriousness of many legislative demands.
287
 
Table 6: The quantitative indicators of Majles’ scrutiny:  1980-2006 
 
Majles Warnings Questions Inquiries Interpellations 
1
st
 NA 124 24 2 
2
nd
 NA 83 25 0 
3
rd
 NA 16 13 3/1 dismiss 
4
th
 2764 51 16 2 
5
th
 2765 82 13 2/1 dismiss 
6
th
 3760 155 28 4 
Source: Majles. Majles Annual Reports. 20 vol. 1980-2007 
 
The interpellation (Estizah) is a more powerful instrument in the hand of Majles as it 
may lead to the dismissal of the council of ministers or an individual minister in question. In 
the case of interpellation, the council of ministers or the minister must be present in Majles in 
order to answer and seek a vote of confidence.  Ultimately Majles is authorized to declare a 
vote of no confidence if it deems it necessary. In such circumstances, the council of ministers 
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or the minister subject to interpellation is dismissed. Since the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic, Majles has called for interpellation and subsequent vote-of-confidence several 
times. During the first Majles, two interpellations took place without resulting in a dismissal. 
During the second Majles, one interpellation occurred, but the hearings were not actually held 
until the third Majles. During this latter period, there were three interpellations and one of 
them led to the dismissal of a minister. During the fourth Majles a minister was forced to 
resign, in part because of the pressure parliament brought to bear. A second minister only 
managed to survive the interpellation proceedings with the help of CG. During Khatami‘s 
presidency in the fifth Majles three interpellations took place and one, Interior Minister 
Abdollah Nouri, did not survive, and the Culture Minister resigned voluntarily. The sixth 
Majles was marked by having the highest number of interpellation with no minister to 
dismiss.
288
  
Another instrument of scrutiny is the so-called Commission of Article 90, which was set 
up by parliament. The commission was established in 1981. After that date, all government 
officials were obliged to give prompt answers in a detailed and convincing manner to all the 
commission‘s questions concerning complaints. Since government officials refused to carry 
out this duty, parliament passed a law which made such refusal a punishable offence.
  
It later 
proved necessary to make the penalty provided by this law more severe, since the threat of 
punishment as it stood was evidently not having the desired effect.
 
But the threat of tougher 
punishments proved to be of little avail.
 289 
 For this reason, the vice-president of parliament 
described the legislature‘s right of supervision as ‗colourless and ineffective‘.290  
The pre-agenda speeches of the MPs often criticize the government in sharp tones, and 
since the proceedings are broadcast live on radio it is an effective instrument through which 
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Majles exercise its scrutiny power. As such, Majles has come to be only public body where 
factional differences over economic, social, and political issues become public. 
However, the subjection of ministers to parliamentary questioning or interpellations, or 
the refusal of a vote of confidence to government ministers should not be interpreted as proof 
of the independence and power of parliament visâ-vis the executive. Rather these incidents 
should be seen as a clear sign of chaos and confusion in parliamentary party groups caused by 
a power struggle which is prevalent at all levels amongst those persons, groups, client 
networks and political camps that have some share in government power.
291
 Weak 
parliamentary discipline and loose party cohesion turned Majles into arena where this 
struggle intensifies. For instance, the reformist government spokesman Abdollah 
Ramezanzadeh sharply criticized the Majles‘ interpellation of Transportation Minister 
terming it as ‗unjustifiable‘; he accused the parliament of using its power as a threat against 
the government. "We do not expect the supervisory instruments of Majles turn into a tool of 
threats," he said.
292  
Neither Majles nor the government can be characterized as wielding state power 
independently of these other agents. When analyzing Majles‘ actions towards the government, 
it is of key importance to consider what meaning individual refusals may have had and 
against whom they were directed. With regard to the government as a whole or explosive 
issue of domestic and foreign policy, MPs were less daring in the way they expressed 
themselves publicly. In fact, issues of this nature were scarcely discussed or decided on in 
Majles. On the other hand, when it came to a vote of confidence for individual ministers or to 
dealing with questions the government had left to Majles to decide, then the MPs had ample 
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opportunity to exercise their abilities.
293
 
 
Legislative power 
 
Constitutionally, both government and MPs are authorized to introduce bills to Majles. 
Majles has little to do with the pre-legislative stage of law making because of MPs‘ time and 
knowledge constraint.  On several occasions Majles obliged the government to draw up some 
piece of legislation which it viewed as absolutely essential and extremely urgent. An example 
is the Bill on Self-Sufficiency in Agricultural Products of Strategic Importance which in 1985 
Mjles demanded that the government frame. Seven resolutions of this kind were passed 
during the 1
st
 Majles, and two during the 2
nd
.
294
 But CG took this right away from Majles, 
declaring on the basis of Art. 75 of the constitution that the drafting of bills was a matter 
exclusively reserved for the government.
295
 With the establishment of Majles Research 
Centre (MRC), MPs are given drafting assistance by their staff and became relatively less 
dependent to executive in this stage.  
During the legislative stage Majles is more powerful. Majles is independent in rejecting 
government proposals (layeheh-e qanuni) brought before it by the government. However, it is 
interesting that, with the exception of the 1
st
 Majles, the number of rejected legislative 
initiatives (tarh-e qanuni) put forward by MPs themselves was greater than that of the 
rejected bills (Table 7).
 
Especially during the 3
rd
 Majles when the majority of MPs were not 
in agreement with the government, instead of expressing their opposition directly they 
preferred to express it in the form of legislative initiatives. These initiatives were usually 
contrary to government policy. But interestingly, before being sent on to be rejected by the 
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CG, they were voted down in parliament itself. The more radical these initiatives were in 
departing from government policy, the greater the tendency of Majles to withhold its 
approval. 
296
 
Table 7: The law making trade-off between Majles and executive: 1980-2006 
 
 
Majles 
 
Bills 
proposed 
Bills amended by parliament  
Bills 
approved 
 
Bills 
rejected 
 
Motions 
proposed 
 
Motions 
approved 
 
Motions 
rejected 
with 
minor 
change 
with 
medium 
change 
with 
major 
change 
1
st
 354 NA NA NA 308 44 124 102 22 
2
nd
 258 NA NA 18 239 19 153 103 55 
3
rd
 172 NA NA 76 146 26 221 119 102 
4
th
 227 NA NA 36 196 31 198 130 68 
5
th
 294 180 70 15 265 29 139 106 33 
6
th
 334 204 56 63 323 11 148 122 26 
Source: Majles. Majles Annual Reports. 20 vol. 1980-2007 
The post legislative stage has appeared to be controversial. Majles post-legislation 
scrutiny is also formally defined by the Majles‘s right of supervision over the government‘s 
activities. This entails the right of Majles to examine whether and to what extent the 
government has put into practice parliamentary resolutions or deviated from them. By 
deviation is meant not only the failure to put laws into practice but also the improper 
formulation of statutory instruments, as well as contrary government resolutions and 
regulations. The MP Majid Ansari described this practice in the following words: 
It is quite common to observe that the Council of Ministers 
or the council‘s subordinate commissions formulate executive 
orders in such a way that they are for all practical purposes 
contrary to the law passed by parliament. Sometimes one may 
observe that a particular situation is rejected in a bill passed by 
parliament, but the executive orders are formulated in such a 
way that the rejected situation can still be maintained.
297
 
 
In order to prevent this practice the Assembly for Revising the Constitution changed 
Article 138 and made it obligatory for the government to inform parliament when it drew up 
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statutory instruments and government resolutions so that if these were contradictory to the 
laws in question, parliament could return them to the Council of Ministers for revision. This 
addition to the previous article of the constitution confirmed that there had been a violation of 
Majles right, which is what Majles some time earlier had set out to establish. The 
corresponding law obliged the government to inform Majles, its commissions and its 
president concerning governmental resolutions, circular letters, regulations and ordinary as 
well as secret agreements.
298
 
The problem of putting laws into practice remained unsolved. A selection of the repeated 
complaints of MPs and others will help to illustrate this point. Rasul Hoseini Kuhestani, for 
example, believes that ―a great part of the problems the country faces stem from not putting 
laws and resolutions into practice‖.299  The president of the 3rd Majles, Mehdi Karrubi, by 
pointing out how the government authorities ignore the law mentions the failure to apply the 
legislation to prevent price rises.
300  
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The Expediency Council and Majles 
 
As discussed earlier, the powerful CG which has the right to veto bills acts as an upper 
chamber and the result has been a navette system in which the bills shuttle back and forth 
between two houses. Surprisingly, the mechanism of reconciliation between the CG and 
Majles remained unsolved in the 1979 constitution. In practice, the CG has proven to be very 
insistent on the compatibility of the resolutions of parliament to Sharia (the tenets of Islam) 
while for Majles the interest of the ruling system was of top priority.
301
 
Mediating between Majles and CG, Khomeini was able to make compromises between 
them. However, persistent conflict between Majles and CG pushed him to establish a 
permanent institution. In 1988, Khomeini ordered the formation of the Expediency Council in 
charge of mediating between Majles and GC.
302
 Once the Expediency Council was 
established the first thing to do was to draft its own statutes. The only power it conferred on 
itself was to reach decisions on the basis of the interests of the ruling system, which are often 
irreconcilable with Sharia. More importantly, this power would only be exercised if it proved 
impossible to resolve a conflict between parliament and the Council of Guardians. Following 
the same path, the Expediency Council was established in the revised constitution in 1989. 
Article 112 stipulated that ―the Expediency Council shall meet at any time CG judges a 
proposed bill of Majles to be against Sharia or the Constitution, and the Assembly is unable 
to meet the expectations of CG." 
303
 
Again, the constitution refers vaguely to legislative powers of the Expediency Council in 
two broad areas: the delineation of the ―general policies‖ of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
―resolving the problems‖ which cannot be solved by conventional methods. The latter 
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authority has laid a ground for the Expediency Council to pass laws without reference to a 
request by Majles or CG when it deems it necessary.
304
 In effect this turned the Expediency 
Council into a legislative authority capable of framing legislation independently of Majles 
and CG.  
The Expediency Council also used delaying tactics in making decisions.  According to 
one report 10 to 12 percent of parliament‘s resolutions were delayed more than four years. In 
contrast to CG which is obliged constitutionally to review the bills within a maximum of ten 
days from its receipt, no deadline is mentioned by the Expediency Council‘s self-written rules 
of procedures. The mediating function of the Expediency Council has also been the subject of 
much criticism because it must formulate its decisions either by agreeing with the position of 
CG or that of parliament. However, it can also decide a question by adopting a wholly 
independent position of its own.
305
  (Table 8) 
 
Table 8: The Expediency Council activities between 1988 and 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the Expediency Council official website at: http://www.majma.ir/ accessed: 06 
January 2008 
 
Obviously MPs have been far from pleased with the restriction of parliament‘s rights by 
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Majles 
 
Periods 
General 
Policies 
Solving 
Problems 
Mediating between Majles 
and CG 
III 1988-1992 - 27 19 
IV 1992-1996 - 9 9 
V 1996-2000 8 5 16 
VI 2000-2004 10 2 25 
VII 2004- 2007 13 1 23 
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this council. But they only voiced their protests publicly once the Expediency Council 
became publicly visible and its legislative powers were extended. It was because of these 
protests that Khomeini decided to withdraw the permission he had given the council to 
legislate independently. In practice, however, this decision had no real effect. The council has 
continued to overstep its authority and, consequently, MPs have continued their protests 
against it.
306
  
The Expediency Council enjoyed great legislative importance in third Majles, a period 
that was characterized by crucial developments, such as the end of the Iran-Iraq War and 
conversion from wartime to a peacetime economy, and was thus prone to the passing of 
―emergency laws.‖ During this time, the council was able to grow beyond its designated role 
as an arbiter and assume the authority to pass extensive and special emergency laws, such as 
to fight drug trafficking. Since then, however, the legislative power of the Expediency 
Council has been severely curtailed in large part because of the objections of a Majles 
protective of its own legislative authority. For instance, the MP Qasem Sho‘leh-e Sa‘di 
objected that the Expediency Council was changing out of all recognition even those parts of 
parliamentary resolutions which CG had not queried.
 307
Another MP wanted to know on what 
legal basis it had made its decisions. He added that the council was violating the rights of 
parliament and demanded the restoration of this body‘s legislative function. ‗Legislation‘, he 
declared, ‗is the right of parliament.‘ Another MP said that the Expediency Council, by 
interfering in the process of legislation, was acting in violation of the constitution and 
enumerated several cases in which it had arbitrarily overstepped its powers.
308
 Objections 
from many MPs and CG led to a formal revocation of these extended powers, although in 
practice the Expediency Council continued to promulgate laws independently. During the 
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fourth and fifth Majles, the Expediency Council stayed out of the limelight partly because 
there was no major conflict among the factions within the Majles.  Moreover, since becoming 
supreme leader in 1989, Khamene‘i has wielded his political authority without consulting or 
negotiating with the Expediency Council.  
Yet the decline was short-lived. Shortly after Khatami‘s landslide presidency victory in 
1997, Khamenei presented a unified front with Rafsanjani to curtail the reform movement. 
Khamenehi gave vast new powers to the Expediency Council to enable it to overrule the 
Majles, the President and the Judiciary at will.
309
 Khamenei urged the EC to make the best of 
its power in a decree stating that ―with an eye to the duties and responsibilities of the 
Expediency Discernment Council prescribed in the Constitution, this Council acts as the 
highest advisor of the Leader in the Islamic Republic System‖. He added ―Now that ... the 
sacred Islamic Republic System has been firmly established and has found a commendable 
dignity, it is appropriate for the Expediency Discernment Council to fully discharge its duties 
and responsibilities and act as a senior advisor to the Leadership.‖ 310 He increased the 
members to 35 of whom 26 were from among conservatives and appointed Rafsanjani as 
Council‘s president; a post traditionally occupied by the president. 311 
Despite his support for Khatami shortly before and after the election, Rafsanjani 
demonstrated in his new office a tendency to act as a brakeman to Khatami‘s reformist 
ambitions, perhaps to prevent Khatami from becoming too powerful.
312
 One manifestation of 
this was the establishment of special committees to function in parallel with the government, 
in politics and security culture, social and judicial matters, economics and trade, and 
production and infrastructure.
 
Very little reliable information is available concerning the 
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composition and measures of these committees. 
Yet the heterogeneous composition of the Expediency Council makes it uncertain, 
however, in the Sixth Majles, the Expediency Council sided with the CG in many instances. 
The authority of the Expediency Council grew as the dispute between the reformist Majles 
and hard-line CG intensified. The panel has sided mostly with CG and opposed bills to limit 
the authority of unelected committees controlled by hard-liners.
313
 Complaining about biased 
behaviour of the Expediency Council Abolfazl Shakuri, a member of the Majles Committee 
for National Security and Foreign Policy, said in Majles plenary session: ―Will national 
agreement be achieved with these actions? We see that there are still 19 bills which have been 
approved by the Majles still awaiting the approval of the Expediency Council. It is CG which 
has created a situation in which these bills have to go and wait there [in the Expediency 
Council]. However, the secretary of the Expediency Council stressed: I would like to 
announce explicitly that, so far, 70 per cent of the matters approved by the [Expediency] 
Council concerning cases over which there were disputes, tended to favour the views 
expressed by the Islamic Consultative Majles.‖ 314 The facts and figures confirm the MP‘s 
statement.  
The Arabic newspaper al-Hayat speculated that Rafsanjani had hoped to secure for 
himself a bastion of power superior to that of the president (but still below that of Khamene‘i), 
allowing him, as ‗number two‘ in the country, to ‗shape Iran‘s destiny decisively.‘ This 
assessment was reinforced by an interview Rafsanjani granted to an Iranian newspaper 
shortly before Khatami‘s inauguration. Asked whether the Expediency Council would not in 
the future be, de facto, ―an institution that presides over the three powers,‖ he responded: 
―The expression ‗presiding over the three powers‘ is not well chosen. But if the Expediency 
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Council has issued a law, the three powers cannot repeal it.‖315 
In March 2002, Khamenei decreed the appointment of new members of the Expediency 
Council for the next five years. The new Expediency Council included vocal conservatives 
like Mohammad Reza Bahonar, former Tehran MP and a staunch anti-reform conservative. 
The reformists (i.e., what we have broadly called the ―softliners‖ or the Left) expected a more 
balanced and representative membership in the Expediency Council since a majority of the 
sixth Majles‘s deputies were reformist and Khatami had been reelected on a mandate for 
reform and change. Essentially, the stasis and suspended equilibrium between the hard-liner 
and soft-liner camps was being deliberately perpetuated by the Leader, who was himself 
supportive of the hardliner agendas and positions. The ratio of conservatives to reformists 
was 19 to 8 at best.
316
 The new decree stunned the country‘s political elite and prompted 
much debate, although little of that has been carried out in the public media.  The decree is 
just a paper document at this point and it remains to be seen how extensively it will be carried 
out, but Rafsanjani has never shown a reluctance to exercise power. The decree gives the 
Expediency Council the power to ―supervise‖ the executive, legislative and judicial branches 
of the government. This is a power the Constitution gives the Supreme Leader and which 
both Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor, Khamenehi, have exercised with a light hand. 
Article 110 of the Constitution gives ―supervisory‖ authority to the Supreme Leader and also 
authorizes him to delegate that authority, which is what Khamenehi has now done. The 
meaning of ―supervisory‖ authority has always been subject to debate, but CG has taken its 
―supervisory‖ power over elections to mean it has the final say. The most vocal objections to 
the decree have come from the Majles, supposedly a bastion of conservatism and of support 
for the principle of supervision.  
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Seventh Majles President Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel strongly defended Khamenehi‘s 
decree, calling on fellow deputies to demonstrate their ―unconditional adherence‖ to the 
Constitution, meaning that they should cease their criticism. Legislators began voicing 
concerns about Khamenei‘s decree soon after it was announced and it became clear that 
supervision of the governmental system meant not just the executive and judicial branches 
but also the legislative branch.
317
 The Expediency Council‘s new supervisory authority, 
stressed Akbar Alami, risks turning it into an ―unconstitutional fourth branch‖ of government 
that is above ―the rule of law.‖ This would be ―a blow to the system‘s republicanism.‖ 318 
Hadi Qabel
319
 said the regulations formulated and approved by the Expediencey Council 
about its own supervisory role were "a consequence of the confusion in the legal structure of 
the country which is turning the Council into an institution over and above other powers." He 
criticized the fact that the regulations have not been announced to the media. Abolfazl 
Qadyani said "According to the constitution, the Expediency Council is not responsible for 
the supervision of the performance of the three branches of power. Such a form of 
supervision cannot be effective."
320
 
The concerns of Alami and others were not allayed by the comments of Expediency 
Council secretary Mohsen Rezai, who told the press that under the Leader‘s decree, the 
Expediency Council‘s decision is ―the final word.‖ he added: ―Even if other branches do not 
agree with it, they have to accept it.‖321 
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The Council of Guardian and Majles  
 
The single most important obstacle to Majles legislative jurisdiction is the Council of 
Guardians (CG). Majles can establish laws on all matters; however, the unlimited power of 
testing laws as to constitutionality and consistency with Sharia is reserved for the CG. As 
Kula‘i stated: "The Majles is assigned with the task of devising laws and the constitutional 
watchdog CG with the task of overseeing Majles ratifications, while the latter has constantly 
over-looked this and, in some cases, has compelled the lawmakers to make laws (as per the 
CG's dictates)."
322
 She added: ―CG should perform its duties in a way that the public opinion 
does not come to the conclusion it is against the restoration of civil rights and reforms.‖  
The Council is also authorized to interpret the constitution, and any such interpretation 
reached by three-fourths of the members assumes the same validity as the constitution itself, 
thus making CG a quasi—supreme court. 323  What differentiates the Council from other 
Supreme Courts is the procedure by which the Council exercises such power. "Should there 
be a contradiction between them; the Council sends them back to the Majles. Otherwise, the 
decision can be carried out".
324
 This right of opposition on behalf of CG is of such great 
importance to the Islamic Republic of Iran that, as expressed in the Constitution: "The Majles 
shall not be considered valid without CG except when approving the credentials of the 
representatives and choosing the six jurists of CG." This effective veto power made the 
Council superior status to Majles.  
Its authority in determining the compatibility of laws with Sharia has proved to be 
problematic. The rationale behind this dates back to a century ago when the first Iranian 
constitution was drafted. Clerics have been a regular feature of the Majles ever since its 
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inception. During the session on drafting the constitution, a debate raged between the 
moderate and radical clerics. The moderates wanted to check the monarch‘s arbitrariness 
along the lines laid out in such European constitutions as Belgium‘s, while the radicals 
advocated limiting the ruler‘s power within an Islamic framework arguing that since 
sovereignty had been delegated by God to the (Twelfth) Imam, and then to the faqihs, it did 
not rest with the people. The latter group won. ―Sovereignty is a trust confided [as a Divine 
gift] by the People to the person of the King,‖ stated Article 35. Significantly, Article 2 
specified that no bill passed by the Majles was valid until a committee of five faqihs—elected 
by the Majles from a list of twenty submitted by the Shia clergy— had judged it to be in 
conformity with Islam. In practice, however, this Article was never implemented. All the 
rulers prior to the Islamic revolution ignored it.
325
  
Since the advent of the Islamic Revolution, there has been a resurgence of clerical power 
and the legislative authorities of faqihs intensified. If the text of the 1979 constitution were to 
be taken literally, CG would have to be described as the real source of legislation. Although it 
had no part in formulating laws, it decided whether or not a draft text could become a law 
through its right of opposition. This right has so far been used by CG against a number of 
parliamentary decisions by establishing their incompatibility with either Sharia or the 
constitution and by sending the issue in question back to the Majles. The proportion of 
rejected parliamentary decisions varies from one period to the next, ranging from 27 to 40 
percent. According to official statistics released by the Council, it has raised objection to 844 
bills and referred them back to Majles for revision between 1980 and 2006. 
326
 In the sixth 
Majles CG used its veto power to reject 111 of 295 mostly progressive pieces of legislation 
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passed by the Majles, making the parliamentarians look like useless chatterboxes. 
327
 
Until the establishment of the Expediency Council in February 1988 and its inclusion in 
the 1989 Constitution, a decision by the Majles, unless it was dropped by the latter, could be 
sent back and forth between the two authorities until the changes made by the Majles 
satisfied the Council. A large number of parliamentary resolutions were repeatedly rejected 
by CG, in some cases as often as five times. However, since the Expediency Council was 
organized, the Majles has been able to pass on issues rejected by CG for the ultimate decision 
of the Expediency Council.
328
 This happens when the Majles is not willing to fulfil CG 
wishes for modifications.  Even after the establishment of the Expediency Council and its 
inclusion in the 1989 Constitution, CG regularly checked the decisions of the Majles and sent 
them back to the latter when finding anything contradicting the Islam or the Constitution. The 
difference with the period before the formation of the Expediency Council lies in the fact that 
parliament no longer has to follow the recommendations of CG. It can reject them and leave 
the decision about the matter to the Expediency Council in the hope of a suitable result. The 
parliamentary decisions demanded by CG are usually of great importance as to their effect on 
social life in the Islamic Republic. They deal, for example, with the control of foreign trade, 
landed property, banking, industrial law, cooperative systems, press laws and decisions 
concerning women's rights.
329
   
The CG‘s right of opposition is not restricted to the bills approved by the Majles, but 
also applies to statutes approved by boards of organizations and societies belonging to, or 
affiliated with, the state.
330
 CG also exercises its right of opposition to statutory instruments 
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approved by the cabinet and other executive organs, decrees of the Cabinet, treaties and 
statutes, by referring to Article 4 of the Constitution. The latter states that "all civil, penal, 
economic, administrative, military and political laws and rules must be based on Islamic 
criteria" and that "this shall be at the discretion of the theologian members of CG."  
The most controversial aspect of the Council‘s practice is that they very rarely explain 
the arguments supporting their points of view about parliamentary decisions. These views 
usually say nothing more than that such decisions would contradict Sharia or a certain 
principle of the Constitution. Sometimes they briefly mention the direction in which desired 
changes are to be made, but this is done in such vague and brief phrasings that even experts 
find them difficult to understand. Sometimes the contradiction to Sharia or the constitution 
established by the CG involves the whole content of a parliamentary resolution, but more 
often it has to do with individual articles and paragraphs. During the sixth Majles CG took 
unprecedented and bizarre steps by taking an expansive interpretation of its responsibility to 
reject the articles which have been already approved by itself. Their criteria went beyond the 
unconstitutionality and contradiction to Sharia and extended to contradicting orders of the 
Leaders.
331
 In the sixth Majles a bill was introduced by MPs, requiring CG to open their 
deliberations and make them available to the public. It was rejected by the Council as it was 
expected.   
 Article 98 of the Constitution provides the CG with the right to interpret the 
Constitution. This requires a two-thirds majority. CG thus acquires further possibilities to 
exercise its power. This right has often been used by the CG, especially during the first years 
of its activity. But even afterwards, the Council has repeatedly used this means to solve 
problems by interpreting the Constitution in line with its conservative leanings. When these 
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interpretations are accepted by a two-third majority, they are as valid as the Constitution itself. 
Otherwise they are considered as an "advisory decision" without compelling force. According 
to its own statutes, CG interprets the constitution on request. Applicants can be the Head of 
Parliament, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Cabinet, or the President. In practice, CG also 
acts as interpreter on behalf of the lower echelons of the State. Whether or not an application 
is accepted is decided by CG itself. CG's interpretations of the Constitution mainly concern 
the mutual relations between particular authorities of the State or the relationship between 
different offices within each State authority. Some interpretations also concern economic 
relations between Iran and foreign countries. Through its frequent interpretations of the 
Constitution, CG can, and often does, use its influence to steer decisions in the desired 
conservative direction. Since 1981, the council have offered 151 interpretations to 70 articles 
of constitutional law. The number of interpretations range from 1 to 6 in some instance.  
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The membership autonomy or subordination 
 
 
The Judiciary and Majles 
 
On paper Iranian MPs enjoy a comprehensive immunity. Article 86 of Constitution laid 
down: "the representatives of Majles shall as such be free in expressing their views and 
giving votes and shall not be prosecuted nor arrested for their views as expressed in the 
Majles or the votes given in the discharge of their duties as such". Similarly, Article 84 of 
Constitution provides: "representatives shall be individually responsible before the people 
and shall have the right to express their views on all domestic and foreign issues of the 
country".
332
 In practice however, the courts have summoned deputies in several instances for 
offences that include speeches made in the Majles, despite a doctrine of parliamentary 
immunity. In fact the judicial branch, whose head is appointed by the supreme leader, 
considered to be a significant barrier to MPs‘ independence 333 . Here the representative 
examples of the breach of parliamentary immunity quoted in ―Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices‖334 will be unfolded.  
In October 2003, reformist parliamentarian and outspoken critic Mohsen Armin was 
sentenced to 6 months in prison for insulting a conservative Majles member. The judge 
reportedly also stripped Armin of his ‗‗social rights‘‘ for one year for not appearing in court. 
Armin ascribed his absence from court to his assumption that he held parliamentary 
immunity. In August, Armin appeared in court in response to a complaint relating to speeches 
he made in 1999–2002 and an accusation of spreading lies. At year‘s end, Armin had not 
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been imprisoned. 
335
 In spring 2001, security forces arrested then Majles member Fatima 
Haqiqatju for inciting public opinion and insulting the judiciary for criticizing the arrest of a 
female journalist and claiming that the Government tortured prisoners. She was the first 
sitting Majles member to face prosecution for statements made under cover of immunity. 
Haqiqatju was sentenced to 17 months in prison, although at year‘s end, she had not been 
imprisoned for this offence. Separately, in June, the public prosecutor summoned her to court 
and charged her with ‗‗propaganda against the system,‘‘ ‗‗spreading lies with the intent of 
disturbing public opinion,‘‘ and ‗‗insulting CG, the judiciary, and the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps.‘‘ She was released on bail, but she was forbidden to leave the country. On 
November 29, Haqiqatju was summoned to a Tehran Penal Court due to a complaint by the 
Public Prosecutor based on her February 23, 2003, resignation speech from the Majles. She 
was charged with spreading lies to disturb public opinion, insulting officials, and propaganda 
against the Government. 
336
 In August of the same year, a court summoned former Majles 
Deputy Mohsen Mirdamadi in response to a complaint from an Islamic Revolution Guards 
Corps member concerning published remarks by Mirdamadi that interference by military 
personnel in political affairs weakens the armed forces. At year‘s end, there was no further 
information on legal action; however, he had not been incarcerated. In January 2003, the 
judiciary halted efforts by the deputy speaker of the Majles, Mohammad Reza Khatami, to re-
open the banned newspaper Norouz under the new name Rouz-e No, by extending the six-
month ban on the original publication. Khatami was slated to replace former Norouz editor 
and parliament member Mohsen Mirdamadi, who, despite parliamentary immunity, was 
sentenced in May 2002 to six months in jail and banned from practicing journalism for four 
years for ‗‗insulting the state, publishing lies, and insulting Islamic institutions.‘‘ At year‘s 
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end, there were no reports that Mirdamadi had been imprisoned; however, the newspaper has 
never re-opened.
337
  
In his speech before the Majles, Khatami questioned the Judiciary's supremacy over the 
Majles and attacked the Judiciary's attempts to restrict the Majles's activities. He emphasized 
the Majles's legislative authority and its supervisory authority over other government bodies: 
"Despite the independence of the Judiciary, the Majles must be fully aware of how people are 
treated by the Judiciary just as it has to be fully aware of other ministries' performance." 
Khatami complained about the devaluation of the Majles's status, particularly in its present 
session, and railed against the conservatives' disrespect towards Majles members: "How 
come insulting the parliament has become as good as gold, but insulting certain other circles 
[i.e. the conservatives] is regarded as [damaging] the system?" 
338
After several pro-reform 
MPs have been summoned for questioning by the courts for comments made on parliament's 
open floor, the most senior judge Abbas Ali Alizadeh tells parliament in a letter: "No one has 
the right to interfere in judiciary affairs, or we will do our religious and legal duty. Why do 
you raise questions about legal proceedings for the sake of a bunch of so-called reformers and 
newspapers?" 
339
 During the Sixth Majles, the parliamentary committee of the Article 90 
Commission tried in vain to play the role of a liaison organ seeking to exert pressure on 
judiciary.  The Article 90 Commission is a parliamentary body mandated by the Constitution 
to investigate and report on complaints by individuals against the three branches of 
government.  When the press and parliament members pushed more vigorously for the rights 
of imprisoned journalists and activists, the commission served as the only means of official 
redress for many prisoners. The Article 90 Commission set up a human rights subcommittee 
in 2002 to handle complaints regarding the violation of citizen‘s rights. This subcommittee 
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may, with the consent of the Chair, invite concerned individuals to a hearing and carry out 
on-site visits. The relevant authorities have a duty to cooperate with the Commission and its 
subcommittees. Cases of public interest are publicized through the Majles tribune and the 
media is allowed to publish the relevant report. In 2003, for example, a report on detained 
national religious political activists was published. Between March 2002 and 2003, the 
Article 90 Commission received 8775 complaints, a 40% increase from the previous year. In 
2000 and 2001, the Article 90 commission was able to bring pressure on the judiciary 
regarding the arrests of journalists and students, treatment of political prisoners, and state 
accountability for violence against student protesters.
340
  
 Some of the most vocal MPs who repeatedly sought out information about the condition 
of political prisoners or who have openly criticized the judiciary‘s targeting of journalists and 
activists have been subject to similar treatment.  Plainclothes agents attacked them during 
public appearances.  One person who spoke with Human Rights Watch stated that: ―The 
Article 90 Commission is important, and they fulfilled a very necessary function. But now, 
what can they do?  Not only do they not have any enforcement power, but they are always 
getting arrested.
‖ 
In short, the commission, and particularly its public reporting mechanism 
was proved to be only a way to bring attention to their cases with no real enforcement 
power.
341
 One of the most recent reports of the commission highlights the degree to which the 
environment in Iran has changed for the worse.  The report on the death in detention of 
Iranian-Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi presents a scathing indictment of the 
judiciary, and specifically the role of Chief Prosecutor in covering up the cause of Kazemi‘s 
death. However, rather than responding to the serious concerns raised by the Commission‘s 
report, the judiciary instead forced journalists to ignore the report. Only one print newspaper 
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in Tehran ran the full report.  The chairman of the Majles Article 90, Hoseyn Ansari-Rad, 
said: ―The refusal to accept a debate is a trick aimed at confusing the issue and avoiding a 
response. More than once, we have invited [Tehran prosecutor Sa'id] Mortazavi to appear in 
front of the committee and offer his explanation [on Zahra Kazemi case]‖. Ansari-Rad added: 
―Majles has filed a complaint against Mortazavi. The matter has been referred to a court. He 
should now respond to the complaint. There is absolutely no room for debate.‖ He said: 
―Majles considers Mortazavi a defendant. The charges have been filed with the court. 
Mortazavi should be interrogated and given a chance to defend himself. There is absolutely 
no room for debate.‖ 342When the seventh Majles formed its new Article 90 Commission, the 
commission announced that it was dropping all cases pending from the Sixth Majles. During 
the year, the commission took no effective action. 
 
Majles turnover 
 
The official term of office in Majles is four years and the number of legislators is 290. 
As discussed in the last chapter the executive are not empowered to dissolve Majles. As a 
result, the date of the next election is fixed in advance.  Since the advent of the Islamic 
revolution in 1979, seven elections have been held. Because of the revolution all MPs in the 
first election were those who entered the legislature for the first time. As shown in the table 9 
and 10, turnover in Majles is surprisingly high. During the last six legislative elections the 
minimum percentage of turnover has been 52 with a mean of 56.83. (Tables 9 and 10) 
Similarly the incumbency return rate has dropped to 23 per cent in the last two elections with 
the mean as low as 31.67. Then the turnover remained almost constant in the last legislative 
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elections with a standard deviation of 3.488.
343
 
Table 9: Incumbency Return Rate and Turnover in Majles 
No of 
elections 
Incumbency   
Return Rate (%)  
Turnover 
(%) 
1 38 60 
2 38 58 
3 30 60 
4 38 52 
5 23 58 
6 23 53 
 
Source: Saeid, Pedram. Mahdoudiat-e Doran-e Nemayandegi. Majles Research Center. 
No 378563. Tehran: 2003 
 
 
 
Table 10: Minimum, Maximum, Mean and Std. Deviation of turnover in Majles 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Incumbency Rate 6 23 38 31.67 
Turnover 6 52 60 56.83 
Valid N (listwise) 6    
 
Source: Saeid, Pedram. Mahdoudiat-e Doran-e Nemayandegi. Majles Research Center. 
No 378563. Tehran: 2003 
 
 
 
 
Majles facilities and funds 
 
In general, Majles has adequate resources to hire staff sufficient to fulfil its 
responsibilities. Majles has approximately 600 staff, 190 of whom are personal staff to 
legislators. Each committee in Majles has a secretary, an administrative secretary and two 
clerical assistants.  As such, approximately 87 staff provide support to the work of 
committees, and approximately 120 work in the Majles Research Centre (MRC). 
344
. To 
handle the heavy weight of issues before them, the committees are also empowered to 
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consider the recommendations of external experts.  Each committee therefore, has at its 
disposal the legal mechanisms and financial means with which to consult experts. At times 
they use rapporteurs to undertake specific pieces of work on behalf of the committee, which 
are then reported back to the committee.
345
In addition, MRC may hire one-third of the staff. 
Majles has a 34-person Legislative Bureau and benefits from a 75-person Majles library. Yet, 
there is no clear distinction between the legislative staff and the partisan staff of individual 
legislators. At the beginning of each new session, the tenure of almost all Majles staff 
including those who provide legislators with organizational, technical and specialized 
assistance, along with the secretary-general‘s, ends. Intensified by Majles high turn-over, 
such massive change known as ‗Majles clean-up‘ has been regarded as a significant obstacle 
to Majles institutionalization.
346
  
Majles‘ MPs receive significantly higher salaries than most members of the population 
and enjoy a broad range of perks such as offices, housing, and automobiles. As soon as MPs 
start their career, they are paid the highest rank in the civil services salary system. The 
payment is lifelong and will be continued after their term of office in Majles.
347
 At the 
beginning of each new session, MPs are involved in hot discussion and usually through in 
camera session in discussing their remunerations.  In the seventh Majles the majority faction 
initially decided not to allow giving facilities to the Majles arguing that ―it is beneath the 
Majles' dignity and against MPs electoral mandate to be paid from the public purse‖. 
However it was not approved and the Majles president advised those MPs who do not want to 
receive a salary and automobile to give them as gifts to charities quietly.
348
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The authority of Majles in adopting its Rules of Procedure 
 
Majles enjoys exclusive authority to adopt and amend the regulation governing its 
functioning, known as Rules of Procedure (RoP), except those constitutionally mandated. 
This procedural autonomy is explicitly provided for in the constitution. Article 65 stipulated 
that ―the manner of election of the President and the Presiding Board of the Assembly, the 
number of committees and their term of office, and matters related to conducting the 
discussions and maintaining the discipline of the assembly will be determined by the rules of 
procedure of the Assembly.‖ The constitution has also necessitated a two-thirds majority for 
the approval of the RoP of the Majles. The Majles‘ RoP provides the MPs with an 
opportunity to ensure the relevance of its rules by re-adopting them at the beginning of each 
period.
349
 Typically, the current Majles adopts the rules of the previous Majles and make any 
amendments they find necessary. All MPs might make a contribution to the process of 
amending through a special committee in Majles responsible for amending RoP. To make a 
decision for changing provisions of the RoP in detail, it must seek opinions of the Majles 
representatives on the matter and then, according to the article 145 of the RoP, refer its report 
to committees and subcommittees for making a final decision. When they have finalized the 
amendment, it should be sent to the presiding board to be read out on the floor.  In practice, 
despite shortcomings that obstructed proper administration of the former Majles, caused by 
the ambiguous nature of the RoP that led to different interpretations, MPs have made little, if 
any, attempts to make changes in the RoP. A quick review of the Majles RoP confirms that 
the changes were few and far between. For the first time over last 30 years, in seventh Majles, 
a number of MPs attempted to change the essence of the RoP. Some of them who have the 
experience of serving in previous terms of the Majles prepared a motion to put an end to this 
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problem. The main aim of the motion was to inject  more clarity and realism, defend rights of 
the Majles representatives, prevent the interference of other agencies in the Majles ' affairs, 
enhance the supervisory role of the Majles, and ultimately make the Majles committees more 
efficient.
350
 However, the effective opposition of members who advocated amending the RoP 
in the sixth Majles but opposed this in the seventh Majles paved the way for the 
postponement of the motion. They argued that the present RoP must be observed, and after 
the Majles representatives become more familiar with the RoP, they can try to amend it.
351
 
One opponent said: "This motion must be suspended to be put under more expert 
consideration. Amendments to the bylaw must be made with regard to its legal features." 
Other MPs said in opposition to his remarks: "What is this argument that the Majles 
representatives must do nothing until they become familiar with the bylaw?" He added: "This 
was a good opportunity to amend the bylaw from the beginning of the Majles.‖352  
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Conclusion  
 
In this chapter the place of Majles within the broader Iranian political systems was 
illustrated. In particular it delved into the constitutional foundation which set the stage for 
power struggle in Iran. It was demonstrated that the Iranian constitution designed a bifurcated 
system in which the Islamic component, symbolized in the institutions of the Great Leader, is 
superior to the democratic component, reflected in the presidency and Majles. The struggle 
over what was to become the Iranian constitution is regarded by some observers as a rapid 
evolution from an essentially liberal, democratic document [the preliminary draft document 
presented to the Assembly] to an outline for clerical rule [the adopted document of 1979 and 
its later amendment in 1989] in which the powers of the clerical establishment totally 
expanded at the expense of people, and it was definitely a major turning point in the 
subordination of Majles. Ironically, the separation of powers is mentioned but it is also 
stipulated that they function under the supervision of the absolute religious Leader. In other 
words unelected elements of Iran political system under the supervision of the Great Leader 
were to be superior to the elected ones and retain the ultimate control over them.  In such a 
regime Majles as an elected institution enjoy little room for manoeuvre. The Great Leader has 
frequently exercised powers in the matters normally taken to be the province of Majles. It 
was discussed that Majles enjoys some autonomy with respect to the executive but it is 
absolutely subordinate to the Great Leader, CG and the Expediency Council. The most 
important conclusion that can be drawn is that in contrast to many countries the actual power 
conflict is not taking place between executive and Majles but it is operating somewhere else 
— in the Expediency Council or CG.  
With respect to the membership autonomy it was revealed that the judiciary proved to 
appear as the most severe barrier against the MPs by frequent breaching the MPs immunity 
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protections. The turnover is high which left Majles with inexperienced MPs. The funds and 
facilities are adequate but the high salary and benefits of MPs made Majles susceptible to 
misuse. Finally it was declared that on paper, MPs enjoy the authority of adopting and 
amending Majles internal regulation but they have not used this authority effectively.  
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Chapter 6: Majles representativeness 
and deliberativeness 
Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the extent to which Majles is 
representative and deliberative. The theoretical presupposition of this chapter was discussed 
earlier. With respect to the representativeness, two different and complementary views were 
identified: representative as the fair reflection of population diversity and representative as 
meeting the expectation of constituencies. The operational indicators of the former are 
populations‘ characteristics (like ethnic, racial, religious, sex and age distributions), and 
issues attributed to legislatures‘ elections like electoral systems and the election integrity 
while the latter is distinguished by factors associated to the extent to which legislators devote 
their time to constituency services rather than to national policy making. The opposite 
concept of representativeness was coined as exclusiveness as a defining feature of 
authoritarian legislatures.   
The deliberativeness element also was defined as the degree to which parliaments 
operate in accordance with the normative values of deliberative democracy including 
transparency and accountability. The central element was the transparency of internal 
organization of parliament, its openness to the public and the integrity of MPs.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows. It is divided into two parts. The first part 
deals with representative aspects of Majles. Based upon two different perceptions of the 
representative concept, different issues will be discussed. The most important issues 
discussed under this headline are different aspects of Majles elections particularly the factors 
that prevent elections being held in a free and fair manner. The role of GC in the selection of 
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candidates and the integrity of electoral procedures are among significant issues which will 
be discussed in detail. Another pertinent issue is the education and gender of MPs as an 
indicator of representativeness. Finally a detailed discussion is devoted to the constituency 
service notion of representativeness by looking at how Majles is involved in this regard. The 
second part considers deliberativeness. Central to these discussions are several issues 
attributed to the organizational transparency including the openness and accessibility of the 
assembly and committees to the public. Given that transparency and integrity are two sides of 
one coin, the way Majles deals with conflicts of interest which promote the independence of 
legislators from private interests or unreasonable political pressures are also adopted as other 
key indication of deliberativeness in this study. 
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Representativeness 
 
Majles Elections  
 
One of the most controversial aspects of Majles which overshadows its democratic 
nature is Majles election. Elections in general have been a regular feature and integral part of 
the post revolutionary Iran. The Islamic Republic is always proud of holding an average of 
one election each year, or 36 elections by the time of writing, since its founding in 1979. The 
regularity of general elections helped institutionalize the place of the parliament in the 
Islamic Republic and more importantly, it ―has brought a certain degree of pluralism to the 
essentially absolutist theocracy of the Islamic Republic‖.353 Although the basic constitutional 
principles of universal, equal, direct and secret are applied to the election, it is not free and 
fair entirely and constantly unelected authorities resort to unfair practices to ensure electoral 
victory and stay in power. However, the elections occasionally lead to a new government that 
is considerably more democratic than its predecessor. Thus voting still decides the direction 
of popular political debates and more importantly affects the distribution of power and 
political offices at the national level and increasingly so at the local level as well as through 
legislative elections.  
Furthermore, since other forms of political participation, specially the unconventional 
ones are increasingly constrained, voting has remained the only viable channel of civic 
engagement and central to the concerns of both citizens and government. The high voter 
turnout has been very important to the government as it has been regarded as a barometer of 
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the legitimacy of the regime.
354
 Iranian voting participation suggests that the voters tend to 
stay away from the polls when they feel their votes have little impact. In contrast, a huge 
number of people have participated in the election when they believe that their voice is heard 
through the ballot boxes.
355
 Iran's seventh Majles received only a moderate endorsement from 
eligible voters with less than 51 percent casting ballots, the lowest for a parliamentary poll in 
the Islamic Republic's 25-year history as peoples got bored of reformist slogans. However, 
the voters‘ apathy left supporters of the unelected ruling clerics dominating Majles. The 
ruling government‘s strategies toward election have been depicted as oscillating between 
open and closed; however, they appeared to be more likely to manipulate the results and 
repress the opposition than to accept defeat and withdraw from power.  
The voting is not compulsory, but since the participation in elections is regularly 
recorded by stamping a person‘s identity card, people who not have such a stamp must worry 
about getting into trouble when dealing with authorities.
356
 According to one report 50 per 
cent of the voters cast blank and invalid ballots in the Majles elections. 
357
 In addition, many 
religious leaders repeatedly declared that voting is the sacred duty of the faithful to 
participate and that abstaining from the elections is a reprehensible act according to Islam. 
The voting age was fifteen, the youngest voting age in the world.
358
 Since 60% of Iran‘s 65 
million people are under 25 years old, the number of eligible voters will dramatically increase. 
The young were thought to be among the most ardent supporters of the radical agenda and 
more vulnerable to propaganda bombardment urging people cast their vote prior to any 
national election. Khatami‘s presidential election proved that the vast majority of devotees‘ 
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reformists are from among young people. The change of voting age from fifteen to sixteen 
made one million and eight hundred of potential reformist voters ineligible to vote. In a very 
recent amendment to election law the voting age was set at eighteen. In the following section 
two controversial aspects of Iranian elections including the role of CG and integrity of the 
system will be discussed. 
 
The role of the Council of Guardians 
 
A crucial issues undermining the integrity of Iranian election is the exclusionary gate 
keeping roles of CG in Iranian elections. Generally speaking, the elections in Iran are 
organized by the Ministry of the Interior. The supervision of elections, however, 
constitutionally is the responsibility of the Council of Guardians.
359
 The Council has always 
been superior to the Ministry of Interior, having the final word on elections in a way that no 
authority is allowed to interfere in their decisions and judgments. 
360
 To run for a seat in the 
Majles, the aspiring candidates should register with the Executive Committee organized by 
the Ministry. The Executive Committee is responsible for enquiring about their background 
from a variety of resources, among them, the Ministry of Information, the Attorney General, 
State Personal Status Registry Office, Identity Control Office, and the International Police. 
Then they refer the lists of applicants along with the relevant documents obtained from the 
abovementioned sources to the Screening Committee set up by CG.
361
 Although the CG 
decides on the eligibility of candidates based on the formal documents collected by Ministry 
of Interior, it has its own sources of inquiry as well, such as the Revolutionary Guards, Basij 
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and Friday Imams.
362
 It is the CG that takes the final decision with regard to each candidate‘s 
qualification. In the case of differences between the recommendation of the Executive 
Committee and that of the Supervision Committee, the CG is the ultimate arbitrator: ―CG 
announces its final decision regarding the confirmation or rejection of each volunteer‘s 
qualification to the Interior Ministry twenty days after the central Supervision Committee has 
declared its definitive viewpoint.‖363 In the absence of political parties to nominate candidates 
for election, a large number of people register to run for election. For instance, in seventh 
Majles more than 8,000 people signed up for candidacy for the 290-seat Majles. 
364
The 
ratification of legitimacy of the candidates must be on a series of conditions stipulated by 
election law. Such conditions, however, are open to arbitrary interpretation and set in a way 
that it is easy to prevent unwanted people from being elected or even running as a 
candidate.
365
 CG usually refuses to make known its grounds for rejecting applicants, and does 
not even inform the candidates themselves as to these grounds.  
In 2003, after GC budget was tripled through controversial procedures, it used this influx 
of funding to establish supervisory offices in the provinces that would participate in the 
vetting of candidates for elected office.
366
 The surplus funds also helped the CG to have the 
upper hand on election day as well. Reza Yusefian commenting on the soundness of the 
elections expressed much cause for concern and added: ―CG's decisions to designate 15 
supervisors to each ballot box, and the reports we received indicate increased ambiguities 
concerning the soundness of the elections.‖ He added: ―According to reports attempts has 
been made to exaggerate the overall number of votes to show high degree of participation 
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rather than increasing the votes in favor of a particular candidate.‖367 On the remarks made by 
the head of Tehran Supervisory Board concerning the second count of votes to be carried out 
by CG, he said: ―Unfortunately CG is trying to perform the two tasks of supervision and 
execution at the same time.‖ 368 Yusefian also stated that: ―There are speculations that CG 
will be trying to count the votes in the same biased manner that it disqualified the candidates 
in which case we do not know where we should take refuge.‖ Yusefian also said: 
―Considering CG's support for a particular faction during the qualification process, the 
[correct] count of the votes will be surprising.‖369 
Among its supervisory rights, CG also includes the cancellation of election results in 
certain wards which it considers improperly run. In addition, it can cancel all or part of the 
votes in certain ballot boxes. CG can also suspend elections in certain towns and provinces 
under the pretext that they may cause unrest. This right has been used by CG in all 
parliamentary elections hitherto held. In the elections from the third to the sixth parliamentary 
periods, the results were cancelled in 16, 11, 14, and 10 Wards, respectively. As an example 
of the cancellation of votes is the elections of the sixth parliamentary period, when in Tehran 
alone CG declared 2 million votes, to be invalid. This amounted to 25 percent of all votes 
cast in Tehran. This practice can often lead to alterations in the election results. In the case of 
the Tehran elections just mentioned, Gholam Ali Hadad Adel who fought a losing battle 
before the cancellation, afterwards advanced to the 28
th
 place, i.e., to the rank of the elected 
and went to parliament. Instead, Ali Reza Rajaee, the candidate of Nationalist groups and the 
editor of reformist journals who hold 28
th
 place in the Ministry of the Interior list was moved 
to 34
th
 place and stayed away from parliament. As one of the respondents stated ―the number 
of cancellations is directly dependent on CG's measure of success in controlling the various 
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phases in the overall procedure of the elections.‖370 Clearly, the role of CG questions the 
democratic character of Iran‘s parliamentary elections. Thus, it is said that in Iran all elected 
official must in effect submit to two elections, first that of CG and the second that of 
universal suffrage.  
Electoral system 
 
The design of the Iranian electoral system has always been controversial and the subject 
of prolonged discussion due to its abnormal design. The Iranian electoral formula is that of a 
plurality held in a two-round system. In the first round candidates need over twenty five 
percent (it used to be an absolute majority or fifty percent but changed to thirty percent and 
finally twenty five percent) of the total votes cast in their constituency to win the first round. 
If no candidate achieves such a given level of votes, the candidates twice the number of seats 
left to be filled in the given constituency with the highest number of votes must compete in 
the second round of elections. To win in the run-off election, a (simple) mere plurality of 
votes is needed. The Majles hold 290 representatives of the people of Iran from 26 counties 
divided into 207 constituencies. One seat from five of these constituencies is allocated for the 
representatives of the religious minorities of Iran. The number of seats allocated to each 
constituency or district magnitude ranges from one seat for small and medium-sized towns 
and cities to multiple seats for larger cities. For example, Tehran with its suburbs of 
Shemiranat and Shahr-e Rey is the largest constituency, having 30 seats in the Majles.
 
Tabriz 
has six seats in the Majles; Esfahan and Mashhad have five each; Shiraz has four; Ahvaz, 
Abadan, Ardebil, Rasht, Kermanshah, Qom and Urumiyeh have three each. 22 constituencies 
have two seats and the rest of 170 constituencies have only one seat.  
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The plurality model with a second ballot served the interest of Iran‘s ruling power bloc 
at the expense of the voters. In the absence of political parties and the presence of a large 
number of independents, candidates sponsored by the major factions enjoyed a clear 
advantage. From the voters‘ point of view, it was difficult to know all the candidates and their 
positions. For example, in multiple-member constituencies, such as the one in Tehran where 
some 170 candidates contested 30 at-large seats, only major factional candidates received 
publicity. In the first round, the voting ballot was a write-in form. Voters fill in the name of 
their choices, a questionable practice in a country where the illiteracy rate is high. Electoral 
laws allow illiterate voters to be accompanied to the election booth by a literate person or 
―assisted‖ by an official ―volunteer‖ in the polling station. The write-in ballot form is not 
only questionable for illiterate voters, but also for literate ones, who must remember no less 
than 30 names. As a result, voters often carry a copy of the factional list to the booth. The 
major factions distributed their list of 30 choices. The lists were mailed out, or distributed in 
the mosques, in the streets, and appeared in newspapers and on wall posters. It is not 
surprising that all candidates supported by the major factions—except for one independent 
candidate—were those who received the highest number of votes in the first round in Tehran. 
Independent Islamist candidates were the real losers in the elections; in fact, their 
participation in large cities was hardly noticed. Thus, such an electoral system has accounted 
for the elimination of smaller groups as many dependent or minority parties saw the system 
as another strategy by the ruling parties to exclude them from the political platform.  
Election frauds 
 
There are several loopholes in Iranian electoral practice which make it vulnerable to the 
frauds. The most apparent frauds are occurred in election campaigns. The key to success in a 
campaign is access to informal institutions such as influential military and clergymen and 
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their bonyads
 
and publishing houses. In the 1980s and 1990s the major factions had access to 
or owned public media and private publishing centres. In contrast most of the independent 
candidates had neither such access nor support. The electoral laws prohibited the military and 
faqih and imam jomehs from intervening in elections, but in practice they always take the side 
of their favourite candidates. Surprisingly there are no rules governing campaign finance and 
thus Majles candidates were not required to publish their campaign expenses. There appear to 
be few restraints on privileged interests wielding influence over the electoral process. 
Information on campaign contributions by other interests in the business community, the 
military, or government organizations, is also unavailable. It was expected, however, that 
candidates or the groups supporting them would conduct fund-raising, open bank accounts in 
which contributions could be deposited and volunteer in labour-intensive processes during 
the official campaign week.  
Another drawback is associated with the voter registration. Iran is among the few 
countries in which voters are not registered. The lack of registration increases the likelihood 
of the movement of voters between the constituencies and fraud by vote buying. Now and 
again, turnout is reported to be more than hundred per cent in some constituencies as voters 
moved to that constituency from somewhere else. In recent years, the Iranian elections have 
witnessed an unprecedented increase of interventions by the military. It is frequently claimed 
that  the Revolutionary Guards and basij mobilized their constituencies for particular factions. 
The Interior Ministry in the election of seventh Majles hired the Basij organization to assist 
them on polling day. Several reformist groups claimed numerous cases of ballot-box fraud by 
Basij in the presidential elections of 2005 and in the December 2006 local council elections; 
in the latter polling, even the Justice Ministry acknowledged some 290 cases of election 
offences in Tehran alone. All radio and television broadcasting, the main source of news and 
information for nearly all Iranians, is banned legally from involvement in Majles campaigns. 
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However, they are strictly under the control of the supreme Leader‘s office and support 
indirectly conservatives. This gives conservative candidates a strong advantage during 
electoral campaigns especially through negative advertisement. 
 
 
MPs’ Characteristics  
 
To this point the role of Majles election as the main indication of the representativeness 
of Majles was taken into consideration. In particular, the process though which Majles 
election has contributed to the exclusion of the opponents and harmed the representativeness 
of Majles were discussed. In this section the main focus will be placed on the results of 
Majles election as manifested in the diverse characteristics of MPs in Majles assembly.  
A quick review of MPs in the previous sessions of Majles indicates that only a small 
number of Iranian women have won seats in the Majles: four of the 324 members elected to 
the first post-revolutionary parliament were women, and the numbers remained in the single-
digits until after the death of Khomeini and the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1996. 15 women 
were elected to the fifth Majles (1996) (5.1% of MPs), 11 to the sixth (2000) (3.7% of MPs) 
13 to the seventh (2004) (4.7% of MPs) and 8 to the eighth (2008) (2.8% of MPs).
371
 (Table, 
11) 
Table 11: the gender diversity in Majles 
 
Session of Majles 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
Year of election 
 
1980 
 
1984 
 
1988 
 
1992 
 
1996 
 
2000 
 
2004 
 
2008 
 Gender 
         Male 
 
323 
 
273 
 
274 
 
259 
 
252 
 
284 
 
272 
 
277 
 Female 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
9 
 
15 
 
11 
 
13 
 
8 
 Sources: Majles. Majles Annual Reports. 20 vol. 1980-2007 
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The Iranian women in Majles have attracted the attention of a number of scholars in 
recent years. For instance, Afshar noted that in spite of their diverse socio-economic 
backgrounds and political and religious views, Iranian women politicians have generally been 
able to work together, and have made an important contribution to ―gradually clawing back 
rights denied to them‖, by ―assiduously formulat[ing] their demands in terms of Islamic 
teachings‖. Afshar suggests that ―by situating their demands firmly in the context of the 
Islamic teaching, women parliamentarians have formed the only long-lasting, acceptable 
political opposition in a system that does not allow political parties and has driven 
underground almost all other opponents‖.
 
She attributes this success to the women‘s ability to 
use their family networks and knowledge of Islamic law to ensure that they were perceived as 
loyal defenders of Islam.
372
 
Mir-Hosseini provides insight into the career and resignation of 
Fatemeh Maqiqatjoo, a female reformist MP. Mir-Hosseini also discusses the more 
conservative orientation of the 12 female MPs elected to the seventh Majles, who have 
already distanced themselves from earlier female MPs‘ efforts to prompt Iran to sign the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
and facilitate single Iranian women‘s opportunities to study abroad.
 373 
Paidar‘s 2002 chapter 
―Encounters between Feminism, Democracy and Reformism in Contemporary Iran‖ places 
the work of Iranian women MPs in a broader political and theoretical context. Paidar 
highlights the ―opportunities that women have created and used to enact their rights within 
the existing authoritarian context…illustrate[ing]…the paradox of weak democratic 
institutions and active female citizenship.‖
 
Paidar suggests that a ―new window of 
opportunity…has been opened through the ongoing dialogue between and within the 
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democratization and women‘s rights movements. The new strands of political thought and 
discourse and the dialogue between them…present more emancipatory potential for women‘s 
rights than democratic institutions have had in Iran since their inception.‖
 
The force of 
Paidar‘s argument is weakened when considered in the context of the resurgence of 
conservatism and restrictionism in Iran since Ahmadinejad‘s election in 2005. 374  
Apart from gender another significant characteristics of Majles‘ MPs is the number of 
clerics as Majles MPs. A quick review reveals that there is a considerable decline in the 
number of clerics from 50 percent in the first and second session of Majles to around 15 
percent in the 2000s. The percentage of Majles MPs from small towns has oscillated around 
50 percent. Given that only 20 percent of Iran‘s population lives in small towns, it can be 
argued that Majles represented the MPs of small towns on an unequal scale. One-third of 
Iranian populations are still living in villages where in the 1980s and 1990s, 15% of MPs 
represented them their proportions declined to only 6 percent of MPs in the 2000s. With 
respect to the MPs level of education, there is a decline in the number of MPs who did not 
finish high school, approximately consistent with the trend in the general Iranian population. 
The percentage of MPs with graduate degrees, on the other hand, decreased dramatically in 
the late 1980s and 1990s to reach to the level of the first and the second Majles of the early 
1980s. The decline in part reflects the growing level of education in the general population, 
but should mainly be associated to the condition of candidacy prompted in election law by 
Rafsanjani‘s camp which will be discussed later in detail.  
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Table 12: the MPs status in eight Majles sessions 
Session of the Majles 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
Year of election 
 
1980 
 
1984 
 
1988 
 
1992 
 
1996 
 
2000 
 
2004 
 
2008 
 Clerial presense 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Clerical 
 
161 
 
149 
 
80 
 
63 
 
53 
 
37 
 
43 
 
44 
 As (%) of total2 
 
(49%) 
 
(54%) 
 
(29%) 
 
(25%) 
 
(20%) 
 
(12%) 
 
(15%) 
 
(15%) 
 
Place of Birth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cities 
 
123 
 
90 
 
78 
 
93 
 
83 
 
103 
 
117 
 
107 
 Small towns 
 
147 
 
150 
 
161 
 
122 
 
113 
 
176 
 
137 
 
155 
 As (%) of total2 
 
(45%) 
 
(54%) 
 
(58%) 
 
(46%) 
 
(43%) 
 
(59%) 
 
(48%) 
 
(54%) 
 Villages 
 
50 
 
35 
 
45 
 
45 
 
67 
 
18 
 
18 
 
21 
 Holy cities of Iraq 
 
7 
 
2 
 
4 
 
4 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 High School or less 
 
23 
 
20 
 
31 
 
17 
 
4 
 
11 
 
4 
 
0 
 Bachelor degrees and 
diplomas 
 
109 
 
103 
 
146 
 
109 
 
91 
 
101 
 
76 
 
74 
 
Graduate degrees 
 
195 
 
154 
 
101 
 
68 
 
99 
 
166 
 
157 
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 Sources: Majles. Majles Annual Reports. 20 vol. 1980-2007 
The occupational backgrounds of Majles MPs often reflect their educational 
backgrounds. What is striking is the small percentage of MPs who are professionals, for 
example, attorneys, engineers, doctors, university professors, and others with specialized 
university training or advanced degrees. In seventh Majles the number of veteran 
Revolutionary Guards dramatically increased, gaining close to 30 percent of the seats in 
Majles which reflected the militarization of politics in Iran after the Ahmadinezhad 
presidency.
375
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Policy responsiveness  
 
MPs in Iran especially those from small towns and villages are reported to spend a large 
portion of their time for in their constituents. One respondent explained the daily routine of 
Majles MPs: ―They almost every everyday meet a large number of people who want MPs to 
take time to address their concerns and solve their problems caused by other sectors, 
especially the judicial and executive branches.‖376 Another respondent stated that ―In many 
cases they simply request them to provide some amount of money. The poor people expect 
the MPs who are wealthy in their eyes to assist them financially‖ 377 . These local 
commitments in several instance prevented MPs from arriving in time to parliament to attend 
the assembly sessions. Once MPs are in Majles, the individuals still keep calling on 
them.
378
In the constituencies, days will be spent on solving problems including requests of 
finding someone a job or an accommodation, arrangement of personal loan and mortgages, 
application for donations, settlement of individuals or groups problems, delivery of other 
services, or just attending in social day to day life and ceremonies like funerals and other 
private issues.
379
 In the light of this discussion it is apparent that the highest priority is given 
to the local interests rather than public policy making.  
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Deliberativeness 
 
 
Plenary Debates 
 
It is no exaggeration to claim that the most noticeable manifestation of Majles 
deliberativeness is the speeches delivered by MPs prior to the formal agenda of Majles, 
known as pre-agenda speeches. Free to hold and air in the Assembly, these speeches are 
intended to be individual and personal expressions of views and opinions regarding the most 
crucial public issues. Majles Rules of Procedure stipulates that every MP who wishes to 
express himself/herself on any subject that needs to be brought before the Majles and the 
nation may do so through a pre-agenda speech. Each MP is assigned 10 minutes for the 
speech but he or she may share such speaking time allotted with other MPs giving up a 
minimum of 3 minutes, or his/her entire time to another MP. However, MPs using up time 
allotted to them shall speak only for a maximum of 30 minutes during pre-agenda time.
380
 
The pre-agenda speeches, have always been crucial. In one event
381
 a row in the Majles was 
sparked by a pre-agenda speech by a reformist deputy. The minority [conservative] faction of 
the Majles strongly protested about his comments on the duties of the Assembly of Experts as 
outlined by the constitution.  A deputy from the minority stood up and shouted "shut up" 
while reading a section of the constitution on the responsibilities of the Assembly of Expert. 
Simultaneously, another deputy ran to the tribune, darting sharp words at him. Mohammad 
Reza Khatami, who was substituting as Majles president for Mehdi Karrubi, told the 
protesting Majles deputies, who were moving towards the podium: "The pre-agenda speaker 
has acted according to his legal duty and has read an article of the constitution." Ignoring 
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Reza Khatami, members of the minority faction removed the microphone from the podium, 
preventing the pre-agenda speaker from continuing his speech. Meanwhile a rush by the 
minority faction towards the podium prompted members of the reformist faction to enter the 
scene to try to calm the situation down. Other minority deputies moved towards the podium 
with the apparent intention of getting physical with him, but were blocked by the reformist 
faction. In an attempt to prevent the minority faction from tearing the speaker's speech, Reza 
Khatami repeatedly asked the pre-agenda speaker to remove his notes from the podium and 
continue his speech. The Majles deputies were able to prevent him from being physically 
assaulted. But rude and profane words were being shouted in the Majles. He continued his 
speech while the minority members continued their strong protest around the podium. The 
pre-agenda speech ended in the midst of a shouting match between the minority and majority 
faction on the Majles floor. 
According to Majles Rules of Procedure each MP has the right to publicly reflect on bills 
under consideration. A list of speakers is often drawn up in advance.  Those MPs who 
registered earlier take priority over those registered later. The presiding officer determines the 
practical details of the debate such as the calculation of speaking time.  Majles Rules of 
Procedure have no guidance on how presiding officers do their jobs to ensure that the time for 
speeches is divided out among political groups in proportion to their seats. As one minority 
MP stated, his share in debate has been five minutes in two months. 
382
 However some MPs 
tend not to get involved in plenary debates; for instance in sixth Majles 13 MPs accounted for 
50 percent of the suggestions while 15 MPs never spoke and 149 MPs made no suggestion. It 
is partly because the main decisions are within committees and, as an MP stated, the output of 
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Majles is a result of what has been done by MPs collectively. 
383
 
Majles has two set times or readings in which legislation can be publicly debated.  The 
first reading generally consists of a general debate on the principles of the bill, and the second 
consists of a detailed examination of the clauses, and of amendments proposed by committee.  
Ideally, since the will of the majority is usually already reflected in the content of the bill, 
compensatory steps are taken to provide for the views of the opposition to be heard.  The 
allocation of speaking time for opposition groups is the same as those representing the 
majority. Although bills are carefully reviewed in the first and second rounds in the 
committees of the Majles,
384
 the debates on the floor of the Majles are expected to have a 
more important role.
385
  
In the committees the voting practice is relatively democratic. Yet, the committee 
meetings are absolutely closed to the public and the media. No public hearing is held when 
examining the legislation. Minutes and related documentation from such meetings are not 
published. These documents are archived somewhere in Majles but they are classified as top 
secret documents. The reporting of the committee meetings may be announced by members 
after the termination of each session.
386
 
 
 
Plenary Voting 
 
The voting in Majles is made in public, combining the use of non-recorded and recorded 
methods of voting. The recorded voting must be held in Majles if demanded by at least 10 
MPs. However, the voting records of MPs are not published. The method of unrecorded 
voting is by a show of hands and the recorded one by paper on which the name of MPs put 
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down. The exceptions to the publicly recorded voting apply to the election of the presiding 
officer, CG jurists, internal committee elections and votes of no confidence in ministers. 
387
 
Obviously, only legislators have a vote on issues before the legislature as the position of 
membership of the Majles shall be personal and may not be assigned to another.
388
 The 
Majles may not delegate the right to legislate to another person or committee. However, in 
necessary cases it may delegate the right to legislate certain laws to its own internal 
committees, with due observance of the provisions of Article 72. In this case, such laws shall 
be enforced on a trial basis for the period set by the Majles. Their final approval, however, 
shall rest with the Majles.  Likewise the Majles may delegate to its relevant committees the 
permanent approval of articles of association of Government agencies, companies or 
organizations, or those affiliated to the Government, with due observance of the provisions of 
Article 72, and\or authorize the Government to approve them. In such a case, government 
approval shall not be inconsistent with the principles and rules of the country's official Faith 
or the Constitution and the issue shall be determined by CG in the manner laid down in 
Article 96. Moreover, government approvals shall not be inconsistent with the general laws 
and regulations of the country. While the Government notifies such approval for 
implementation [to the ministries concerned], it shall also notify the same to the Majles 
President who shall examine and state whether or not they are inconsistent with the said laws 
Article 85.  
 
Accessibility 
 
According to Article 69 of the Constitution, Majles sittings should be held openly and a 
full report of each sitting is released to the public through the radio and the official gazette. 
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The radio carries a live broadcast of the Majles deliberations. Coupled with radio, the 
Ministry of Justice Formal Newspaper (gazette) also publishes the proceedings in detail for 
the public. The plenary debates are also accessible on-line through the Majles website.
389
 
People as well as foreign and domestic reporters can attend the Majles open sessions. 
According to the Rules of Procedure, Article 177, reporters from the press, radio, and T.V. as 
well as visitors holding entry access cards specially issued for the day's sitting are permitted 
to the parliament building to attend the place earmarked for them. About 300 such persons on 
the days when there is an open session are accommodated. The rules and practice governing 
the granting of building passes to the media virtually follow the flow of free information. A 
relatively well equipped Public Relations Department of the Majles will make every 
necessary coordination in this regard. 
390
 The department has a media relations office or 
spokesperson who is elected from among the presiding officers and directly is accountable to 
the president. Majles also employs a number of staff to actively push the activities of the 
legislature.   
Broadly speaking, Majles frequently make available reasonably accurate, unbiased 
information about the activities of the legislature through the Public Relations Department. 
The problem of creating a party bias in the dissemination of information comes from outside 
Majles. In the sixth Majles, MPs accused the national television, governed by the Leader and 
paid from the public purse, of giving unfair coverage to Majles news. For instance, they 
condemned it for its blackout of the news about the sit-in protest of the reformists MPs in the 
parliament house against the illegal action of CG. Iran's 24-hour television news network 
(IRIB) has not been seen to broadcast any reports on the resignation of Majles deputies. On 
other occasions, IRIB did not broadcast the joint statement of the president and the Majles 
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president when they were alarmed that the rights and votes of the people were being ignored 
by CG.
391
  
In Iran several spoken languages exist, however, it does not constitute an obstacle to free 
political participation because no Iranian has difficulty with the officially recognized 
language, Farsi. Thus language is not a barrier for deputies and citizens to get involved in 
Majles affairs. Majles have also made sufficient effort to accommodate the special needs of 
persons with disabilities because the recent eight-year war has resulted in many with 
disability, a few of which have occupied Majles positions.    
 
Transparency and Integrity 
 
To date, Majles has failed to approve and enforce rules on conflicts of interest which 
promote the independence of legislators from private interests or unreasonable political 
pressures. In the sixth Majles, a number of MPs called on the Majles Research Centre to set 
out a framework for fighting corruption in Majles, however, no one dare to sign a letter to 
request officially the drafting of a Bill on the matter.
392
 In the seventh Majles, the Bill was 
drawn up but it was suspended. One MP stated that when more than eighty per cent of MPs 
are pregnant with corruption how can we expect that they show an interest in such a Bill?
393
 
In Iran MPs are not required to disclose their financial assets and business interests before, 
during or at the end of their post. In many cases MPs‘ lives change completely after they 
come to Majles.   
Majles also suffered from the lack of sufficient regulation for the protection of the 
dignity of the legislature.  Majles‘ RoP refers to some points but they are neither sufficient 
nor obligatory. For instance they require that all deputies shall be present at the Majles open 
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sessions 15 minutes prior to their commencement on dates which shall have been determined 
earlier and notified to them. Any MPs failing to appear on time, or are late, without any 
plausible excuse, shall be taken to task by a reprimand of the Majles Presidium. Any MP 
failing to be present at the time of voting on a motion may also be subject to a reprimand 
irrespective of whether the voting is open (by a show of hands), or by secret ballot.
394
 
However, RoP is often disregarded by MPs because of its lack of enforcement. Majles 
Speaker Behzad Nabavi regards MPs‘ unjustified absence and delays as prime examples of 
MPs‘ misbehaviour. Nabavi, who chaired the sixth Majles, said: ―We have had many 
problems in running the Majles because of excessive absenteeism by MPs.  At times, a 
quarter of  MPs were on leave or duty trips, more than half the members of committees have 
taken leave without their applications for taking leave being confirmed; and some others were 
absent without applying for leave or going on a duty trip.‖ 395  
Majles RoP also stipulate that if deputies fail to conduct themselves according to the 
rules set forth by the Majles and indulge in improper conduct then the Majles President may 
do one of the three things or both as follows: 
 Administer a verbal reprimand directed at the offending deputy.  
 Give a warning to the deputy concerned.  
 Summon him/her to the Presidium of the Majles to provide an explanation of 
his/her conduct.  
It also mentions that it is not permissible for Deputies to interrupt speeches being made 
by other Deputies, to create disturbances of any kind or cause disorder in the Majles, to level 
personal accusations against Deputies or make protestations of an unbecoming nature. The 
Majles president in such an event will reprimand the offending deputy according to the 
provisions of the Majles Rules of Procedure.  
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The Presidium of seventh Majles has taken best advantage of technology to bring 
discipline back to Majles. They used closed circuit television of the Majlis, which is equipped 
with six cameras, to embarrass irresponsible MPs. For instance, in one case during a most 
sensitive meeting of the Majles, suddenly the big screens showed one of the clerical Majlis 
MP who was busy talking on his mobile phone. This deputy, who did not know his picture 
was being shown, talked on his phone for a few minutes. But even when he realized what was 
going on, he just smiled and finished his conversation. This made the other MPs laugh and 
Majles president said: "I have told the control room to film those who are talking on their 
mobiles." After a short time the cameras showed three female MPs, who were talking on their 
mobile phones under their chadors [Islamic veil]. In another case, these cameras which were 
looking for subjects in the Majles found one MP who was talking on his mobile phone. When 
the cameras focused on him he was not talking but when the cameras were not on him he 
continued talking. His picture was shown so much that he finally ended his call. The cameras 
in the Majles also filmed those MPs who were asleep or busy reading the newspaper during 
the debates. Hadad-Adel, president of seventh Majles, after taking these measures addressed 
MPs: "The world is God's scene. Now think about the day that God films our actions. What 
will happen?" 
396
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Conclusion 
 
Having unveiled Majles representativeness and deliberativeness, one can conclude that it 
does not a fully comply with these democratic values. The most crucial factor undermining 
the representativeness of Majles is the exclusionary gate keeping roles of CG in Majles 
election. The Council is given absolute authority to disapprove Majles candidates on the 
ground of arbitrary interpretation of election laws. It also has the final word in any dispute 
related to election in a way that no authority is allowed to interfere in their decisions and 
judgments. Another obstacle against Majles election is the electoral formula. The plurality 
model with a second ballot served the interest of Iran‘s ruling power bloc at the expense of 
the voters. Majles election is also vulnerable to frauds. The interference of informal 
institutions such as influential military and clergymen and their bonyads
 
is a prime example 
of unfair access to the campaign resources. With respect to the MPs characteristics, it is 
observable that only a small number of Iranian women have won seats in the Majles. The 
percentage of Majles MPs from small towns outnumbered other geographical divisions of 
countries. These and other quantitative characteristics of MPs indicate unequal reflection of 
Iranian population diversity. Finally the time and energy invested in constituency services 
workload leave the MPs with little time for dealing with important law making and 
monitoring duties.  
Majles is also scarcely characterized as deliberative in terms of deliberativeness criteria 
defined in this research. Yes, Majles sittings are held openly and a full report of each sitting 
is released to the public through the radio and the official gazette but Iran's 24-hour television 
news network (IRIB) run under supervision of the Great Leader has not been seen to remain 
impartial in broadcasting the reports of Majles. The pre-agenda speeches are an outstanding 
opportunity that gives the MPs to express their views and opinions regarding the most crucial 
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public issues. However the minority has little chance to use this tribune. It is also the case 
regarding the time for any other speech in the assembly. The committee meetings are 
absolutely closed to the public and the media and no public hearing is hold when examining 
the legislation. Finally to date, Majles has failed to approve and enforce rules on conflicts of 
interest which promote the independence of legislators from private interests or unreasonable 
political pressures. Majles also suffered from the lack of sufficient regulation for the 
protection of the dignity of the legislature.  In the light of above discussions it is evident that 
Majles served as a means to exclude the opponents rather than represent the populations. In 
addition its functions and internal organization shrouded in secrecy and as result the integrity 
of Majles is seriously undermined.  
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Chapter 7: Majles and the resilience of  
regime in action 
 
 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters predominantly focused on the environmental and institutional 
determinants assumed to shape and condition the role of Majles in regime longevity. The 
primary aim of this chapter is to explore how in practice Majles fulfil this role. To put it in 
other way, this chapter seeks to explain those functions or performances of Majles by which 
it contributes to the survival of regime. Two significant functions of parliaments in the 
regime survival were identified earlier: co-optation and manipulation.   
Legislature co-optation was defined as those strategies which seek to offer selectively 
legislative seats to a given group of opponents within oppositions to make concession and 
induce their cooperation. As discussed earlier the net result of these strategies is to divide 
oppositions or reinforce their disunity. In the Iranian case, there are deep differences and 
divisions among the oppositions. As a result co-optation strategies largely accentuate these 
existing fractions. In this sense, it is necessary to make sense of the ideological diversity 
within Iranian political groups and factions and then to explore the extent to which they were 
given seats in Majles or prevent from entering into the assembly.  
Majles also acted as the main agent of manipulation of political institutions through its 
law making function and by this contributed to the stability of the Islamic Republic. Included 
among more than 2000 laws enacted by Majles are those laws which deal with the main 
political institutions including elections, political parties, and elected local councils. 
Reviewing a sample of such laws help to understand the extent to which Majles fostered the 
survival of regime through legislation function. To examine this role the main concern here is 
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the centrality of Majles in making such law.  Occasional reference is also made to the context 
and other factors the extent to which such law run against democratic values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
187 
 
Co-optation Role 
The short history of post-Revolutionary Iran is marked with the ongoing attempts of the 
regime to divide the opponents into insiders (khodi) and outsiders (gheir-e khodi). The 
weakness of the outsiders as a result of their diverse ideological divisions and ongoing rivalry 
allowed the regime to co-opt some groups or eject the others. In addition the line between 
elite and opposition is blurred and insiders increasingly turned out to be outsiders.
397
  
Ayatollah Khomeini, as the leader and mastermind of the Islamic Revolution, overthrew the 
authoritarian regime of Mohammad Reza Shah with the support of a diverse range of groups. 
The members of the ex-regime were summarily executed or extremely marginalized, but the 
power struggle continued between the different elements that had contributed to the 
revolution including seculars and Islamic groups. The Islamic groups were mainly the 
members of IRP, a party consisting of a closed circle of clerics whose main commonality was 
the loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeini. They were populist Islamic radicals, intent on establishing 
an Islamic state governed by Islamic law. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution the power of 
Islamist was consolidated and their opponents were gradually eliminated. The exclusion of 
Islamist opponents began with the election of first Majles and since then Majles turned into 
the main institution, encapsulating the loyal oppositions and excluding those were regarded 
as outsiders. On the advent of the Islamic Revolution, as soon as the new constitution was 
ratified, an election law was drafted by the Revolutionary Council which consisted of 
Khomeini‘s close adherents. The document was written by Khomeini‘s close adherents to 
―guarantee the election of the true representatives of the people.‖ However, it proved that for 
those who were being gradually excluded from the political arena, the law was a wise attempt 
                                                 
397
 Majles Former Deputy,  Personal Interview, Tehran Summer 2009 
188 
 
to consolidate the rule of the clerics.
398
 Inspired by the French model, the law stipulates a 
second ballot majority electoral system in that the elections would be in two stages in which 
candidates must receive an absolute majority, meaning over fifty percent of the vote. Without 
an absolute majority, the candidates with the highest number of votes must compete in the 
second round of elections. With the exception of the IRP, most groups condemned the new 
law because the smaller groups—such as the Mojahedin, the National Front, and the National 
Democratic Front, and the Marxist Fadai—saw the new law as a strategy by the clerics to 
exclude them from the political arena. These groups wanted a proportional representation 
system under which they could gain a minimum representation. In the 1
st
 Majles none of their 
candidates could have that absolute majority in the first round. Defenders of the new law, 
Rafsanjani and Mahdavi Kani, argued that the large numbers of small parties and candidates 
made the two-round system a necessity.
399
 As a result, the first Majles (1980-1984) was 
dominated by the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) which formed a loose coalition with the 
Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI).
 
Since the main aim of the IRP was much too general, it 
was more a movement than a party with specific aims and objectives.
400
 The discipline in the 
ruling IRP was not so tight as to ensure the endorsement of President Khamanei‘s first 
nominee as prime minister. The fact that left-of-centre Mousavi won the deputies‘ vote of 
confidence by three to one showed that the Majles had more leftists than conservatives. Most 
of the rest would be Independents. Confusingly, while pursuing different agendas, many 
conservatives and leftists (including Mousavi) belonged to the IRP. Within two years of its 
formation, the IRR and its allied groups occupied almost all political posts within and outside 
Majles. As years passed, IRP factions had become so deeply divided on socioeconomic issues 
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and foreign policy, between pro-private sector conservatives who favoured increased 
diplomatic and economic links with the West (except America) and pro-public sector leftists 
who opposed closer ties with the West, that their infighting impeded the workings of the 
executive and the legislature.
401
  
In the elections for the 2
nd
 Majles (1984—88), it was the turn of the liberal-Islamicists of 
the Liberation Movement to be excluded. Although they had been represented in the first 
Majles, this time they were forced to stay away from the elections on the ground that they 
would have only paid lip-service to velayat-e faqih and thus they declared unsuitable as 
candidates. In the second Majles, the division within IRP were not exacerbated mainly 
because Khomeini was keen to maintain a balance between the two factions. Majles again 
endorsed Mousavi when President Khamanei presented him as his choice after his own 
reelection in 1985. In fact Khomeini favoured Mousavi as he had no choice but to go along 
with what Khomeini wanted.
402
 By mid-1986, the tension between two IRP factions had 
become so acute that Khomeini appointed a mediation council to conciliate them. It failed. So 
he ordered the party‘s dissolution in July 1987. 
To provide political alternatives to the people, Khomeini encouraged the radicals—those 
who gave priority to social and economic justice at the expense of free enterprise—within the 
long-established Association of Combatant Clergy (ACC) to separate and form the Society of 
Combatant Clerics (SCC) in March 1988, and set up its own religious network. Led by 
Hojatalislam Mahdi Karrubi, it fared well in the general election.  
As long as Khomeini was still alive, conservative dominated CG was not able to make 
the most of this power. Thus only a few candidates who were classified as left-wing 
extremists were excluded from the elections to the 3
rd
 Majles (I988—92). In the third Majles 
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(1988—92), the leftist camp including the SCC and the other moderates gained the majority 
of two-thirds of the deputies.
403
 However, the leftist-dominated Majles resisted Rafsanjani‘s 
plans to liberalize the economy to the extent that he cooperated with Khamanei, now raised to 
Leader, to guarantee the fall of leftists in the elections to the fourth Majles in April 1992 by 
urging the Council of Guardian to prevent them from entering into Majles. Exclusion from 
the elections for the 4
th
 Majles, which took place three years after Khomeini‘s death, was 
unprecedented. Out of 3,150 aspirant candidates, 1110 were declared unsuitable by the 
Council of Guardians.
 
Amongst them were almost all the top figures of the radicals, including 
45 members of the 3
rd
 Majles, some of whom had been members since the first Majles.
404
 In a 
Friday prayer sermon in March, Khamaeni endorsed the scrutiny system used by the Council 
of Guardians, and upheld Rafsanjani and his cabinet.
405
 Winning 150 seats, economic 
reformers, who were also social conservatives, emerged as the majority. And leftist MPs were 
reduced by half, reaching to ninety. Hojatalislam Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, the leader of the 
conservative ACC, became the Majles president. From the floor, conservative deputies, 
opposed to ―Westoxication‖ (their term for Western cultural imperialism), began attacking 
Hojatalislam Muhammad Khatami, who had been Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance 
since 1982, for his failure to tackle the threat posed by the invading Western culture. Their 
views were given wide publicity by the largely conservative press. Under this pressure, 
Khatami resigned in July 1992.
406
  
However, the parliamentarians, favouring a strong private sector and economic 
liberalization split when Rafsanjani, reelected in 1993 on a much-reduced mandate (63 
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percent on a voter turnout of 56 percent), extended reform to the economy‘s external 
dimension—with economic nationalists in the conservative camp opposing his moves. Their 
resistance to Rafsanjani‘s plans led to the President‘s supporters to keep distance with the 
traditional right-wing camp and, in January 1996, sixteen top technocrats and politicians 
published an open letter, calling on the electorate to vote for those Majles candidates who 
were dedicated to prosperity and modernization of Iran as proposed by Rafsanjani. This led to 
the establishment of the Servants of Construction (SOC) which contested in the forthcoming 
election.  
In the fifth Majels election, the Great Leader Khamanei warned electors not to be misled 
by candidates who wanted to emasculate the foundation of Islamic beliefs under the cover of 
―freedom and liberalism.‖407 Following this, the Council of Guardians—taking its cue from 
the Leader—rejected as many as 35 per cent of the prospective candidates. Again there were, 
among the rejected candidates, a large number of members of the official and unofficial 
opposition and even members of the 4
th
 Majles.  The credentials of only 3,276 of the 5,365 
people who registered as candidates were approved.  
One of the underlying forces of the Islamic Revolution was the enduring coalition 
between merchants and the lower social class. During the election, the conservative faction 
made best use of this alliance. But in this process they lost the support of the modern middle 
class which shifted their loyalty largely to the mainly centrist SOC. 
408
 Accordingly, the 
conservatives‘ number in the fifth Majles (1996-2000) declined to 120. Yet their number was 
more than the combined strength of the left-wingers and centrist SOC members at seventy.  
In the 1997 presidential poll, Khatami won in a landslide victory on a reformist platform. 
An important consequence of Khatami‘s win was that the term ―leftist‖ almost disappeared 
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from the scene, giving its way to ―reformist/reformer,‖ which covered everybody who was 
not a conservative or hard-line fundamentalist. 
409
 Fundamentalists and right-wingers wanted 
to maintain the status quo while centrists and leftists advocated widening of the freedom of 
expression, association, and assembly within the constitution.
 410
 They invoked republican 
elements of the 1989 constitution. Given this, and the unprecedented citizens‘ protest in 1999 
which focused on political freedoms, the country prepared for the elections to the sixth 
Majles (2000-2004) in mid-February 2000.
411
 It was the moment of truth for exclusionary 
role of CG. Reformists feared that the conservative Council of Guardians would disapprove 
the qualification of their candidates on a large scale. But this did not happen. The radical drop 
in the number of rejected candidates may be associated to the struggle of the Ministry of the 
Interior under Khatami's administration and fears of the people‘s reaction. It can also be 
argued that it was a wise decision to encapsulate the opposition within Majles. The relatively 
free and fair election led to the reformist victory, praised by the US, the European Union and 
Russia in which supporters of reformist President Khatami swept aside the Iranian old guard 
of hardline conservatives. Of the 6,800 aspiring candidates for 290 Majles seats, only seven 
percent were barred. A dozen conservative groups, dominated by the ACC and the 
Miscellaneous Islamic committees‘ formed an alliance called the Followers of the Imam‘s 
and Leader‘s Line. It emphasized improvement in economic conditions rather than political 
reform. On the other side, eighteen reformist factions—ranging from the reformist SCC to the 
progressive reformers Islamic Iranian Participation Front (IIPF) to the centrist SOC—formed 
the Second Khordad/May 23 Front, named after the (Iranian) date on which Khatami scored 
his landslide victory. The IIPF‘s programme included greater media freedom, including 
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privately owned radio and television channels, and reform of government bureaucracy.
412
 On 
polling day, with thirty-two million electors participating, the turnout was 83 percent, a 
record for Majles elections, and 12 percent higher than in the previous poll. Winning almost 
two-thirds of the seats, the May 23 Front emerged as the clear victor. The conservatives‘ 
score was sixty, and the independents‘ fifteen.413 Karrubi became the new Majles president 
by a huge majority with nobody voting against him, and sixty-two deputies abstaining. The 
breakdown of the 186 deputies voting for Mahdi Karrubi was: ninety-five members of the 
IIPF, thirty of the SCC ten of the longer-established Mujahedin of Islamic Revolution, made 
up of leftist laypersons, thirty of the SC, and fifteen independents. 
414
In Tehran, reformists 
roared to victory —with IIPF leader Muhammad Reza Khatami, the president‘s younger 
brother, who had set up the IIPF as a platform for his elder brother‘s reformist ideas in late 
1998. At the bottom of the list appeared Rafsanjani despite the fact that, on the eve of the 
election, he had published full-page advertisements in newspapers and distributed two million 
flyers. Later, when his election was challenged, Rafsanjani decided to withdraw his name 
rather than face possibly embarrassing scrutiny by neutral auditors.
 
During the four-year 
tenure of the Majles, reformists found their modest attempts at democratization squashed 
repeatedly by the Council of Guardians. It vetoed many bills regarding democratic 
institutions and procedures.  
In the seventh Majles election CG did not hesitate to disqualify an astonishing 3,600 
candidates out of 8,157 from running for the Majles elections. They included 83 serving 
members of parliament, most notably Muhammad Reza Khatami the deputy to Majles 
speaker and the most prominent reformist MP. In response, reformists staged a sit-in at the 
Majles for three weeks. Reformist parties threatened also a boycott of the elections. But when 
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disqualified deputies staged a sit-in at the Majles, there was not a single public demonstration 
in their favour. ―The general public witnessed four years of constant bickering between the 
Majles and other organs of the government and got fed up,‖ Jim Muir, the BBC‘s 
correspondent in Iran, stated. ―They thought this was a quarrel among politicians, and took 
little interest.‖ 415 Khatami and Karrubi called upon CG to carry out a ―fundamental review‖ 
of the disqualifications. Under pressure from Khamenei, CG eventually reinstated roughly 
1000 of the candidates it had previously disqualified on 30 January. It was hardly a 
compromise as, despite the reformists, the council has already disqualified some more 
reformist candidates. With 2530 candidates still barred from running, reformists argued that 
the disqualifications had created 132 seats that were guaranteed to go to the conservatives due 
to lack of any serious contender. The Interior Ministry declared that it was impossible to hold 
free and fair elections under the circumstances.
416
 When the final list of candidates was 
announced, 124 deputies rushed to the Majles president‘s podium and handed in their 
resignation one by one to him after a leading reformist, Muhsin Mirdamadi, had read aloud 
his letter of resignation—broadcast live on state-run radio. He said that the totalitarians 
planned ―to eliminate the republicanism of the system and turn its Islam into a Taliban 
version of Islam [as in Afghanistan, from 1996 onward].‖ Another deputy, Rajab Ali 
Mazrsoui, said, ―An election whose results is decided beforehand is treason to the rights and 
ideals of the nation.‖ 417  Some in the reform movement proposed that the Khatami 
government‘s Interior Ministry should refuse to conduct the general election or include the 
rejected candidates‘ names on the contestants‘ list, or postpone the poll to gain time to 
resolve the crisis satisfactorily. But Khamanei decreed that the poll must be held on February 
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20 as scheduled. Eventually, Khatami followed his demands, stating that the Interior Ministry 
would carry on the elections as planned. The reformist camp split. Eight of the twenty-two 
groups in it decided to participate, including the SCC to which Khatami and Karrubi 
belonged. These groups formed a coalition called the Construction and Development of Iran. 
After co-opting moderate conservatives and independents, it fielded candidates for all the 
seats. Khatami and Karrubi appealed to the electorate to vote while fourteen reformist groups, 
including the IIPF, boycotted the poll. Because of this, the voter turnout became a crucial 
element in the upcoming contest in that 50 per cent voter turnout would satisfy Khamanei‘s 
call for a successful election.  
The conservatives, contesting under the umbrella of the Builders of Islamic Iran (BII), 
were led by Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel and clandestinely guided by Mojtaba, Khamenei‘s son. 
Instead of chanting such ambiguous slogans as freedom, reform, and civil society, the new 
Majles concentrated on inflation, unemployment, state control of the economy, and social 
justice. According to the reformist-run Interior Ministry, 50.6 percent of the forty-six million 
voters participated in the poll. In Tehran the turnout was 30 percent versus 63 percent in 2000, 
which was also the national figure. The national statistic on the voter turnout was twice the 
reformist camp had predicted. At the same time, since the figure was marginally above 50 
percent, conservatives claimed legitimacy. Little wonder that the general mood was of 
disillusionment and apathy, not of revolt. The 189 conservatives were divided into pragmatic 
(about 10 percent), mainstream (roughly 75 percent), and ideological hard-liners (10 to 15 
percent). When the Seventh Majles met on May 27, it elected as president Hadad Adel, 
whose daughter was married to Mujtaba Khamanei, a son of the Leader.  
The summary of the results of co-optation strategies manifesting itself in Majles is 
shown in the table 13.   
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Table 13: The results of co-optation strategy represented in Majles between 1980 
and 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, data collected from various resources by author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Majles sessions 
 
Offered Majles Seats 
Disqualified from 
running for Majles 
election 
 
I (1980-1984) 
IRP and allies 48.2 
LMI  20 
Independents 31.8 
 
Secular groups 
 
II (1984-1988) 
IRP 48.2 
Independents 51.8 
 
Liberal-Islamist 
III(1988-1992) ACC and allies 48.3 
SCC 37.2 
Independents 24.5 
 
Few left-wing 
IV(1992-1996) ACC and allies 67.6 
Independents 33.4 
The majority of left-
wing ( SCC) 
 
V(1996-2000) 
ACC and allies 40.8 
Independents  29.6 
SOC and allies 296 
The majority of left-
wing ( SCC) 
VI(2000-2004) ACC and allies 25.5 
IIPF and allies 74.5 
Unsuccessful attempt 
of reformist 
disqualification 
VII (2004-2008) BII 82.5 The majority of 
reformists and left-
wings 
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Legislation Role 
 
To this point, it was explained how Majles acted as an institutional platform to co-opting 
the loyal political oppositions while ejecting or marginalizing alternative political groups. 
This section deals with another important function of Majles by which it tends to help the 
regime to remain in power. There is little doubt that Majles is central to the manipulation of 
political institutions to the regime advantage. It is largely because parliament has long been 
the focal point of law making in Iran. By considering a series of laws regarding the main 
Iranian political institutions it will be demonstrated how Majles contributed to the 
consolidation of the regimes through its legislation function. The underlying premise here is 
that Majles has the power and authority to propose laws or make significant amendments 
rather than merely approve the decisions has been made somewhere else. This in part can be 
understood by considering its actual power and capacity during different stages of law 
making process. In the following pages three important laws will be reviewed. 
 
Election laws 
 
Before turning to the law cases it is imperative to make sense of the origin of such laws. 
The context within which the laws originated dates back to the early days after the 
proclamation of the Islamic Revolution. At the time, the former parliament had been 
dismissed and the law-making authority was delegated to the Revolutionary Council, a 
temporary institution whose main task was to deal with the country affairs in the absence of a 
permanent government.
418
 The first draft of election law formulated by the Revolutionary 
Council was amended by Majles 43 time by the time of writing this thesis. Yet, two defining 
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moments can be identified in which the law was dramatically changed. The first turning point 
was, in the beginning of 1984 when a comprehensive new draft law was introduced in Majles 
by the executive.
 
A general glance indicates that the new law was not very much different 
from the previous one. However, once Majles had completed its burdensome process of 
voting on each article, substantial changes appeared in the final document. The most 
substantial changes were attributed to the setting of candidates‘ qualification. To be eligible, 
a candidate should have ―spiritual, as well as revolutionary commitment to Islam, and 
provide ‗evidence‘ of loyalty to the Islamic Republic.‖ Second, he must have ―total loyalty to 
the Great Leader, Imam Khomeini, and velayat-e-faqih. If it were not for CG‘s amendments, 
the draft bill was even more restrictive and exclusionary. The Council of Guardians also had 
its role in amending the draft bill. The draft of Article 32 had broadly stated that ―anyone who 
held a political, or administrative position during the Shah‘s regime, will not be eligible.‖ The 
council changed the article to apply only to an individual who had been involved as an 
―active and significant player‖ in the former regime. CG completely rejected Article 30 of the 
bill, stating that candidates could run in the regions in which they were born and in whose in 
which they had resided for only six months prior to the elections.
419
 With the insistence of the 
advocates of Rafsanjani in Majles, the clauses containing certain rules were also inserted. It 
was required now for the candidates to have political and social astuteness and provide proof 
of a formal education. In the previous election, the candidates simply stated on their 
applications what educational background they had without submitting any documentation. 
According to Dr Abbas Shaybani- a strong Rafsanjani supporter throughout the Majles- the 
pro Rafsanjani group wished that the insertion of these clauses would push voters to elect 
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those with university credentials.
420
  
The second crucial moment was in the late 1999 when the lame duck 5
th
 Majles, 
surprised by the reformist landslide victory in the presidential election reacted by initiating a 
version of the bill that increased considerably the supervisory powers of the Council of 
Guardians in every stage of Majles elections. According to Article 3 of the bill, "the 
Guardians Council will have the supervisory task in every stage of the parliamentary 
elections. This supervision will be expedient and comprehensive in every election related to 
the Majles.‖ Article 60, which was approved later, authorized the Council of Guardians to 
"disqualify any candidate for the parliament who commits any type of offence - or any 
offence which may affect the outcome of the election - and declare the election null and void.‖ 
Another bill gave the authority to the Council of Guardians to have two supervisors at each 
polling place. In 1999, the Expediency Council attempted to make the Council of Guardians 
explain its reasons for rejection to the candidates themselves under certain conditions. In 
practice, however, the Council of Guardian has often refrained from doing so.
421
 In reformist 
dominated 6
th
 parliament the MPs attempted to pass legislation laying down guidelines that 
limited the circumstances under which candidates could be disqualified. According to the 
new bill anyone can be a candidate unless he or she is declared ineligible beyond any doubt. 
In other words the ineligibility must be approved rather that than the eligibility. The 
approbatory supervision has also been changed to simple supervision. It was obvious that the 
bill would be rejected by the Council of Guardians.  
In the light of these discussions it becomes apparent that the manipulation of Majles 
election laws including the motions stipulating vague and arbitrary condition for the 
candidates‘ qualification and also giving the absolute authority for the Council of Guardians 
                                                 
420
 Etellat, 29/12/ 1996 
421
 Kayhan, 29 June 1999. 
200 
 
to screen candidates‘ qualifications has been in line with other efforts to consolidate the 
regime and exclude the opponents.  
 
Political Parties Laws 
 
Another prime example of Majles manipulation of political institutions law is its 
initiatives in Political Parties Laws. Having lived in a dictatorship for ages, a great number of 
groups came to set up their own political organization shortly after the Islamic Revolution. 
Article 26 of the constitution stipulated the freedom of association by stating ―Parties, 
societies, political and corporate associations, as well as Islamic organizations and 
organizations of the recognized religious minorities, are free‖, as long as they do not damage 
―the foundations of the country‘s independence, freedom, national unity‖, or ―Islamic 
principles and the foundations of the Islamic Republic‖. The explicit intention of Article 26 
gave rise to the explosion of diverse political organizations. The prevailing freedom to found 
organizations triggered virtually all extant political thought and trend to create their own 
organization. As a result, in the first few months after the revolution the number of political 
organization exceeded 100.
422
 However, the freedom, which made it possible to form these 
organizations, was short-lived.  There has long been conflict between Islamic and secular 
groups struggling for power. The Islamic Revolution brought these old conflicts to the 
surface. The ruling clergy employed any means to eliminate the political organizations that 
they found unacceptable. In particular Majles played a significant role in this regard by taking 
the initiative in proposing a law concerning political parties.
423
 The law initiated by Majles 
called ―The Law on the Activities of Parties, Societies, Political and Corporate Organizations, 
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Islamic Associations and Associations Founded by Recognized Religious Minorities‖. 
Among others, this law made the formation of parties dependent on formal approval of the 
Ministry of the Interior. The approval should be issued by a commission called the article 10 
commission composed of one representative of the chief public prosecutor, one from the 
Supreme Court, one from the Ministry of the Interior and two MPs. The article 10 
commission also continuously retrains supervision over the activities of approved parties and 
organizations. In cases where it understands that the activities of any party are against the 
1aw it can withdraw its approval and propose before the courts that the party be dissolved. 
Ten loosely defined offences provide justifications for requesting that a party be dissolved. 
These include activities ‗which exploit the existing religious, racial and cultural diversity in 
Iranian society in order to stir up or intensify conflict within the ranks of the Iranian nation ... 
which harm the Islamic principles and foundations of the Islamic Republic ... which promote 
anti-Islamic propaganda‘, as well as those which involve ‗the distribution of books and other 
publications that lead people astray‘, or undermine the independence of the country.424 This 
list of offences represents the same accusations that the ruling clerics had often made against 
the political parties which were repeated by their supporters during the parliamentary debate 
over the law. For instance, MP Hosein Harati warned against emulating a Western model of 
political parties. Rather he stated that the Islamic Republic was itself a model that others 
should emulate. ―We do not want democracy but a republic which is under the supervision of 
velayat-e faqih.‖ He characterized ‗the small political groups‘ that had come to existence 
after the revolution as ‗products of Russian or American origin‘ and stressed that the law 
should curtail their activities.
425
Similarly another MP, Mohammad Taqi Besharat, declared 
that the law would ensure the freedom only of those who pursue the progressive goal as 
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velayat-e faqih. He described the oppositions of the regime as ‗microbes in the body of 
society‘ and said that ‗measures of hygiene‘ should be applied in society that was thus 
afflicted.
426
 During its second reading, MPs put forward proposals to make the bill more 
austere. Movahhedi Savoji proposed that groups with suspicious platforms should simply be 
refused an approval - there was no need to wait until they contravened the law.
427 
To prevent 
the fomenting of a conspiracy by parties, Ayat proposed that they be obliged to reveal the 
names of their members to the commission provided for in Article 10 of the proposed law. 
However, a proposal to define offences cited in the law as political which, in accordance with 
Article 168 of the constitution, would have meant that they would be tried before a jury, was 
rejected. The opposition declared itself to be against the bill, but they were in an absolute 
minority. For instance, Mohammad Mohammadi contended that it was in tune with the spirit 
of despotism. Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari pointed out that it was contrary to the 
constitution which did not stipulate that parties could only be founded if they received 
approval from the government authorities.
428
 Since the prohibitions on parties after the 
revolution were for the most part imposed before the law on parties was passed,
 
one must 
again conclude that the real purpose of this law was not simply to regulate political parties. 
The fact that for a number of years there was no question of enforcing the law also leads to 
the same conclusion. The Majles election of 1996 and particularly after the presidential 
election of Mohammad Khatami, who was an advocate of their role in civil society, was 
considered to be a resurgence of political parties‘ activities. Surprisingly, despite reformists 
MPs‘ pledge in the sixth Majles election to promote the democracy and civil society they 
were very reluctant to talk about political parties‘ law. All their efforts to try to enhance the 
political parties law is confined to a governmental decree to allocate financial assistance to 
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existing political parties.
429
  
Press Law 
 
A very interesting case in which Majles appeared both in favour and against an 
authoritarian institution is the case of Press Law. Following the Islamic Revolution, freedom 
of speech and expression thrived, albeit briefly. In contrast to the former regime in which 
censors sat in the editorial rooms of newspapers and the state-run radio and television, the 
Islamic Revolution pledged to uphold and respect press freedom. This appeared in Article 24 
of the constitution by stating that:  ―Publications and the press have freedom of expression 
except when it is detrimental to the basic principles of Islam or the rights of the public‖. ―The 
details of this exception will be specified by law.‖ 430 On paper this was a vast improvement 
compared to previously. However, the subsequent events unveiled the weak points of the 
revolution‘s commitment. Imposing constraint on the press was manifested in the law passed 
in the early months after the revolution and was approved by the Revolutionary Council in 
1979. The second was passed by Majles and approved by CG in1986 in the midst of the Iran-
Iraq War. Although the first law restricted the freedom of the press, it was far less drastic 
than the second. Even while the bill for the second law was being discussed in Majles, the 
censorship and the restriction on the press were so harsh that some MPs could not refrain 
from characterizing the law as superfluous and in fact harmful. Mohammad Ali Hadi MP 
declared that the problem with the press was not the lack of a regulatory law, but rather the 
fact that criticism was not tolerated and thus the press underwent self-censorship and avoided 
publishing any material on controversial subjects. He compared the problem of the press to 
that of Majles. In parliament too everyone had to consider his words ‗a thousand times‘ 
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before speaking. He feared that if the bill in question were passed, the press would be 
hindered from publishing the little bit that it still dared to say those days.
431
 ‗Ali Panahandeh 
MP drew attention to the population‘s annoyance at the way the press was obliged to toe the 
party line: ‗The media‘ he stated, ‗are either directly censored or they censor themselves.‘432 
As the decade progressed, in the absence of well-organized and properly structured 
political parties, newspapers became their surrogates.  Their circulations indicate the size of 
their support after Khatami‘s victory. As such, from the summer of 1988 until the aftermath 
of sixth Majles polls of 2000, the press had a significant impact on democratization. The 
impact of the press is so profound in this period that some observers called it as ‗the press 
revolution.‘  But this left the conservatives vulnerable to charges that they stood in the way of 
civil liberties—an unpopular stand they were not yet prepared to take in public. They, 
therefore, rallied their forces within the institutions they still controlled, primarily the 
judiciary and the intelligence service.  At first, they put pressure on the Ministry of Islamic 
Guidance to limit the domestic press. However, they soon realized that it was far better to use 
the courts which they dominated, to close newspapers and imprison leading publishers and 
editors.
433
 At the same time, the conservatives assembled a package of tough new press 
restrictions and then rammed them through the last days of the fifth Majles, just before the 
reformers and independents were due to take over the Majles. Among the key changes was a 
ban on any criticism of the Islamic constitution, whose shortcomings and contradictions were 
seen by many reformers as an obstacle to democratic reform. The new law also made it easier 
to close newspapers without trial and effectively required security clearances for all 
journalists, giving the secret police veto power over who could and who could not work.
434
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Many saw the revised press regulations, passed by an outgoing Majles in the face of 
enormous popular opposition, as a payback for Khatami‘s promises to implement the rule of 
law.  
The new Majles had every intention to revise the law. Reformist MP Mohammed Reza 
Khabaz told the legislature: "The newspapers are the voice of the people. We must not 
silence the people's voice by our actions". Another MP Reza Akrami said: "These [changes] 
guarantee the correctness and health of the press".
435
  The new draft was prepared and 
introduced by MPs. But to their surprise and disappointment, on the scheduled date for 
debating and voting on the amendments to the Press Law, Majles president Karrubi read out a 
letter he had received from Leader Khamanei the night before. ―If the enemies of Islam, the 
revolution, and the Islamic system take over or infiltrate the press, it will be a big danger to 
the country‘s security and the people‘s religious beliefs,‖ said Khamanei. ―Therefore I cannot 
allow myself and other officials to keep quiet in respect of this crucial issue. The bill is not 
legitimate and not in the interest of the system and the revolution.‖ Reformist leaders had 
reckoned that the Council of Guardians would veto the bill and that it would end up with the 
Expediency Council headed by Rafsanjani since 1997. But neither they nor their ranks had 
anticipated that Khamanei would make this drastic, unprecedented intervention at this early 
stage. His vetoing of the bill meant indefinite suspension of the matter. There were angry and 
shouted protests in the chamber. Scuffles broke out between reformists and conservatives.
436
 
But Khamanei had acted within his powers as described in Article of 110 of the constitution, 
which charged him with ―delineation of the general policies‖ of the Islamic Republic. ―Our 
constitution has the elements of the absolute rule of the Supreme Clerical Leader, and you all 
know this and approve of this,‖ said Speaker Karrubi. ―We are all duty bound to abide by 
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it.‖ 437  The next day, thousands of raucous conservatives assembled outside the Majles 
complex to demonstrate their backing for Khamanei‘s edict. The situation was so surcharged 
that many onlookers felt that the chanting crowd might storm the building. It did not. As the 
existing Press Law banned direct criticism of the Leader, the reformist bloc directed its anger 
at its conservative rivals. On August 13, a motion pledging to advance reform and accusing 
the conservative bloc of manipulating Khamanei‘s letter was signed by 161 deputies (out of 
274).
438
  
The following day, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Council of Guardians, spoke 
―You cannot save Islam with liberalism and tolerance,‖ he declared. ―I am announcing 
clearly and openly that the closure of the [pro-reform] newspapers was the best thing the 
judiciary has done since the revolution.‖439 Faced with this reaction, the reformist centrist-
leftist majority in the sixth Majles decided to lower its horizons. It knew only too well that 
the institutions directly controlled by the Leader, and functioning outside the purview of the 
Majles, included the Ministry of Intelligence, the judiciary, the military, the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, the state-run radio and television, and the richly endowed 
foundations which controlled a substantial segment of the economy.
440
 
The subsequent efforts to amend the law also proved fruitless. The decree of the Leader 
was so changeless and immutable that prohibited even discussion on the issue. Two years 
later, an amendment to make minor changes including the removal of limitations on the 
geographical distribution of a publication and the elimination of restrictions on subjects that 
could be covered by a publication was proposed by MPs. CG rejected the bill citing that the 
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Supreme Leader of the Revolution's [Khamene'i's] letter to the Majles about the Press Law 
has ruled that it [the amendment] contravenes the shari'ah and Article 57 of the constitution
441
  
In subsequent years, the Judiciary authorized by law, closed more than 20 newspapers 
and journals. The UN Special Rapporteur in 2004 deplored ―the climate of fear induced by 
the systematic repression of people expressing critical views, including imprisoning 23 
journalists and closing 98 publications.‖442 Despite courageous attempts to keep alive the 
relatively free press that had generated so much public excitement, press freedom was 
doomed.
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Conclusion  
Throughout this chapter it was demonstrated how the Iranian ruling elites used Majles to 
co-opt the opponents and manipulate the political institutions. Majles was identified as a 
forum through which the founding members of IRP, the conservative clerics loyal to 
Ayatollah Khomeini, were able to reinforce the disunity of opponents and make policy 
concessions with them. In this process, the exclusionary formula of electoral system and 
supervisory role of CG facilitated Majles role in dividing the opponents and making 
concession with them. It was discussed that in the first Majles, a few Liberal-Islamist were 
elected to Majles while all secular groups were eliminated. Since 1984 only candidates 
unequivocally committed to velayat-e faqih have been allowed to run. As a result the Liberal-
Islamists which were offered Majles seats in the first Majles session were barred from 
running the election. With the passage of years the differences among those loyal advocates 
to Khomeini came to the surface and fundamental ideological divisions and power rivalry 
became apparent. Two apparent divisions were Conservatives and Radicals. Upheld by 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Radicals formed the majority in the second (1984-1988) and third 
Majlis (1988— 1992), but after Khomeini's death the conservatives gained unprecedented 
power.  They dominated the CG and through which they abrogated to themselves the right to 
vet candidacies and proceeded to invalidate the candidacies of most radicals. Consequently, 
conservatives dominated the fourth and fifth Parliaments (1992-2000) with pragmatist 
supporters of Rafsanjani forming the minority. The sixth Majles was an exception. The 
majority of sixth Majles seats were taken by reformists. In fact, the conservative encapsulate 
their reformists‘ opponents in Majles to make concession and more importantly exercise 
control over them. For the Majles elections of 2004, however, conservative had upper hand in 
power, feeling no obligation to make concession with outsiders. As a result, CG disallowed 
the majority reformist candidates, including about eighty sitting MPs.  
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The centrality of Majles is distinctly traceable in almost all attempts to manipulate the 
law regarding political institutions in regime advantages. The most notable example is 
election laws. It was Majles initiative that legalized the vague and arbitrary condition for the 
candidates‘ qualification and increased the exclusionary role of Council of Guardians to 
screen candidates‘ qualifications. In the same token, Majles played a decisive role to impose 
severe restriction on the political parties and also the establishment of a commission called 
the article 10 commission retaining supervision continuously over the activities of approved 
parties and organizations. The amendment of Majles in Press Law resulting in the package of 
tough new press restrictions in the last days of the fifth Majles made it easier to close 
newspapers without trial and effectively required security clearances for all journalists, giving 
the secret police veto power over who could and who could not work.  In general, a cursory 
review of the laws passed by Majles regarding the main democratic institutions reveals that 
Majles has enhanced authoritarian institutions much through its legislative role. None of the 
laws reviewed offers a contribution to democracy and each contradict significantly 
democratic values.  
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Conclusion  
Most of this research has grown out of the author‘s previous employment in Majles 
Research Centre in sixth Majles session between 2000 and 2004.  This period coincided with 
the most flourishing time in Majles history. Since Islamic Revolution, it was for the first time 
that a number of reformist-minded MPs forced their way into the Majles pledging to make 
the most of Majles capacity to accomplish the democratic missions. With this conviction in 
mind and overwhelmed with the mainstream literature in parliaments and democratization, 
the departure point in the first draft of the research was the premises that parliaments can and 
should make much contribution to the consolidation of democratization in the context under 
study, Iran. Yet, once the sixth Majles session came to a close, the balance sheet of what it 
was able to gain showed that the high hopes about the role of Majles in democratization had 
been completely dashed. In the hindsight of this session, it became evident that the 
experience of democratizing or newly democratized countries have not fared well when 
extended to the Majles case. Instead, the scholarship on parliaments under authoritarian 
regimes proved to be more appropriate to this case. As a result, the current draft draws 
exclusively on these literatures and their alternative theories.  
Rather than a mere review of the relevant literature on the role of legislatures in regime 
change and durability in authoritarian regimes, this study sought to develop a comprehensive 
framework based on the legislative institutionalization by which one can understand and 
analyze the capacity and performance of legislatures in the authoritarian context. As such, 
this research serves to be both a product of and a supplement to extant literature on 
legislatures under authoritarian regimes. It also offered a better understanding of the complex 
story of Iran‘s post revolutionary parliament Majles, an outstanding institution in a country 
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that is frequently heard about but rarely understood. Several conclusions can be drawn from 
the research.  
For one thing, despite enduring quest for democratization and intermittent movements 
away from authoritarian regimes in the course of contemporary Iranian history, the 
democratic openings either stalled or aborted exclusively in Iran. The democratization 
process proved to be an unsuccessful struggle in Iran, characterised by one step forward two 
steps back. Given the resilience of authoritarianism in Iran, the alternative question in this 
context, however is how institutions may generate the conditions to contribute to the 
longevity of authoritarian regimes rather than how they can contributing to democracy. As 
such, central to this study was the conditions under which Majles could contribute to the 
resilience of authoritarian regimes. Inspired by legislative institutionalization approach three 
main characteristics were identified: subordination as oppose to autonomy, exclusiveness as 
oppose to representativeness and secrecy as oppose to deliberativeness.  
With respect to subordination criteria it was demonstrated that Majles is greater in 
subordination. Majles is caught between powerful and influential formal and informal 
institutions. In particular, informal institutions outside Majles have a decisive impact on the 
autonomy of Majles and its contribution to the survival of the current regime in Iran. It put 
into question the widely accepted idea that Iranian political culture as the main reason for 
democracy failure in Iran by offering empirical evidence from recent polls. Instead it 
discussed relatively overlooked factors, informal institutions, which have been an outstanding 
consequence for democratic fate in Iran. These informal institutions constitute a secret 
network which exerts absolute control over Majles. In the absence of political parties, 
factions are in charge of offering Majles candidates lists and also able to mobilize thousands 
of volunteers through their vast networks of mosques and foundations. The Ahmadinezhad‘s 
presidency in 2005 also ushered in an era in Iranian history viewed by many observers as 
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militarization of Iran politics. This encouraged many IRGC members to occupy Majles seats. 
The dominance of factions and military endangered increasingly Majles autonomy.  
There exists a labyrinth of formal institutions constraining the autonomy of Majles in 
many ways. In particular, the Iranian political system is marked by the coexistence of 
multiple centres of powers nested in numerous unelected and elected institutions. The 
unelected institutions were created by the hard-line clerics shortly after the Islamic 
Revolution and share overlapping responsibilities with the elected ones. They, however, 
served to be superior to the elected ones and retain the ultimate control over them. Majles as 
an elected institution is no exception. The Great Leader is at the helm of power in Iran. The 
frequent intervention of the Great Leader in very sensitive issues, normally falling within the 
authority of Majles, has increasingly jeopardized Majles autonomy. In addition, CG rule on 
the constitutionality of Majlis actions has increasingly vetoed Majlis actions. The numerous 
parliamentary decisions rejected by CG reveals the limitation of the legislative role of Majles. 
The Expediency Council, initially established to mediate between Majles and CG, turned out 
to an institution enjoying legislative authority capable of framing legislation independently of 
Majles and CG. As discussed, Majles enjoy some autonomy with respect to the executive but 
it is absolutely subordinate to the Great Leader, CG and the Expediency Council. The 
membership autonomy of Majles is also curtailed in several senses. Although Iranian MPs 
enjoy a comprehensive immunity, the courts have summoned deputies in several instances for 
offences that include speeches made in the Majles. It was also shown that more than half of 
the deputies are elected to parliament for the first time. The high turnover of new MPs in 
Majles, is striking indicator of the lack of professionalization which ensured the 
subordination of Majles. Likewise, massive staff clean-up at the beginning of each new 
period is another factor that accounts for the lack of Majles institutionalization. 
Majles also fell short of meeting the representativeness and deliberativeness identified as 
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decisive criteria, distinguishing authoritarian from democratic legislatures. The exclusionary 
gate keeping role of CG in vetting the aspirants to run for Majles election was identified as 
the most formidable barrier against Majles representativeness. In fact, the members of 
parliaments ultimately are elected from among the candidates approved by the Council of 
Guardians. Another barrier Majles election faced is the electoral formula. The plurality model 
with a second ballot served the interest of Iran‘s ruling power bloc at the expense of the 
voters. Fraud and corruption are rampant in Majles election. The interference of informal 
institution such as influential military and clergymen and their bonyads
 
is a prime example of 
unfair access to the campaign resources. The quantitative characteristics of MPs in terms of 
gender and social status indicate unequal refection of Iranian population diversity. Finally the 
constituency services workload leave the MPs with little time for dealing with important law 
making and monitoring duties.  
Deliberativeness, as defined in this research can scarcely be regarded as an integral 
feature of Majles. Majles sittings are held openly but Iran's network (IRIB) run under 
supervision of the Great Leader has frequently distorted the news releasing biased 
interpretation. The committee meetings are absolutely closed to the public and the media and 
no public hearing is held when examining the legislation. Finally to date, Majles has failed to 
approve and enforce rules on conflicts of interest which promote the independence of 
legislators from private interests or unreasonable political pressures. That made Majles prey 
to corrupt interests, exercised through powerful informal networks outside Majles. Majles 
also suffered from the lack of sufficient regulation for the protection of the dignity of the 
legislature.   
In the light of above discussions it is evident that Majles is subordinated to influential 
and powerful formal and informal institutions serving as a means to exclude the opponents 
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rather than represent the populations and internal organization shrouded in secrecy and as a 
result the integrity of Majles is increasingly in question.  
With respect to the Majles‘ performance it is not an exaggeration to say that Majles has 
been at the centre of the regime co-optation strategies since the beginning of Islamic 
Revolution to encapsulate the loyal oppositions and to exclude those were regarded as 
outsiders. In so doing, Majles served to divide oppositions or reinforce their disunity. In the 
first Majles the secular groups were eliminated from Majles thanks to the exclusionary 
electoral formula. The second Majles excluded the liberal-islamist groups with assistance of 
CG. And since then CG turned out to the main agent to control the selection of candidates.  
Majles also acted as the main agent of manipulation of political institutions through its 
law making function and by this contributed to the stability of the Islamic Republic. The 
centrality of Majles is apparent in the attempts to manipulate the law regarding authoritarian 
political institutions. Most proposals of such laws emanated from Majles. Majles was 
significant in that it changed the rule of the game in post revolutionary Iran. By emphasizing 
legality written into legislation by Majles, the arbitrary use of power by ruling authorities and 
state institutions was considerably reduced and it bound the state to the rule of law. These 
gains however did not sustain democratic reforms in Iran. Although the ruling circle would 
continue to behave in authoritarian ways, thanks to Majles they do so increasingly within the 
bounds of law using the legal forums.  So it is ironic – but again perhaps unsurprising – that 
Majles in post-revolutionary Iran has contributed to the rule of power at expense of the rule 
of law.  
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APPENDIX I: LIST OF RESPONDENTS TO 
INTERVIEW 
 
 
Alaei, Housein. Majles Committee Secretary. 
 
Alami, Akbar, Sixth Majles MP. 
 
Ansari Rad, Hussein. Sixth Majles MP 
 
Armin Muhsen, Sixth Majles MP. 
 
Ghabel, Hadi. Member of the central council of the Participation  
 
Hosseini, Ahmad. Majles Press Correspondent.  
 
Jalali, Kazem. Sixth and Seventh Majles MP. 
 
Khatami, Mohammad Reza. Sixth  Majles vice-President.  
 
Kula‘i Elahe, Sixth Majles MP. 
 
Ansari, Majid Sixth Majles MP. 
 
Qadayani, Abolfazl, Political activist 
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